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The focus of this thesis is on elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. Originating 
from the fertile yet crowded slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, this group is amongst the 
most entrepreneurial and best educated in Tanzania. In the literature on ethnicity, 
elites are usually understood as playing a key role in the imagining of ethnicities, while 
at the same time usually being venal and manipulating ethnicity for purely instrumental 
means. Yet this approach not only risks misrepresenting elites; it also clouds our 
understanding of ethnicity itself. This thesis interrogates themes of elites, politics and 
ethnicity through an examination of the trajectories of Chagga experience from the 
1850s to the present. 
 
Any discussion of Chagga ethnicity must have at its centre place - the landscape of 
Kilimanjaro, and the kihamba banana garden. Ideas of Chagga ethnicity were shaped by 
how the very first European explorers and missionaries saw the landscape of the 
mountainside. This formed how the colonial Tanganyikan state treated the Chagga 
people, placing them in an advantageous position through education, and a wealthy one 
through the growing of coffee. In the 1950s, the Chagga ethnic group came under a 
single political leadership for the first time with the introduction of a Paramount Chief. 
This decade marked a period of Chagga nationalism. The role of intellectuals in the 
articulation and imagination of Chagga ethnicity is examined through two Chagga-
authored ethnohistories. After independence in 1961, the advantages of the colonial 
period placed Chagga elites in key roles in the new state. However, as Tanzania moved 
towards Julius Nyerere’s ujamaa socialism, the policies of the state began to clash with 
the more capitalist outlook of the Chagga elite. Nevertheless, through educational 
achievement and international migration, members of the Chagga elite were able to 
remain influential and powerful. As such, they were in an ideal position to take 
advantage of the political and economic liberalisation, even as new challenges emerged 
from within Kilimanjaro itself. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the role of 
ethnicity in the 2005 Presidential elections in Tanzania.  
 
This thesis makes a contribution to the literature on ethnicity in Africa by providing an 
account of elites that is more nuanced than in much of the existing literature. Even 
though Kilimanjaro saw one of the strongest manifestations of ethnic nationalism during 
the colonial period, Chagga elites contributed greatly to the nation-building project in 
postcolonial Tanzania. Tanzanian nationalism, however, did not destroy a Chagga 
identity, but rather enabled a new imagining of Chagga ethnicity which today continues 
to have a role and saliency within the Tanzanian nation. 
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This thesis examines the trajectories of elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. This 
is a group that originates from the southern and eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, 
and is usually understood as one of the most capitalist-orientated groups in Tanzania. 
My focus will be on elite members of this ethnic group. As argued by Richard Werbner 
(2004) of elites in Botswana, African elites are not usually described in a positive light 
by the academic literature; they are frequently portrayed as little more than tyrants and 
thieves. Werbner, however, calls for a more empathetic and insightful view of elites. I 
argue that the negative portrayal of elites is particularly problematic when approaching 
questions of ethnicity, which are central to this thesis. With regard to ethnicity, many 
theorists state that elites are of great importance in the imagination of ethnic identity. 
Yet at the same time, these elites are described as purely instrumentally manipulating 
ethnicity for their own ends. This description, I argue, not only runs the danger of 
misrepresenting the elites: it is also theoretically problematic and clouds our 
understanding of theories of ethnicity. If the elites are playing such key roles in the 
imagination of ethnicity, and their own motives are the self-serving manipulation of 
ethnicity along instrumentalist lines, does this not reduce ethnicity to being purely 
instrumental? I argue that this is problematic for many theorists of ethnicity, as 
	   2	  
instrumental theories alone fail to account for the appeal and power of ethnicity. Of 
course, it would be equally as problematic to assume purely altruistic motives to elites, 
or to deny that elites can be cunning and astute political actors. Rather, an analysis that 
has a more nuanced approach to elites provides can only a increase the richness of our 
understanding of ethnicity.  
 
A study of the elite members of the Chagga ethnic group provides an excellent 
opportunity to explore these themes. It is a group that is often portrayed, and portrays 
itself, as being non-homogenous. They do not share a common origin, nor a common 
myth of origin, and there is a long history of intra-Chagga warfare and competition 
between the chiefdoms of the mountain. Perhaps most interestingly from the 
perspective of theories of ethnicity, they do not have a common language, but rather a 
series of mutually-unintelligible dialects. At the same time, although this group seems 
diverse, there is much to unite the Chagga ethnic group. In the 1950s, they had one of 
Tanganyika’s strongest ethnic nationalisms under a paramount chief. Their reputation 
as traders and capitalists finds Chagga people all over Tanzania. Most importantly, I 
argue, the kihamba system is found across the mountainside, and provides the most 
important aspect of the Chagga lifeworld. 
  
Thus, the Chagga ethnic group is a fascinating case on which to base a study of theories 
of ethnicity. Despite the fact that Kilimanjaro receives a great deal of attention from 
researchers in a broad range of fields, surprisingly few deal directly with questions of 
ethnicity. This thesis makes a new contribution to the body of literature on Kilimanjaro 
through an examination of these themes, and does so through a variety of ways. First, 
while in previous decades some authors such as Kathleen Stahl (1964) have examined 
strata of elite Chagga membership, this is the only recent study of the Chagga ethnic 
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group to have this focus, placing the elites in a wider context in a way not performed by 
Stahl. The focus on elites gives a new perspective on the existing debates of perennial 
importance in Kilimanjaro, such as land shortages and migration. Secondly, this study 
has breadth: most studies of the Chagga ethnic group limit themselves to one subgroup, 
whereas my study attempts to encompass a broader Chagga identity. It does this 
through the study of elites, who cut across the divisions between rival ex-chiefdoms. 
Thirdly, it has an historic depth, which enables an analysis of the trajectories of Chagga 
experience through the changes in national politics and economics. Again, it is the focus 
upon elites that facilitates this depth. This thesis utilises the work of the earliest 
European explorers to Kilimanjaro, whose contact was almost solely with a chiefly elite. 
 
Tanzania is usually understood as a success story in African nation-building, particularly 
in the field of alleviating ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, the trajectory of the Chagga elite 
follows a similar pattern to that found in many African postcolonial states. This thesis 
argues that members of the Chagga elite, who were the recipients of many of the 
advantages of colonialism, particularly education, managed to maintain their elite 
position even though the policies of socialist Tanzania were aimed at evening-out 
development across the nation. With the liberalisation of the economy and politics, 
they were in an ideal position to take advantage of the new economic and political 
spaces that opened up. Yet in many ways Kilimanjaro remains a source of opposition in 
Tanzania. This trajectory, that the members of a group receiving the advantages of 
colonialism continued to be in a dominant position after independence, is a feature of 
many African postcolonies. The study of a particular example, that of the Chagga elite, 
provides an interesting account and serves to emphasise the role of agency of both state 
and non-state actors.  
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As I stated above, the Tanzanian nation is usually considered in the literature to be a 
great success in its nation-building. This thesis does not deny this; in fact, a study of a 
rebellious group such as the Chagga only serves to emphasise the successes of the 
nation-building project. However, the apparent stability of some African nations does 
not necessarily mean that they have solved the divisions in society. A 1999 edited 
collection, Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, contains a chapter on how 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania had been successful in maintaining peace through containing 
potential conflict (Dashwood and Pratt 1999). Writing in 1999, as well as praising the 
successes of Tanzania, Dashwood and Pratt (1999: 224) praise Zimbabwe’s “relative 
[success] in maintaining both political and economic stability”. Subsequent events in 
Zimbabwe have arguably shown these claims of the stability of Zimbabwe to be flawed. 
While I argue that Tanzania does not face the same issues that developed later in 
Zimbabwe, the example of the Dashwood and Pratt chapter shows how the divisions 
that remain in a society can remain despite the apparent stability. 
 
Given that Tanzania is a rare example of an African postcolony that is praised for its 
internal stability and successful nation-building, it is a fascinating case to study. 
However, the existing literature on the role of ethnicity in Tanzanian politics has been 
limited. Compare Tanzania with its neighbour, Kenya: politics in Kenya is often seen 
“through an ethnic lens”, in which both Kenyan and outside observers view politics 
purely in terms of ethnic conflict, even when this does not present a full explanation for 
the Kenyan political scene (Lynch 2006: 61). While there are exceptions that do 
examine issues of ethnicity in Tanzania in more interesting ways (Askew 2002; Mercer, 
Page et al. 2008), studies that specifically look at the politics of Tanzania, tend to 
analyse ethnicity only in the context of describing Tanzania’s successful nation-building 
in the most glowing of terms. Many of these approaches fall into what Susan Geiger 
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(1997: 8-9) criticises as the “lacks and absences” approach;  approaches that explain 
Tanzania’s peace and stability only in terms of what the nation lacks, such as large 
ethnic groups. A recent example of this is Elliot Green’s (2011) analysis of the stability 
of Tanzania through its unique demographic qualities. This current thesis fills a gap in 
the analysis by examining the role of agency in the creation of this national unity; the 
agency, as Geiger examines, not only of party activists but also of the members of the 
Chagga ethnic group opposed in some respects to the party’s project.  
 
This thesis argues that, in a number of important respects, Tanzania did not eliminate 
ethnic differences in the country, nor did it cure the effects of the legacies of 
colonialism. However, this thesis does not conclude that the Tanzanian nation is facing 
great instability. A series of articles, mostly in the 1990s, claimed that Tanzania’s 
national unity was under threat from the strains of economic and political liberalisation. 
This thesis addresses these concerns with an examination of the multiparty elections in 
Tanzania, and the presidential candidates of Chagga ethnicity who stood in the 
elections. I find that, while the ethnicity of the candidates has a role to play, ethnicity 
has not turned out to be the divisive and destructive force that some had feared. 
 
This introduction first examines the background to the Chagga ethnic group in 
Tanzania, and then focuses on the variations present in the group. The introduction 
goes on to discuss theories of ethnicity. Then there is a discussion on the importance of 
the elite research, and a discussion on the nature of the Chagga elite. Next is a 
discussion of my fieldwork and the methodological issues it raised. Finally, there is a 
summary of the rest of the chapters of this thesis.  
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The Chagga Ethnic Group and the kihamba 
 
The Chagga ethnic group have as their homeland the southern slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro, on the Tanzanian side of the Kenya-Tanzania border. The sizes of the 
populations of ethnic groups in Tanzania are hard to estimate: in the interests of 
national unity questions of ethnicity have not been asked on censuses since the last 
census of the colonial period (Gulliver 1969: 36-37). This census, of 1957, gave the 
Chagga population as 318,167 (Moore 1977a: x). Estimating the Chagga population 
becomes particularly difficult because of the  migration from Kilimanjaro to urban and 
rural areas elsewhere in Tanzania. The 2002 census gives the population of the Chagga-
dominated districts of Hai, Moshi Rural, and Rombo as totalling 908,868; the 
population of Moshi Urban is of more mixed ethnicity, but is mostly Chagga, and is 
given as 144,336 (National Bureau of Statistics 2002b). Population density in the 
kihamba belt is high. Sally Falk Moore (Moore 1986: 110) described the area as a 
“rururb”: a rural area with an urban population density. 
 
Central to Chagga life and identity is the kihamba banana grove. The kihamba belt, the 
zone of the mountain between 900 and 1,800 metres (3,000 and 6,000 feet) that was 
suitable for the cultivation of bananas, would become key to Chagga on many levels 
(Setel 1999: 32). The kihamba banana garden is not large, today typically being only 
around a hectare in size (Devenne, Chapuis et al. 2006: 178), but it contains not only 
the home of a Chagga man and his family but also the staple banana crop, vegetables, 
livestock and, after the start of the 20th century, coffee. The kihamba is of key 
importance to Chagga people: 
The kihamba existed on many levels at once – material and 
metaphorical. The kihamba was the lineage reproducer, 
agricultural producer, and the provider of material for shelter. 
It was a unit of political capital and the living manifestation of 
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key cosmological processes. Yet, first and foremost, it was none 
of these, but in its varied cultural topography, and with shifting 
emphases over time, it has simultaneously been all of them. 
(Setel 1999: 30) 
 
There is an extent to which a feeling of attachment to home is a common feature. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that this attachment is seen as being particularly strong 
amongst the Chagga ethnic group. Charles Dundas notes that Chagga people are “more 
attached to his home and country than is usual among Africans” (Dundas 1924: 195). 
More contemporarily, there is evidence that other ethnic groups consider Chagga 
people as more connected to their home places than other groups, with an elite member 
of a different ethnic group being quoted as saying “the Chaggas are more home-loving 
than we are… but if we can learn from them…” (Mercer, Page et al. 2008: 201). Thus, 
Chagga ethnicity is closely associated with place. One of the most important crops of 
the kihamba is the banana, with various varieties grown that not only serve as a staple 
food but are also used in brewing mbege, a beer brewed from bananas and millet (Von 
Clemm 1964). Another plant of great importance is masale, a variety of dracaena, which 
is known as the “plant of peace and pardon” and serves as the border of the kihamba, a 
plant which gives a “supernaturally protected legal right” to the land (Moore 1986: 81-
82). 
 
The plant that had the greatest economic impact, however, was the coffee tree. Arabica 
coffee was introduced to Kilimanjaro at the beginning of the 20th century, grown in the 
individual kihamba alongside the bananas. Coffee had been grown in Kilimanjaro since 
1896, but the planting of coffee by Chagga people was not encouraged by the Germans 
as it was a danger to their own production (Ogutu 1972: 280). However, after the First 
World War as the territory became a League of Nations mandate, coffee growing by 
Chagga people was encouraged by the British administration. The District Officer for 
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Kilimanjaro from 1919-24 was Major (later Sir) Charles Dundas. Dundas was 
instrumental in pushing for Chagga people to start growing coffee. He was involved in 
1923 with the establishment of the Kilimanjaro Native Planter’s Association (KNPA), 
the predecessor to the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), to represent 
the interests of Chagga planters against European settlers (Moore 1977a: 17).  
 
While there are coffee estates in parts of Kilimanjaro, much of the coffee production in 
Kilimanjaro was done within the kihamba. The banana plants provide the necessary 
shade for the coffee trees (Munger 1952: 181). Thus, coffee was added to existing 
cultivation methods, rather than replacing them. This led to a continuation of both 
agricultural systems and norms of inheritance (Moore 1986: 117). Yet coffee, and the 
money it brought, caused great change on Kilimanjaro. It made Chagga people 
comparatively wealthy; although, as a senior agricultural officer commented in 1938, “It 
is generally held that the Chagga are a wealthy tribe. Is this actually the case? Much 
depends upon what standard constitutes a wealthy native” (Davies 1938: 27-28). 
Nevertheless, coffee-growers in Kilimanjaro were significantly better off than most of 
the rest of the country. In 1957-8, the national per capita income was £6, while the 
average annual payments to coffee farmers in Kilimanjaro and Meru was £47 (Pratt 
1976: 21). It led to what Moore (1986: 129) describes as a “cultural commitment” to 
the market, as Chagga people spent their money not only on goods but more 
importantly on education. Politically, the coffee production led to the creation of one 
of East Africa’s earliest cooperative unions, the KNCU: a “parallel, nonchiefly, 
nongovernmental organisation, mountainwide in its constituency” (Moore 1986: 124). 
It was this that funded the Chagga Council and the building of the 1950s. Perhaps more 
importantly as it pertains to this thesis, the introduction of coffee led to the creation of 
a new, nonchiefly elite. This elite, spending their coffee money on education, would in 
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time no longer be dependent on the crop, yet it was the introduction of this source of 
income that would allow the creation of a nonchiefly elite group. 
 
There is a striking difference in land use between the southern and eastern slopes (in 
what is now Tanzania), which are inhabited by agriculturalist Chagga, and the northern 
slopes (in what is now Kenya), where the conditions favour Maasai pastoralism 
(Campbell, Misana et al. 2004). Chagga people have also long held land further down 
the mountain slopes towards the plain, referred to as shamba, which is mostly for 
growing maize (Moore 1986: 82-84). This land, however, does not hold nearly the 
same importance that the kihamba does. It follows different inheritance rules. Most 
notably, however, this land “is unfit for human habitation… This is part of Chagga 
mythology – the bush is inhospitable with its brigands, animals and scorching heat” 
(Von Clemm 1964: 119). In fact, to a degree, any land away from the kihamba belt is 
not considered a right or moral place to live. Yet, Chagga people are found all over 
Tanzania: by 1957, members of the Chagga ethnic group were found in every region of 
Tanganyika save one. “All this for members of a cultural group that was known to 
stigmatise any land off and away from Mount Kilimanjaro as uniformly unfit for 
habitation by decent human beings” (Setel 1999: 68). 
 
Chagga Variation and Identity 
 
The Chagga ethnic group is, in many ways, not an homogenous group. A point regularly 
emphasised to me while I was conducting fieldwork was the question as to whether 
Chagga consisted of a single ethnic group at all. The divisions within the Chagga ethnic 
group consist of a diversity of politics, history and language. 
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The Chagga ethnic group does not have a single origin; furthermore, there is no single 
myth of Chagga origin. The Bantu-speaking people who would become Chagga settled 
on the southern slopes of Mt Kilimanjaro in waves of migration, probably beginning 
around the 14th and 15th centuries (Moore 1977a: 5). Migrants came from the Galla, 
Kamba, Maasai, Pare, Unyamwezi and the Ngu Hills (Dundas 1924: 44; Stahl 1965: 
37; Moore 1977a: 6). People from these varied backgrounds settled in what became 
known as the kihamba belt. The initial migrants to the southern slopes of Kilimanjaro 
five or six centuries ago came not as a result of a single migration, war or empire-
building; rather they were attracted to this zone by the availability of water and the 
fertile soils suitable for the cultivation of bananas and grass for cattle (Stahl 1964: 43; 
Wimmelbücker 2002: 47). Thus, Chagga are of diverse origins. Furthermore, within 
most of the literature and my own research, Chagga people themselves readily recognise 
that the Chagga ethnic group has diverse origins away from Kilimanjaro1. This contrasts 
to some definitions of ethnicity presented in the academic literature, for example Bates’ 
(2006: 167) claim that “the term ‘ethnicity’ commonly refers to collectivities that share 
a myth of origin”. Such a definition is clearly faulty. The Chagga ethnic group is far from 
unique in lacking a common myth of origin; numerous empirical studies (including by 
Fardon (1987) and Lindgren (2004)) find other ethnic groups that neither have, nor 
claim to have, a common origin. It is clear from the Chagga example, as well as many 
others, that a common myth of origin is not an essential part of a definition of ethnicity, 
yet as Lentz (1995: 307) puts it, such views are “extraordinarily tenacious”. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The notable exception with the literature is Stahl’s (1964: 51) observation that no 
chief during the time of her research would admit that their lineage had origins 
anywhere but Kilimanjaro. She notes that this stands in contrast to earlier work, such as 
Dundas (1924). The most convincing explanation that she offers for this disparity is 
that this is the result of a fear of European settlement and land seizures during the time 
of her research, and the fear that an admission of coming from somewhere else might 
weaken the historical claim of Chagga occupation of the land. 
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If one looks at a map of the ex-chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro, still real entities within 
Chagga understandings of place, one can see that they are arranged in what Moore 
(1986: 24) refers to as a vertical alignment, running from the forest down toward the 
plain. This pattern persisted throughout the political shifts of the 19th and 20th centuries 
down to place names today. The reasons for this arrangement are threefold. First, while 
the kihamba belt is remarkably homogenous running east to west, ravines and gorges 
impeded movement across the mountainside (Devenne and Bart 2006: 97). Even today, 
travel east-west across the kihamba belt is often not possible and necessitates travelling 
down the mountain to the plain; in the past, during times of conflict, such a journey 
could be difficult or impossible. Secondly, microclimatic differences exist between 
various altitudes, encouraging vertical interlocal trade (Moore 1986: 23). The third 
reason is one of the features of Kilimanjaro that most impressed European visitors: the 
irrigation system. The system of furrows that brought a year-round water supply to the 
kihamba belt impressed many of the European visitors discussed in this chapter, only 
increasing in reputation, as Dundas (1924: 261) writes: “Europeans have often been 
inclined to suspect that these Africans have solved the mystery of making water to run 
uphill”. These irrigation channels allowed the cultivation of bananas and sugar cane all 
year round2 (Meyer 1891: 103). This furrow system, Dundas (1924: 262) argues, 
resulted in the development of chieftaincies in Kilimanjaro: “within the course of a 
furrow order must prevail.” (See also (Moore 1986: 23-24; Grove 1993)). By the late 
19th century, irrigation not only provided water, but became “a focal point of political 
and social relations” (Bender 2007: 9). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It was argued by two authors in the 1920s (Gillman 1923: 6-7; Dundas 1924: 262) 
that the irrigation system was not necessary for the production of any food crop, but 
rather for the production of eleusine, a crop used solely for brewing of mbege (banana 
beer). An informant of mine disagreed that this was the case, arguing that brewing was 
under the control of the monarchy for special occasions, doubting that it could be the 
basis of the rural economy (Personal Communication, 8/6/2008). 
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There is no doubt that the irrigation system was of great importance in the political and 
social development of Kilimanjaro; but using this to make essentialisations about 
Chagga ethnicity must be cautioned against. For example, the notable social 
anthropologist Bruno Gutmann, who published works of Chagga ethnography between 
1905 and 1936, wrote in 1913 linking the development of societies from their origins as 
hunter-gatherers. With the development of the water rights and land tenure: “[t]he 
drive (Triebkraft) towards higher forms of social organization was thus instilled into the 
tribe” (cited in Winter 1979: 107). Such an approach has been criticised because the 
history of Kilimanjaro is not so easily condensed into stages of history (Wimmelbücker 
2002: 73). A principal problem is that the irrigation system across Kilimanjaro is not 
constant, with the eastern slopes of Rombo having few furrows, agriculture there being 
mostly rain-fed (Stahl 1964: 339; Wimmelbücker 2002: 51). Thus, the approach of 
authors such as Gutmann is flawed; as Winter points out about Gutmann’s writing on 
this topic, it discloses more about the theories than the history (Winter 1979: 107). 
Writing of Africa in general, Goran Hyden argues that the unique quality of African 
peasantry is that it is essentially rain-fed; this Hyden uses to argue that the African 
peasant is more socially independent than his Asian counterpart, and thus is less 
required to enter into the modern cash economy (Hyden 1980: 10). The example of 
Chagga irrigation systems provides a counterexample to Hyden’s assertion that African 
agriculture is essentially rain-fed. Hyden himself notes that the Chagga have more of an 
entrepreneurial spirit, and have more readily entered into the cash economy than other 
ethnic groups (ibid.: 53-56), yet he does not link this to the presence of a developed 
irrigation system, even though doing to do so would serve to strengthen his argument. 
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Pre-19th-century Chagga society is reconstructed by Moore (1977a: 6) as consisting of 
small, mostly autonomous settlements, consisting of several or one large patrilineages. 
The mtaa (plural mitaa) lineage lands were at that time distinct but later, as the 
population of Kilimanjaro grew, changed to form the continuous settlement that exists 
on Kilimanjaro today. Villages as such do not, and never did, exist (Hemp 2006: 2). 
The mtaa remains a relevant and important unit today, as it is within the lineage that 
such issues as kihamba inheritance are governed (see, for example, Moore’s (1986) work 
on law and land tenure)3. Through the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, “what 
had originally been many independent and small Chagga chiefdoms were gradually 
merged through precolonial conquest and alliance (and later through colonial 
administrative fiat) into larger and larger chiefdoms” (ibid.: 24). This consolidation 
meant that the number of chiefdoms moved from over a hundred at the beginning of the 
19th century, to 37 by 1899 (Stahl 1965: 38). In 1924, Dundas (1924: 19-24) reports 
28, and by the introduction of indirect rule there were 15 (Stahl 1965: 38). Eventually, 
and briefly, there was a single paramount chief. These consolidations led to a pattern of 
chieftaincies in what Moore refers to as a vertical alignment, running from the forest 
down towards the plain (Moore 1986: 24), a pattern which persisted throughout the 
political shifts of the 19th and 20th centuries down to place names today. 
 
In Kilimanjaro in the late 1940s and 1950s, there was an active debate over the political 
shape of Kilimanjaro. Two commoners, early adopters of the coffee introduced at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lineage theory has come under attack in the literature, with Kuper (1982: 92-93) 
stating the model “has no value for anthropological analysis… fac[ing] its long-evident 
bankruptcy”. However, in the case of Kilimanjaro, “people talk about ‘lineages’… so 
frequently and so emphatically that it is safe to claim that lineage serves as an important 
source of identity” (Pietilä 2007: 146). Pietilä does emphasise, however, that 
acknowledging the importance of patrilineages and their rules does not mean the 
acceptance of a rule-guided model, and that the rules and membership of a lineage are 
not immutable and unchanging. 
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beginning of the 20th century, established a political organisation that led to the 
creation of a single political leadership for Kilimanjaro for the first time (Iliffe 1979: 
490-494). The preferred candidate of the pro-paramountcy lobby was Thomas 
Marealle. Thomas Marealle was of royal blood. He was the grandson of one of the most 
famous chiefs of Kilimanjaro’s past, Marealle, ruler of the chiefdom of Marangu from 
c.1880 until his retirement in 1912 (Stahl 1964: 308-336). Prior to his election, T. 
Marealle was not directly involved in Kilimanjaro’s active political scene. A promising 
civil servant, he was  sent to the UK for university courses and eventually became 
programme director of the Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station (Swahili Service) 
(Eckert 2006: 259-264). T. Marealle, with royal blood yet also educated and with 
much experience of working with the British administration, was an ideal candidate. He 
was elected into the post with a landslide on 10th November 1951 (Iliffe 1979: 493). 
 
The 1950s were a period of Chagga nationalism, led by T. Marealle. A flag, an anthem 
and an annual Chagga Day were established. The Chagga nationalism of the 1950s has 
been described as “the period of Chagga self-awareness” (Stahl 1965: 48). Despite the 
achievements of the paramountcy, it became increasingly unpopular. T. Marealle was 
seen as too close to the British administration, and was increasingly self-aggrandising. 
Chagga nationalism stood in opposition to the Tanganyikan nationalism of Julius 
Nyerere and TANU. As matters came to a head, a referendum was held in 1960 over 
whether to continue the paramountcy. The result was a eight to one majority for the 
abolition of the paramount chief. 
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Figure 1: Kilimanjaro in 1960 
 
(Source: (Stahl 1964)) 
 
While place names may reflect old chiefdoms, the chiefs were abolished in Kilimanjaro 
easily, with surprisingly little fuss. The newly independent government abolished the 
powers of chiefs shortly after independence, yet Chagga people had already rejected the 
institution with a referendum that had abolished the paramount chief in 1960. Most 
commentators on Kilimanjaro (including (Stahl 1964; Mramba 1966; Samoff 1974)) 
agree that the abolition of the institution of chieftaincy was abolished remarkably 
smoothly. This was not the case in some other parts of Tanzania. For example, 
Nyamwezi chiefs and headmen retained a great deal of influence in this period, acting as 
“intermediaries between modernising bureaucratic authorities and the custom-bound 
populace” (Miller 1968: 187). By contrast, some former chiefs in Kilimanjaro did 
attempt to stand for parliamentary elections in independent Tanganyika, but they were 
eliminated in the district selections (Mramba 1966: 1-7).  
 
The ease with which Chagga stopped traditional chiefly leadership is a curious factor in 
their history. For some commentators, Chagga identity and the institution of chieftaincy 
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seem to be intimately linked. Most notably, Kathleen Stahl’s History of the Chagga 
People of Kilimanjaro (1964), funded by the Chagga Council, presents Chagga history as 
essentially the diplomatic rivalries between the chiefs. Compiled during the 1950s, but 
not published until after the abolition of traditional rule, Stahl acknowledges the 
changes in the preface, admitting that the abolition “was effected with ease” (ibid.: 7). 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I make the argument that intellectual history can give an 
insight into the reasons why the chiefs were so easily wiped away. While the Chagga 
nationalism, and the writing of the likes of Stahl, present chiefly rule as essential to 
Chagga identity, there were at the same time rival conceptions that placed less emphasis 
on the chief. Particularly from the non-chiefly elite, chiefs were not essential to Chagga 
ethnicity. 
 
A notable divergence is the linguistic variations found across Kilimanjaro. Classifications 
of the languages can vary according to whether the language spoken in different parts of 
Kilimanjaro should be classed as different dialects or as unique languages in themselves. 
The Chagga today speak at least four distinct dialects, identified by Whiteley as Vunjo, 
Rombo, Kibosho and Machame. There are “considerable differences” between each 
dialect (Whiteley 1965: 68). Those from the chiefdom of Ngasseni, on the far east of 
the mountain, speak a language that cannot be understood even by their immediate 
neighbours (Stahl 1964: 343), whereas members of the Meru ethnic group to the west 
speak a dialect similar to that found in western Kilimanjaro4 (Spear 1997: 18). There is 
more linguistic variety within Chagga languages than there is between some other 
language groups that are given their own ethnic label. For example, there are bigger 
differences between Chagga dialects than there is between the central Kenyan languages 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Some authors use the phrase “Chagga-speaking peoples” to refer to members of the 
Chagga ethnic group (Tuan 2000; Myhre 2006; Bender 2007). This phrasing is 
problematic as it begs the question, what is a Chagga language? 
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of Kikuyu, Kamba and Embu, yet each of those have their own ethnic label (Phillipson 
and Montlahuc 2003: 475). The linguistic variety is interesting, as language is often 
considered one of the key determinants of an ethnic group. Language is often 
considered very important by writers on ethnicity. For example, historians (including 
Ranger (1989) and Johannes Fabian (1983)) give attention to the role of missionaries in 
standardising language dialects precisely because they are considered a key aspect of the 
imagining of ethnic identities. Leroy Vail (1989: 11) quotes Samuel Johnson’s adage 
that “languages are the pedigree of nations”. The importance of language is considered 
very great: “We are taught to express ourselves in a specific language which not only 
allows us to communicate and share in recorded material but places us in a specific 
cultural context” (Marâe 1993: 28).  
 
How, then, does the lack of a single Chagga language impact upon these theories of 
ethnicity? Is the existence of a linguistically diverse population evidence against the 
prevailing view that language is a key determinant of ethnicity? In actual fact, the lack of 
a common language has caused some angst amongst Chagga people. For example, during 
the discussions over the formation of the paramount chief, the debates had to be 
conducted in Swahili, rather than a Chagga dialect, as their dialects were mutually 
unintelligible (Whiteley 1956: 352; Iliffe 1979: 331). Language was considered 
important to Chagga people, as they first attempted to talk in their own tongue, but 
interests of Chagga unity forced a move into Swahili. The Chagga-authored 
ethnohistories discussed in Chapter 3 were written in Swahili, not a Chagga dialect. 
This, I argue, was part of the project of these texts to show a unified Chagga identity. 
 
Given these divisions, does it make sense to talk about a single Chagga ethnic group? 
From an outsider’s perspective, there is much that unites the Chagga ethnic group. 
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Indeed, as Chapter 2 will discuss, the name “Chagga” comes from outside. For the 19th 
century European imagination, there was much about the Chagga people that fitted 
their idea of nationhood: unlike many groups with more ambiguous boundaries, the 
boundaries of the kihamba belt formed a bounded, continuous territory for the Chagga 
people. More recently, there is much that connects the Chagga people. For as they 
themselves might not always see themselves as one people, the kihamba system is a 
constant across the mountain. Given the importance of the kihamba to Chagga moral 
life, this is an important factor in considering a single Chagga ethnic group. 
 
Chagga are broadly seen as amongst the most capitalistic in outlook of Tanzania’s 
ethnic groups. As Siegel (1989: 365-366) argues of ethnic stereotypes, these are not 
necessarily just the subject of irrational or fallacious gossip, but rather can contain 
elements of historic truth and continue to inform social relations. There is certainly a 
long history of trade within Kilimanjaro and with the outside world. Kilimanjaro has a 
long history of regularly-held markets (Pietilä 2007: 4). They engaged with the outside 
world, trading with neighbouring areas for resources that Kilimanjaro lacked, such as 
clay, as well as the international market through Kilimanjaro’s key role in coastal trade 
routes. Yet it was the introduction of coffee at the beginning of the 20th century that 
truly led to an increased engagement with the market as they began to spend their 
coffee wealth not only on goods from outside as well as on education (Moore 1986: 
129). Under colonial rule, the Chagga group were the only ethnicity with enough of an 
entrepreneurial tendency to begin to edge out Asian traders (Bryceson 1993: 92). A 
perceived distrust of socialism by Chagga people adds to the picture of them as 
capitalist (Moore 2009: 153-154). 
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Within this general overall essentialisation of Chagga people as capitalist, however, 
there exist variations. These understandings of varieties within Chagga people are 
gendered. Ethnic identities contain a strong gendered component. Writing of Ndebele 
in Zimbabwe, Björn Lindgren writes that Ndebele ethnicity is based upon male 
identity: “When men in Matabeleland talk about the Ndebele as brave, they are 
referring to themselves as brave men. And when colonialists write about Mzilikazi and 
the Ndebele as cruel, the are describing the men as cruel warriors” (Lindgren 2002: 22). 
Certainly, gender plays a key role in Chagga identity. For example, there is a strong 
stereotype that the women from Machame are strong at business, to the extent that 
they would murder their husbands to get along. Thus, under the banner of the Chagga 
stereotype as the capitalist ethnic group, there lie many sub-identities. These have a 
strong gender component. However, in the case of the overall Chagga stereotype, it is 
not as easy to say that it is simply a “male” or “female” stereotype. 
 
It is quite possible that, looking at Kilimanjaro today, it seems from my outsider 
perspective to be more homogeneous than in previous decades. Take, for example, 
housing. The traditional Chagga house, made in a beehive shape and thatched with 
banana leaves, occurred in a variety of shapes across the mountain (Dundas 1924: 255-
258). Today, that style of housing is all but extinct. The contemporary housing, from 
mud and wattle, through to cinderblock to the largest mansion, has more homogeneity 
across the mountainside than perhaps was present in the past.  
 
Much of the internal Chagga suggestion that there is no such group as the Chagga stems 
from the localism that has been a persistent feature of Chagga politics. Moore describes 
the man who has land in the patrilineage: 
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What interests him when he joins the other men in the late 
afternoon for a beer and some talk is what is going on in the 
neighbourhood. He may well know the price of coffee on the 
world market, and may have hard of what the party is saying on 
somebody’s transistor radio, or at a meeting, or even in church 
on Sunday. But unless he is an official or works in town he is 
not likely to be preoccupied with what is going on in Moshi, at 
the administrative seat of the district, and certainly knows little 
or nothing about what is going on in the other ex-chiefdoms. 
The ties of the rural neighbourhoods are stronger to the 
administrative center and to the world away from the mountain 
than to other similar neighbourhoods in other ex-chiefdoms on 
the mountain. (Moore 1986: 141) 
 
While true, the focus of this thesis is upon Chagga elites, a group that cuts horizontally 
across the vertical divisions present on Kilimanjaro.  
 
Do “Chagga” exist? 
 
Given the variations present in Chagga ethnicity, the question has to be raised as to 
whether it makes sense to talk of a single Chagga ethnic group. Most interestingly, this 
was a point raised by my informants themselves. Many conversations would begin the 
same way: I would tell the informant (or potential informant) that I was studying 
Chagga ethnicity. The first point that they would mention was regularly that Chagga are 
not a homogenous group, emphasising the divisions within Kilimanjaro, or that Chagga 
did not exist at all. “There is no such thing as Chagga!” I would hear regularly. The 
fascinating aspect of the denial of Chagganess is this: while the opening of any discussion 
on Chagga ethnicity would often begin with a denial of its existence, my interlocutor 
would more often than not subsequently make some reference to Chagga later in the 
conversation. After denying the existence of Chagga, they would later make remarks 
such as “We Chagga return to Kilimanjaro for Christmas”, or “That person is Chagga”. 
Despite their earlier denials, they clearly felt able to use Chagga in conversation, and 
imply the existence of the ethnic group. This contradiction led me to focus greatly on 
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Chagga ethnicity, and to search for any sub-Chagga ethnicities of which people may 
have been members.  
 
The divisions within Chagga were also emphasised in the academic literature, and I set 
out to explore whether there existed any other groupings that could be described as 
ethnic groups. This was something that I searched for throughout the entirety of my 
fieldwork. If “Chagga” did not exist, then of which ethnic group were the people of 
Kilimanjaro members? I explored the possibly evidence that there could be separate 
ethnicities within the Chagga ethnic group, perhaps based upon the different language 
families of Kilimanjaro. I asked my informants directly. I listened closely whenever 
people spoke, or the conversations around me, to hear how people would identify 
themselves or others. I searched for any clues of people identifying themselves or others 
as being part of a sub-ethnicity, or to offer an ethnic identity as something other than 
Chagga. Given that my status as an outsider may have affected the ways in which my 
informants talked to me about ethnicity, I also paid attention to the conversations of 
Chagga and non-Chagga people around me. I even looked for relatively trivial sources, 
such as looking through the “tribe” column of hotel guestbooks to see if anybody 
identified themselves as being another ethnicity other than Chagga. I came up with 
absolutely nothing that suggested the existence of sub-Chagga ethnicities.  
 
Of course, there was much evidence of the divisions within the Chagga ethnic group, as 
evidenced by my informants comments on Chagga ethnicity. Particular attention was 
drawn to the linguistic variations. There was also a set of essentialisations about parts of 
Kilimanjaro, and gendered stereotypes of people from a variety of places on the 
mountain .Yet there was nothing that could suggest the existence of ethnic identities. 
While there are communities, there were not imagined ones. 
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Assessing these issues led to the development of my ideas of ethnicity in general, as well 
as the specific issues surrounding Chagga ethnicity. I began to fear that my search for 
alternative ethnicities was based upon a faulty set of ideas: the idea that this complex, 
varied Chagga identity could not be people’s real ethnicity; there must be, underneath, 
some other monolinguistic monocultural ethnicity that more closely fitted with 
theoretical models. This was clearly not the case, and I began to respect the diversity 
that was found across the Chagga ethnic group, and as a consequence the richness of 
ethnicity itself. Furthermore, this led me to reflect further upon Chagga political 
history. The Chagga ethnic group had seen, in the 1950s, one of Tanzania’s strongest 
ethnic nationalisms under the Paramount Chief. The denial of Chagga ethnicity led me 
to look beyond this period in understanding Chagga ethnicity, to concentrate on other 
aspects of Chagga ethnicity explored in this thesis: the moral economy, and the role of 
the landscape of Kilimanjaro and the kihamba. 
 
The fascinating question was then why people would so readily deny the existence of 
Chagga. There was a lot to be learnt from the reasons why people felt that there was no 
Chagga ethnic group. The most commonly mentioned was the lack of a common 
Chagga language. This was not because of an understanding of sociological theory, but 
rather the impact that the lack of a common language had upon Chagga people’s day-
to-day lives. It was not uncommon for husband and wives of Chagga ethnicity yet from 
different areas of Kilimanjaro to be unable to communicate in a Chagga dialect but 
resorting to Swahili. This concern about the lack of a common language extends further 
to the political field. 
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It is also, I argue, necessary to put people’s denials of Chagganess in the context of 
contemporary, Tanzania. With “tribalism” very much a taboo in Tanzania, in the 
political sphere strong expressions based on ethnicities are frowned upon. In the case of 
the Chagga ethnic group, this extends to the denial of the existence of the Chagga group 
itself. This, perhaps, is connected to the danger connected to the portrayal of Chagga as 
a single political block. Given that the Chagga ethnic group is in a powerful economic 
position, combined with the history of Chagga nationalism, they are a group in 
particularly sensitive position. For example, as illustrated in Chapter 6 of this thesis, for 
a political candidate to identify too strongly with a particular ethnic group is not a 
route to electoral success. Denying the existence of the Chagga ethnic group thus 
removes the possibility of a particular candidate being portrayed as a Chagga candidate. 
   
Theories of Ethnicity 
 
Ethnicity is a difficult term to define. Indeed, Richard Fardon (1987: 171) notes that 
“ethnicity is clearly not amenable to essential definition”. As with the concept of elites, 
it is at the same time obvious and yet at the same time problematic to define. Most 
definitions will result in empirical counter-examples. For example, Elliott Green (2005: 
2) presents a definition of ethnicity, designed to be useful in the communications 
between academics and policy-makers, and which Green vehemently holds to be 
superior to the constructivist paradigm: “a belief in common descent, a common history 
and a common homeland”. The counterexamples to this definition are clear, for 
example the existence of many nomadic ethnic groups. 
 
The problem with attempting to draw up a definition, or set of criteria, for ethnicity 
from one’s own research is the risk of draining from the concept all that is interesting. 
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Let us say that I attempted to define ethnicity in general based purely upon my research 
into Chagga: I would surely come up with a definition based essentially on a home land. 
This definition would not only have clear counterexamples – nomadic peoples, for 
instance – but also reduce our understanding of ethnicity. It is my contention that the 
Chagga connection to Kilimanjaro has many unique properties, and it does not follow 
from this that members of other ethnic groups in Tanzania feel the same way about 
their own homeplaces. 
  
In the definition of ethnicity used in this thesis, I follow the concept of Benedict 
Anderson, who states that the nation “is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each live the images of their communion” (Anderson 2006: 
6). The concepts of nationalism and ethnicity are very close, and works on nationalism, 
such as Anderson’s, are often relevant to our understandings of ethnicity. The Chagga 
example illustrates the closeness between the concepts, with the flag and anthem of 
Chagga nationalism in the 1950s. It is a useful and powerful tool to not draw a sharp 
distinction between the imagining of ethnic groups, on the one hand, and nations on 
the other. Whereas in contemporary Tanzania the notions of kabila – “tribe”, or ethnic 
group – and taifa – nation – may be very different, historically there has not always been 
such a distinction. Colonial era Swahili books  use taifa – nation – to refer to “tribe” as 
well as nation, with kabila also referring to tribe but being closer to clan (Madan 1903: 
124, 357; Burt 1910: 96).  
 
Two older approaches to the theorising if ethnicity are the primordialist and the 
instrumentalist approaches. Instrumentalist approaches emphasise how ethnicity is 
mobilised to achieve certain goals, often by elites. This approach, however, does not 
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account for the specific content of ethnicity, and does not explain why it is so powerful 
(Spear 2003: 17). Primordialist thinkers, on the other hand, emphasise the ‘primordial 
ties’ of ethnicity, through blood and groups with a common history and culture. 
Primordialists can emphasise the sociobiological elements of ethnicity, such as Pierre 
Van Den Berghe’s argument that ethnocentrism and racism (and by extension ethnicity 
and race themselves) are “biologically evolved mechanisms” (Van Den Berghe 1981: 
xiii). Edging close to this is Isaac’s concept of ethnicity as the “basic group identity”, a 
set of endowments and identifications given to an individual at the moment of birth at a 
given town in a given place (Isaacs 1975: 31). Primordialist approaches go some way to 
explaining the emotional power of ethnicity. The approach, however, is open to 
criticism. Thomas Spear (2003: 17) criticises the primordialist approach for failing to 
explain when and how ethnicity is invoked to such power in some contexts. This 
criticism can be mediated by an author such as Clifford Geertz; Geertz (1973: 259) 
places the processes by which ethnicity becomes an idiom for defending particular 
interest in a political and historical context, while at the same time holding that 
ethnicity itself is a “primordial attachment” that stems from a number of “givens”. 
 
The real weakness of the primordialist approach is that it is based upon these “givens” 
and essentialisations of the nature of ethnicity, and is based upon an “a priori givenness 
of ethnic identity” that has been refuted empirically many times (Lentz 1995: 307). As 
shall be illustrated in this thesis with the case of Chagga ethnicity, many of the “givens” 
for classifying ethnic identity are not universally applicable – for example, the claim that 
that members of ethnicities share a common myth of origin, a claim disproved by the 
Chagga case amongst others. Another example is that of language. 
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Constructivist approaches have attempted to bridge the gap between the primordialist 
and instrumentalist approaches. John Iliffe lays out the process of how diverse, 
amorphous, and fluctuating precolonial identities were changed by a “historical 
misunderstanding” during the interwar period of indirect rule into fixed ethnic groups. 
“The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans 
created tribes to function within the colonial framework” (Iliffe 1979: 318). Iliffe’s 
work was influential on Terrence Ranger’s (1983) work, “The Invention of Tradition in 
Colonial Africa”. However, Ranger’s approach has come under fire for denying the 
agency of Africans, particularly in the precolonial period. Determining the role of local 
people themselves in precolonial ethnogenesis is not an easy task, as the principal source 
present in the case of Kilimanjaro is that of the writings of European explorers and 
missionaries. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, however, I am able to draw from these texts 
evidence of Chagga agency, at least by chiefs, in forming Chagga identity. As such, an 
argument that puts full weight of ethnogenesis on indirect rule is faulty. Indeed, Ranger 
(1994: 78-82) would later acknowledge the drawbacks of this work as one that implies 
that the “invention” is a one-sided happening, in which the colonial and administrators 
played the role of the “inventor”, thus sidelining African agency and pre-colonial 
identities. Ranger moved away from the use of “invention” towards using Benedict 
Anderson’s word “imagined”. 
 
Benedict Anderson coined the term “imagined communities” to refer to nations. He 
argues for a key role for elites and intelligentsia. The idea is a strong one, and I use the 
term “imagined” in this thesis. Yet it has received criticism. Anthony D. Smith argues 
that, while the elites may have some role in the particular articulation of a modern 
nation, it is “absurd” to talk of the intelligentsia as being solely responsible for 
constructing a nation such as Poland: the heritage of “ethnic ties” of memories, myths, 
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traditions, and language are necessary. Without these, a modern imagination or re-
construction, Smith argues, is inconceivable (Smith 1991: 364-365). As illustrated in 
the case of Chagga nationalism, and the texts examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
Smith’s argument has its strengths: it is clear that elites cannot simply invent an 
ethnicity from nothing out of thin air and have it given the appeal, force or longevity 
that is seen in ethnicity. Nor, it should be noted in the Chagga case, do they attempt to 
do so. Unfortunately, Smith goes too far in his neo-primordialism, again returning to 
essentialisations of ethnicity which the Chagga example proves false. The most 
convincing case is made by Thomas Spear:  
Intellectuals need historical raw materials to construct their 
stories if their reinterpretations are to ring true. Precisely 
because struggles over tradition, custom and ethnicity are so 
embedded in local discourse and so emotionally fraught, they 
are readily evoked but not easily created. (Spear 2003: 26) 
  
There is a strong role for literate elites in the imagination of ethnicity. Anderson looks 
at print capitalism in Europe. The role of a literate intelligentsia has also been put in a 
strong position in the African context, with Berman arguing that the construction of 





The term “elite” has the contradictory nature of being both self-evident and having no 
commonly-agreed definition. The idea that there are, in some sense, people at the ‘top’ 
of society has existed for a long time, and has remained remarkably constant over 
thousands of years. Indeed, Josiah Ober (1991: 12) argues that the definition and 
attributes of elites in ancient Athens are similar enough to our own that we can use the 
modern terms to describe Athenian society with little fear of anachronism. The defining 
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characteristics given by Aristotle, in his Politics, of the elite as opposed to the mass of 
the population is close to our general understanding of elites today; these elites are 
distinguished from the rest of the citizenship by four factors: wealth, high birth, 
education and virtue (ibid.: 11-12). The criterion that stands out for the modern reader 
is that of virtue, a theme to which I shall return later. Aristotle himself notes that, given 
the difficulty in identifying genuine virtue, in identifying members of the elite the more 
visible criteria of wealth, good birth, superior education, and political position gave 
more useful criteria for sociological enquiry (Tessitore 1996: 18). 
 
While the characteristics of elites drawn up by Aristotle do strike chords of recognition 
with the modern reader, establishing a definition of elites has caused a great deal of 
debate. In political science, with a much stronger focus on elites than anthropology, has 
generated a large number of definitions of the political elite. These definitions are of 
limited use for this thesis, as I shall discuss, but do have some interesting features. C. 
Wright Mills (Mills 1959: 3-4), in his influential study of leading figures at the top of 
US military, economic and governmental institutions, describes the elite as “men… in 
positions to make decisions having major consequences… they are in command of the 
major hierarchies and organizations of modern society.” The difficulty of this approach 
is that it places too great an emphasis on the role of individuals within institutions and 
organizations. While the elites examined in this thesis have often been, at some point in 
their lives, leading members of powerful institutions, this is not always the case and it 
would not be informative to exclude them from the analysis. The wider difficulties with 
definitions that focus exclusively on political power are the twin problems of defining 
power itself, and empirically identifying those that wield it (Zuckerman 1977: 327). An 
interesting definition of the elite is “all persons capable, if they wish, of making 
substantial political trouble for high officials (i.e., other elite persons who happen to be 
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incumbents of authoritative positions) without being promptly repressed” (Burton and 
Higley 1987: 296). This definition had an appeal at certain stages of the fieldwork, 
where certain elites were willing and open in criticising elements of the state and those 
in current political power. The drawback is that this definition does not capture the 
politeness and modesty that forms the character of many Tanzanians, with even the 
powerful often showing a reluctance to offer criticisms of others; this makes using this 
definition problematic. 
 
While elites are influential people, portrayals of elites that describe them as all-powerful 
do not fit with the arguments that I make about elite roles in the imagination of 
ethnicity. An example of the weight put on elites by some theorists is Vilfredo Pareto, 
an Italian sociologist working at the beginning of the 20th century, who echoed Marx in 
writing, “the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of elites: as 
one ascends, another declines” (Pareto 2005 [1901]: 36). Pareto has little concern for 
the role of non-elite groups in his social thought; his work proved influential on 
Mussolini’s fascism, and led Karl Popper to call him the “theoretician of 
totalitarianism” (Popper, cited in Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004: 157). Unfortunately, 
presupposing the power of elites is also common in works on ethnicity that only 
tangentially mention elites. 
 
While it is difficult to draw wholesale from political science to construct a definition of 
elites for this thesis, there are many valuable features that can be extracted. In the works 
of C. Wright Mills and Mattei Dogan, there exists a concept of “elite interpenetration” 
as elites move from one power summit to another, for example moving from the summit 
of the civil service to a political career, or from leadership in the military to leadership 
in a private organisation (Dogan 2003: 1-2). As shall be seen in the thesis, this reflects 
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the life-course of the Chagga elite as they moved from sector to sector, particularly as 
illustrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The other important feature is the way in which 
authors recognise that the nature, size and composition of elites varies from place to 
place, and across time (Dogan 2003). 
 
One of the issues with the study of elites in the European or North American context is 
that there is a portrayal of a large cleavage between the elite populations and non-elite 
members of society. In the African context, as Jean-Pascal Daloz (Daloz 2003: 280) 
argues, elites have a far closer relationship with the rest of the population, and are 
perhaps not as all-powerful and autonomous as in other contexts. To this extent, 
Daloz’s analysis chimes with the findings of this thesis. Unfortunately, Daloz’s (Daloz 
2003: 280) conception of the relationship between the African elite and the rest of the 
population is one purely of patron-client relationships, with elites as the Big Men 
seeking to gain control over larger and larger factions in order to gain economic and 
political advantage. Again, the Afropessimist view of the African elite comes to the fore. 
My approach shows the Chagga elite to be close to the rest of the Chagga population 
not through these arrangements, but through mutual engagement with the moral 
economy. 
 
While one of Aristotle’s criteria for elite membership is that they be virtuous, few other 
writers have picked up on that element of his definition. There are some exceptions: the 
Italian political theorist Gaetano Mosca argued at the beginning of the 20th century that 
the ruling elite should show moral leadership about the mediocre moral standards of the 
majority of the population (Parry 2005: 37). Nevertheless, the ethical content of elite 
membership has been broadly absent from discussion on elites. However, the 
afropessimist view of elites shows a re-emergence of the ethical content of elite 
	   31	  
membership – that of the negative moral character of individuals of elite status in the 
African context.  
 
A distinction, from the anthropological literature on elites, is drawn by George Marcus 
(Marcus 1979: 135) between strategic or societal elites on the one hand, and segmental 
or group-based elites on the other. The former are elites with significance for their 
society or region as a whole, while the latter have power only in their particular 
communities, institutions or professions. This distinction is clearly useful in helping 
conceptualise the difference between, say, and elite athlete and the head of a 
multinational company. When approaching the questions I ask about ethnic elites, 
however, it comes across the difficulty of scope: how does one define the difference 
between a community, on the one hand, and a society or region on the other? This 
could be an issue for research conducted on smaller ethnic communities, or on ethnic 
minorities in a larger community. For my research, with the scope of the project focused 
upon Tanzania, I can safely argue that the Chagga elites are influential enough on the 
national stage to be counted as a strategic elite. 
 
One of the difficulties in conceptualising elites for this thesis is the broad time period 
that the piece covers. This makes it problematic to come up with the type of operative 
definition for elites used by most other studies of elites (see, for example, the operative 
definitions offered by (Higley and Dogan 1998: 223). It is quite clear that the strict 
criteria for elite membership changed over time; the general level of education in society 
has changed, for instance, as has levels of wealth. Setting precise criteria is impossible 
for a study of this nature. As a result, in developing the concept of elite used in this 
thesis, I spent time reflexively considering how the elite might be characterised. The 
criteria I began to use were very similar to those proposed by Aristotle: birth, wealth 
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and education. The relative value and importance of these criteria changed over time. In 
the pre-colonial and for much of the colonial period, with the majority of power in the 
hands of the chiefs, it was the position in the aristocracy that determined elite status. 
However, with the introduction of coffee and the introduction of mission education, 
the importance of education and wealth came to the fore, and after the abolition of the 
chieftaincy birth ceased to be a factor. Most recently, as the economy liberalised, 
education has arguably become less important as a route to elite status, as wealth 
became to be a more important determinant of elite status. 
 
To give an example of the complexities involved with determining elite status, I will give 
the case of one profession and my thought process on reflecting on whether they have 
elite status: secondary school teachers. Teachers are educated, and recently qualified 
teachers are likely to be educated up to degree standard. From an educational point of 
view, this means that many were in the top percentiles of level of education in the 
country. In contemporary Tanzania, however, the wages of a state secondary school 
teacher are low. I believe that this precluded them from inclusion in the elite. It is not 
necessarily that their lack of wealth per se precludes them from elite status, but rather 
that this is a severely limiting factor in having the high status and influential position to 
consider them elite. In the context of the colonial period, however, I would definitely 
include teachers in the elite category. Similarly, some teachers in contemporary 
Tanzania have extraordinary status – for example, high-ranking officials in teaching 
unions. It is not so straightforward to define elites. 
 
In terms of identifying contemporary elites as informants, there were several criteria that 
I used. As snowballing was an important way for me to gain informants, it was often a 
question of seeing how other elites would describe and behave around an individual. 
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This was often a clearer indication than having to untangle the modesty, or boasts, of an 
individual’s description of themselves. There were, however, various clues that I would 
watch for when determining whether an individual could be classed as elite, related to 
education, wealth and status. Education was an important factor, and most of my 
informants had received at least some tertiary level education or professional 
qualification. Study abroad, particularly in previous decades when the opportunities 
were more limited, was another key indicator.  
 
Wealth was also important, but was a factor that was sometimes difficult to judge. 
Many of the outward displays of wealth, such as clothing, jewellery and mobile phones, 
were also used by non-elites to boost their status. The size and quality of housing was a 
more important criteria, particularly if an individual had multiple houses in Kilimanjaro 
and elsewhere. How they cared for their immediate family was also important; the 
schooling of the children of elites gave clues. The car that a person drove and regular 
foreign travel, were other indicators of elite status; these indicated either personal 
wealth, or a high-status job that provided these benefits. 
 
The Moral Economy 
 
In this thesis, I argue for the importance of the concept of the moral economy, and the 
relevance of the concept for understanding the role of elites in Chagga ethnicity. The 
term moral economy, and related concepts such as the economy of affection, emerged 
from the study of the peasantry. James C. Scott (1976) developed the idea of the moral 
economy, arguing that the economy of peasant villages was embedded in a moral 
universe of concerns of justice and rights paramount, with norms of reciprocity and 
charity strong. Goran Hyden (1980: 18-19, 99) uses the related term “economy of 
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affection”, referring to the way in which peasants do not behave in a manner purely 
directed at individual profit, but rather ways that are embedded in “a range of social 
considerations”, and mutual aid and reciprocity are strong features. Hyden (1980: 19) 
does not argue that the emergence of the capitalist market economy necessarily destroys 
the market economy, but rather the economy of affection can survive and affect the 
operation of the market economy. Tony Waters (1992) gives a number of examples to 
support Hyden’s notion of the “uncaptured peasantry”, showing how many of the 
poorest in society behave in a way which seems anomalous to a pure utility-maximising 
viewpoint. Theorists of moral economy stand in contrast to authors such as Samuel 
Popkin (1979), who bases his work on the notion that peasants are economically 
rational agents utilising a cost-benefit analysis.  
 
The concept of the moral economy has usually been associated with the poor, whether 
it be 18th century rioting English poor (Thompson 1971) or peasants in the developing 
world (Scott 1976; Hyden 1980). Elites do have a place in works on moral economy; 
alas, much emphasis is placed upon their role as patrons in patron-client relationships 
(Berman 1998; de Sardan 1999). Elites use the moral economy to bolster their own 
position, for example to establish themselves as Big Men or to gain votes at election 
time. I do not wish to imply that these vertical relationships are unimportant in the 
context of developing an understanding of African politics. Nevertheless, there is a 
danger in creating a disconnect between the poor, who enter the moral economy 
because of their moral worldview, and the rich, who do so out of pure self-interest. 
Rather, I argue that elites are often part of the moral economy because they also share 
this moral worldview. 
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I am not the first to develop the idea of the moral economy in relation to work on 
Kilimanjaro. Tuulikki Pietilä, for example, develops a distinction in her work between 
the cash economy and the moral economy on Kilimanjaro, with the moral economy 
consisting of the requirements of gift-giving, feeding, patronage and feasting (Pietilä 
2007: 12-13). This develops a theme in Sally Falk Moore’s (1986: 300) work between 
the values of tradition and modernity. My focus on elites, however, draws out these 




The focus of this research is on elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. The social 
anthropologist Richard Werbner describes how postcolonial African elites are portrayed 
in the academic literature: “predatory tyrants… prominent in their midst stand the 
African Big Men, alias the kleptomaniacs, and somewhat behind their backs scurry the 
agents of mismanagement, the swollen legions of self-serving or mindless bureaucrats” 
(Werbner 2004: 1). Such a view, in Werbner’s assessment, is essentially Afropessimistic 
in outlook. If all African elites are corrupt, save for perhaps Julius Nyerere and Nelson 
Mandela, what hope is there for the continent? Through his work on the Kalanga 
ethnic group in Botswana, Werbner calls for a study of elites that does not 
automatically assume that they have only the most Machiavellian of motives, that any 
public act of good that they do is purely part of a cynical trick to maintain domination. 
Rather, researchers have to “bring to elites… the same empathy and insight that 
anthropologists bring to the rest of the people they study” (ibid.: 8). 
 
Why are elites portrayed in this manner? In the anthropological field, George Marcus 
notes that researchers have personal, moral and ideological sympathies that often 
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motivate them to study non-elite groups rather than elites. “As a result, the cultural 
conditions of typical subjects of ethnography in complex societies are humanly 
portrayed while those of elites in the background appear more as caricatures, created 
from the ideological biases of the ethnographer” (Marcus 1979: 136). While 
undoubtedly the biases of the researcher matter, the problem with this argument is that 
other disciplines, such as politics and history, frequently have elites centre-stage yet still 
portray them negatively.  
 
The pessimistic view of African elites is very much visible in the literature on ethnicity. 
Take, for example, the discussion on ethnicity that occurs with Patrick Chabal and 
Jean-Pascal Daloz’s Africa Works (1999). They draw upon Lonsdale’s distinction 
between political tribalism and moral ethnicity, arguing that the latter provides a basis 
for a more accountable politics in Africa. However, Chabal and Daloz are more 
pessimistic than Lonsdale, and ultimately ask, “how, in practise, a political system based 
upon moral ethnicity does not become, under the relentless pressure for the drive for 
power, the tyranny of political tribalism” (ibid.: 60). Elites are reduced to being the 
“Mobutus of Africa” (ibid.: 61). All elites are tarred with the same brush. Another 
example is the role of elites in Bruce Berman’s work on ethnicity. Berman’s analysis of 
elites is of value as he portrays elites as having a role not only in the “political tribalism” 
aspects of ethnicity, but also the creation of ideas of “moral ethnicity”. Yet Berman still 
argues that the elites only do so in order to maintain their own self-interest and to 
maintain their own patronage networks (Berman 1998: 327). 
 
There are a number of problems with these approaches to elites. First of all, it is 
insulting to members of the elite group. Second, it is, as Werbner observes, essentially 
Afropessimist in outlook. Thirdly, and most importantly, it clouds our understanding of 
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the theoretical issues surrounding ethnicity. Given that many authors consider elites to 
be, in varying degrees, key in the imagination of ethnicity (including Berman (1991), 
Lonsdale (2004) and Lentz (1994)), if the elites are acting from purely instrumentalist 
motives then this makes ethnicity itself essentially instrumental in nature. Take, for 
example, Lonsdale’s critique of Bayart, who discusses: “politicized ethnicity too 
exclusively from an instrumental or top-down angle, at the cost of the view from below” 
(Lonsdale 2004: 76). Here, Lonsdale equates “top-down” with “instrumental” – so, 
given the importance of elites, ethnicity itself is close to being reduced to being purely 
instrumental. This leaves their arguments open to the strong critiques that can be made 
against instrumentalist theories of ethnicity. If a more nuanced consideration of elites is 
considered, and our understanding of elites is taken beyond them being solely 
instrumental actors acting for selfish motives, then these critiques are mediated. A more 
subtle approach, treating elites as more than instrumental manipulators of ethnicity, 
ensures that theories of ethnicity retain a depth beyond that of a purely instrumental 
approach. 
 
A weakness in some studies of elites is that they argue for the importance of elites at the 
expense of other strata of society. Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian sociologist working at the 
beginning of the 20th century, echoed Marx in writing, “the history of man is the history 
of the continuous replacement of elites: as one ascends, another declines” (Pareto 2005 
[1901]: 36). Pareto has little concern for the role of non-elite groups in his social 
thought; his work proved influential on Mussolini’s fascism, and led Karl Popper to call 
him the “theoretician of totalitarianism” (Popper, cited in Mandelbrot and Hudson 
2004: 157). More recently, Higley and Burton’s work places an emphasis on the role of 
elites in state stability  (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton 1989). Their 
argument places an emphasis on the role of elites at the expense of non-elites. 
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The elites that are the subject of this thesis are cosmopolitan, and frequently 
intellectuals. It does not follow from this that they are the only members of society who 
have these characteristics. The sharp distinction between “cosmopolitans” and “locals” 
has been challenged in the literature, (Ferguson 1999: 211-218; Marsden 2008), “‘local’ 
on whose terms?” (Clifford 1992: 97) Cosmopolitans do not have to be elite (Notar 
2008). Similarly, intellectuals are not necessarily elite: see for example Steven 
Feierman’s (1990) work on peasant intellectuals. Similarly, elites are not the only 
members of society capable of manipulating ethnicity for their own ends, using ethnicity 
in an instrumental manner (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 693-694). 
 
The Chagga Elite 
 
Over the history of Kilimanjaro, a number of groups that could be considered elite has 
emerged. During precolonial times, as described in Chapter 2, the traditional, 
aristocratic elite were in a powerful and influential position. It was not until the 
beginning of coffee production at the opening of the 20th century that a non-aristocratic 
elite was able to take over. As Samoff describes it: 
That class had its origins in both salaried employment and 
successful coffee farming during the period of British rule. By 
allying largely with the local peasantry and partly with the 
national anti-colonial movement, that class displaced the chiefs, 
whose own position both in the local economy and as political 
officers had been supported by the British administration. 
Though forced to make some adjustments, that class has largely 
opposed socialist initiatives from the centre. But 
simultaneously, due primarily to the access to education 
created by its rôle in local production, it has supplied a 
significant portion of the national leaders in Tanzania. (Samoff 
1979: 57) 
 
It is this elite that Samoff describes that form an important part of this thesis. As with 
ethnicity, elites are not easily defined. The individuals who might be considered part of 
the elite vary over time. For example, in the colonial period, an educated person such as 
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a secondary school teacher could be considered part of the elite; today, with the low 
wages of state-employed teachers, it makes less sense to speak of them as the elite. This 
thesis focuses upon those who are clearly members of an elite group: ambassadors, 
leading professionals, government ministers, senior party officials, etc. I argue in this 
thesis that the elite in question can accurately be described as a Chagga elite, rather 
than a section of a national elite who happen to be of Chagga ethnicity. I argue this for 
a number of reasons. I argue that the elite are in their position as a result of their 
Chagga ethnicity, in a legacy that runs back to the first European contact with 
Kilimanjaro and continued through indirect rule. Perhaps more importantly, I argue 
that the elite are not divorced from the moral economy of Kilimanjaro, but are very 
much part of it. 
 
 With the end of traditional rule, both through the rejection of the paramount and the 
elimination of chiefs as an institution, many chiefs became, in the words of Kileo 
(2005), paupers. There are notable exceptions, which weakens the distinction drawn by 
Samoff. The most senior of the chiefs at the end of the colonial period, themselves 
educated individuals and with substantial land holdings, were given state-sponsored jobs 
and roles. Thomas Marealle, for example, was employed by the state and sent abroad.  
 
A study of Chagga elites raises the question as to whether the strata in question are 
ethnic in nature, or whether it is just a slice of a national elite. For example, Carol 
Myers-Scotton (1990; 1993) argues that there is a national elite in Tanzania made up 
of those fluent in English. Defining elites using a purely educational criteria, those with 
A-levels or above5, she argues that these elites are not necessarily the most wealthy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A limitation of Myers-Scotton’s analysis is that she does not take into account the 
existence of non-elites who have become fluent in English outside of the formal 
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society, rather they are “the successors to the colonial officers in the civil service; they 
staff institutions of higher education and create the mass media; and they are the 
middle-range executives in the mainly still foreign-owned business corporations” 
(Myers-Scotton 1990: 28). Myers-Scotton (1990: 28) downplays the importance of 
ethnicity, arguing that the elite cuts across ethnic boundaries, and the extent to which 
the elite maintain ethnic ties is to gain access to resources. Myers-Scotton is certainly 
correct in identifying English language skills as an important social differentiator in 
Tanzania, it not only affects access to employment and education, but also is passed 
down through the generations. It is, however, not the full story, as Myers-Scotton 
reduces the importance of ethnicity down to its instrumental use by elites to gain access 
to resources. Chagga elites are engaged with the moral economy of Kilimanjaro, not 
purely using ethnicity for instrumental reasons. The moral economy, and the economy 
of affection, “reflects normative values about kinship, the symbolic meaning of 
exchange, social obligations, subsistence, and trade… ultimately [it is] a cultural rather 
than an economic construct” (Waters 1992: 163). As this term was popularised by the 
works of James Scott (1976) and Goran Hyden (1980), it is most often understood in 
terms of the peasantry. However, this thesis argues for its relevance beyond this section 
of society, to include the elite also. 
  
There have been attempts to quantify the elite in Tanzania. Gordon M. Wilson used 
those appearing in Who’s Who in East Africa 1963-4 as his definition for being elite. In 
his analysis of the ethnicity of people appearing in this book, he found that Chagga 
ethnicity was over-represented in elite groups. While Chagga people made up only 5% 
of elected or appointed representatives, roughly in line with their share of the nation’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
education system. Examples include people working in tourism, sex workers, and 
unskilled migrants from neighbouring countries.  
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population, they made up 11% of the elite civil servants, and 15% of all other elite 
groups (Wilson 1966: 432). Another statistical analysis was conducted by Hopkins 
(1971). Analysing members of the National Assembly and the upper-level government 
administrators, he finds that people of Chagga ethnicity made up 3.6% of legislators, yet 
17.2% of administrators6 (ibid.: 77). “[T]he National Assembly reflects, in a rough 
fashion, the tribal proportions of the nation, while the administrative elite are highly 
overrepresentative of such tribes as the Haya, the Chagga and the Nyakyusa, and 
underrepresentative of others such as the Sukuma, the Makonde, and the Hehe” (ibid.: 
75-76).  
 
Fieldwork – methodology 
 
The data in this thesis is drawn from a broad range of sources. The principal fieldwork, 
and the conducting of formal and informal interviews, was conducted on a series of trips 
to Tanzania between June 2005 and August 2007. I have also made use of a variety of 
archival sources, newspaper articles and books, written by both Chagga and non-Chagga 
authors, that I was able use as primary sources for this thesis. In many important 
aspects, it was the perspective from above that allowed these works to play an 
important role in this thesis. As discussed in this methodology section and in the main 
body of the thesis itself, an elite perspective enables such works to form a coherent part 
of the whole. It is the case that, for most of the early European authors, it was only with 
the elite members of the Chagga ethnic group that they had contact. Similarly, when 
examining Chagga-authored books, it is the case that, as in most societies, the books 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There are some discrepancies between the figures presented by Hopkins and Wilson. 
Wilson states that 5% of administrators are Haya, whereas Hopkins gives 20.7%. This 
indicates the difficulties inherent in their statistical analyses. 
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tend to be written by the elite. First, however, I turn my attention to the fieldwork in 
Tanzania and some of the methodological issues which arose. 
 
The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted between 2005 and 2007, in Dar es Salaam, 
Moshi, and various sites around rural Kilimanjaro. My own contacts with Kilimanjaro, 
however, go back a lot further. I first visited Tanzania in 1997, when at the age of 16 I 
made a school exchange visit to a school in Moshi. I returned to the same school to 
teach for a year in 1998-9. This gave me a long-standing relationship with teachers at 
the school,  although prior to starting my fieldwork in 2005 I had not had the 
opportunity to visit since the end of 2000. This long-standing connection gave me many 
opportunities for my research. While it is difficult to classify secondary school teachers 
as elites, due to their low salaries despite their educational achievements, they 
nevertheless provided an opportunity for making contacts. The members of staff that I 
had known for a long time provided opportunities to bounce ideas off of, and gave me 
the chance to ask questions of clarification about Chagga issues. Finally, the school on 
occasion provided me with accommodation while I was in Moshi, for which I am 
grateful. 
 
While I had strong contacts in Moshi, I started the fieldwork for this thesis in Dar es 
Salaam, arriving in June 2005. The initial plan was to undertake 6 months Swahili 
language training in Dar es Salaam, while arranging the administrative issues such as 
research clearance. However, I soon found that my time in Dar es Salaam gave me 
opportunities for research and to cultivate important research contacts. A strength of 
the research is that fieldwork was not limited to only one geographical area, but was 
conducted in Dar es Salaam, Moshi town and rural Kilimanjaro. Given that the 
researched population is mobile, it was good to be in various locales. Having this broad 
	   43	  
variety was an opportunity to see how their networks operated. Informants I would 
meet in Dar es Salaam would recommend contacts in Kilimanjaro, and vice versa. My 
informants were not necessarily permanently based in the locale in which I encountered 
them; I would sometimes meet Dar es Salaam-based informants in Kilimanjaro who 
were visiting their home area; on other occasions, I would meet Kilimanjaro-based 
informants when in Dar es Salaam. I found this to be a powerful indication of how the 
Chagga networks between Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro operated. A weakness of the 
research is that in scope it only included Dar es Salaam as a location outside of 
Kilimanjaro. Given that individuals of Chagga ethnicity are known for having a presence 
all over Tanzania, it might have been informative to have studied Chagga people in 
urban or rural communities away from Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam. For three 
months during the writing-up stage of this thesis, I was based at the Teofilo Kisanji 
University in Mbeya; however, under the terms of my visit, I was not conducting new 
research. However, given that Dar es Salaam is such an important locus of power in 
Tanzania, the fact that my study is of the Chagga elite tends to mitigated this weakness.  
 
I spent the period of the general election campaign of 2005 between Kilimanjaro and 
Dar es Salaam. The polling day was originally set for 14th October, and I was due to 
return to the UK at the beginning of December; however, the polls were subsequently 
delayed until 14th December 2005. I delayed my return to the UK until January 2006. 
This resulted in benefits for the fieldwork, as I was able to stay in Kilimanjaro over the 
Christmas period. This was advantageous for my research as I made valuable contacts 
over the Christmas period, a well-known time for returning Chagga migrants to return 
to Kilimanjaro. 
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After a brief return visit to the UK, I started my second phase of fieldwork at the 
beginning of March 2006. While I spent some time in Dar es Salaam, and visited 
regularly to maintain research contacts, for the first three months I spent most of the 
time in Moshi town. Staying here enabled me not only to build research relationships in 
the town itself, but to reach easily various of the rural parts of Kilimanjaro via public 
transport and lifts with friends. I spent a six month period based in Machame Nkuu, 
from July 2006 until the end of the year when various personal difficulties and family 
illness forced me to make an unexpected return visit to the UK. Returning in April 
2007, I spent an extra three months based mostly in Moshi, but making visits to various 
areas around Kilimanjaro. 
 
Conducting elite research presents its own methodological challenges. Werbner notes 
the challenges of researching elites: 
It may well be that “studying up”, particularly in Africa, as a 
research strategy that demands the cultural competence and 
social networks of a known, experienced fieldworker. Possibly, 
also, the anthropologist must first become familiar with elites 
over a reasonable period on a casual basis, while doing other 
research, and not with the intent of doing systematic fieldwork 
among elites. Elites may have good reasons, not necessarily 
Machiavellian ones only, for wanting to observe and know the 
anthropologist closely before being ready to cooperate in the 
many ways needed for elite research. (Werbner 2004: 8) 
 
It is not altogether clear that these trust issues are unique to researching elite 
populations. Nevertheless, developing trust was a key part of my fieldwork. Naturally, 
over the course of the length of PhD fieldwork, developing the long-term research 
relationships that Werbner discusses is difficult. However, in my own research, I found 
the research relationships I cultivated from the beginning of the fieldwork were in many 
ways the most fruitful. 
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I made initial contacts through a variety of channels. The teachers at the school at 
which I had contact provided me with opportunities to speak to their elite relatives. 
Another route was via Dr Tom Molony at the University of Edinburgh, who introduced 
me to whisky-drinking Chagga elites in Dar es Salaam. As I had cultivated a taste for 
whisky while in Edinburgh, I was able to arrive with a bottle of single malt which 
undoubtedly aided the initial research contacts. In terms of developing trust, I found 
that the informal environment was often more productive than meeting in a formal 
setting. Bars are a natural place for conversation, although not always appropriate for 
many informants. Travelling is another good opportunity for conversation, for example 
taking a drive around Dar es Salaam or walking around in the rural areas provided good 
opportunities to talk. In key respects, Werbner is correct in that taking the time to 
develop relationships is key to the research. For example, it took up to a year before the 
whisky-drinking circle in Dar es Salaam would begin to introduce me to friends and 
relatives of theirs who might aid me with the research. I could see no Machiavellian 
motivation for taking their time with me: it was simply an issue of trust. I had to prove 
myself to be a trustworthy person, with a knowledge of my subject that meant that I 
was not simply wasting the time of their busy relatives. 
 
While the researcher, as Marcus observes, may have ideological and moral sympathies 
with underprivileged members of society, it is nevertheless the case that in the African 
context the researcher is far more likely to have more in common with the elite. For 
example, many of my subjects had visited the UK at some point in their lives. Given the 
high level of educational background of my informants, most interviews were conducted 
in English. I did employ a research assistant while in Moshi, although he was mostly 
employed in aiding me with the translations of the texts examined in Chapter 3. As I 
preferred the informal setting, I used a pen and notebook to take notes of interviews 
	   46	  
and discussions. While I did consider starting to use a tape recorder, I found that the 
pen and notebook formed such a useful ‘prop’ that I did not do so. It was very useful to 
be able to be seen to write down the important details. Particularly while having a long 
and varied conversation in an informal environment, largely on subjects not relevant to 
the subject of this thesis, it was useful to be able to pull out the notebook when 
relevant subjects were raised. It also served as a reminder to those I was speaking with 
that I was also a researcher. On a handful of occasions, informants told me not to write 
down particular details. Naturally, I did not do so, and such details do not appear in 
this thesis. Nevertheless, it indicates that there is an openness about pen-and-paper 
discussions that is perhaps lacking in a tape-recorded one. 
 
There is a disagreement in the literature over the ease of elite interviews. Werbner’s 
account above indicates that it is a challenging field, requiring long research 
relationships. On the other hand, John Galliher (1980), researching elites in the USA, 
found them completely open in sharing information, even when describing situations 
which broke ethical, or even legal, rules. “Powerful people seem so convinced of their 
own righteousness and so sure of their power that they usually talk freely” (ibid.: 303). 
This fits with one definition of elites as “all those persons capable, if they wish, of 
making substantial political trouble for high officials (i.e., other elite persons who 
happen to be incumbents of authorative positions) without being promptly repressed” 
(Burton and Higley 1987: 296). 
 
My own experience varied. It is correct to say that many informants were apparently 
openly expressing views. This, however, can hide the fact that elites are frequently 
skilled and experienced interview subjects. If they so choose, they can skilfully avoid 
answering questions, and can provide answers that are less than insightful. As observed 
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by Mark Kermode (2008), there was much to be gained from the more recalcitrant 
interview subjects. In terms of getting the most out of informants, the snowballing 
techniques that gained me access often served well in making a more constructive 
discussion. The interviews with people with whom I had received an introduction 
through another Chagga elite were often more constructive than those times when I 
had, as it were, just knocked on someone’s door. Even so, some subjects required some 
effort to get them to give more in-depth answers. On occasion, this was due to their 
assumption of a low level of knowledge on my part. It was thus sometimes necessary to 
illustrate how I already had some knowledge of the subject. One way was through 
exploring my knowledge of Chagga history. The other way in which I was able to 
explore subjects with informants was through my reading of the daily newspapers. 
While my newspaper reading had begun during the election campaign of 2005, to aid 
my understanding of the campaign. I found it extremely useful to continue doing so 
throughout my fieldwork; even when the events in the news did not directly pertain to 
my fieldwork, it still informed my discussions. 
 
Apart from the fieldwork conducted in Tanzania, I also consulted archives: the National 
Archives in Kew, London, the Tanzanian National Archives in Dar es Salaam, and the 
Lutheran Mission Archives in Moshi. At the time I was conducting my research, this 
last archive was in danger of closing.  This thesis also makes use of the published 
writings of missionaries, explorers and colonial officials who visited Kilimanjaro. Most 
of these works were accessed in Edinburgh, via the National Library. While I had 
encountered many of the works before starting the period of fieldwork in Tanzania, I 
only turned to study them in detail after I had completed this fieldwork. Turning back 
to my fieldnotes after reading these texts, I was struck by the similarity between my own 
descriptions and theirs. Using published works, cited by later academic authors over the 
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subsequent decades, presented a problem as far as creating a new and interesting angle 
on these works was concerned. I found, however, that my readings on the history of 
colonial science led me to place these works in a new context; and furthermore, to 
examine the relevance beyond the history of science. 
 
I only became aware of the ethnohistories that form the basis for Chapter 3 of this 
thesis while in Tanzania, and I was eager to get hold of copies of the texts while in the 
field. Petro Itosi Marealle’s book had recently been republished, and I was able to find a 
copy in a bookshop in Dar es Salaam. I was lucky to find a copy for sale, as books on 
Chagga topics can be very popular. For instance, it took me some time to track down a 
copy of Alice Makule’s 2003 book, Asili ya Wachaga na Baadhi ya Koo Zao; the 
booksellers informed me that this was a very popular book, according to them bought 
mostly by Chagga people seeking to understand their own culture and history. Finding a 
copy of Sam Ntiro’s work, however, proved more difficult. Thanks to the librarian at 
Marangu Teacher Training College, I was able to find a copy in their library. 
 
There is another side to the issues of trust and the research relationship. During the 
course of my fieldwork, various personal and family problems meant that, in December 
2006, I had to return to the UK for several months. This was a very difficult time for 
me, and I was touched by the universal support I was offered by the Chagga elites 
during this time, and some went far out of their way to help me. For this I am grateful. 
This support is a natural extension of developing the types of trust and social networks 
necessary for this type of research.  
 
Elite research raises certain unique ethical problems. In the writing of the thesis, 
maintaining the anonymity of informants can be a challenge. Even with the names 
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changed, details such as employment and personal histories can at times make the 
identity of an informant instantly knowable by an informed source. There are some 
particular cases when my informants comments, in the context of the rest of the thesis, 
would present an embarrassment to them. This I tried to avoid as much as possible, by 
ensuring the anonymity of most informants. 
 
A more substantive ethical dilemma stems from the very nature of elite research: elite 
research will produce conclusions that are not necessarily in the interest of elites. While 
I have endeavoured to treat my informants with empathy and as human beings, at the 
heart of the thesis lies the assertion that these people who benefited from colonialism 
continued to do well in the postcolonial state. There stems from this a normative 
question, which I do not seek to answer: is it right that this should be the case? 
Depending on the sympathies of the reader, this mans that the research may not be to 
the benefit of the population researched. This seems to be a dilemma that could 
effectively cause difficulties for much elite-level research. While this issue is quite 
possibly unsolvable, elite-level research is nevertheless an important area to study. The 




Chapter 2, “Understandings of Kilimanjaro by European explorers, missionaries and 
colonial officials”, opens on 11th May 1848, with the first recorded sighting of Mount 
Kilimanjaro by European eyes. This chapter examines the ways in which the European 
visitors saw the mountain, and in turn the people who lived on its slopes. The chapter 
casts the texts written by European explorers, missionaries and colonialists in a new 
light. It places landscape in a central position, with the descriptions comparing the 
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landscape of Kilimanjaro with that of England, Scotland and Switzerland. Yet while 
their views were certainly shaped by 19th century European ideas of landscape, I argue 
that the Europeans did not conceive of it alone, but rather developed their conception 
of the mountain through a dialogue with their coastal African guides and Chagga elites. 
This chapter also argues that these academic debates are not only of interest to the 
historians of science, but also have a saliency and relevance to the later understandings 
of Chagga ethnicity. 
  
Chapter 3, “Elite Imaginations of Ethnicity? Two Chagga Ethnohistories”, turns its 
attention to the work of Chagga intellectuals in the imagining of Chagga ethnicity in the 
1940s and 1950s through an examination of two Swahili-language Chagga-authored 
ethnohistories. Maisha ya Mchagga Hapa Duniani na Ahera (translated on the title page 
as The Life of Mchagga here on Earth and After Death) was published in c.1947, and 
written by Petro Itosi Marealle, a chief from Marangu and uncle to Thomas Marealle, 
the paramount chief. The second work is Desturi za Wachagga (Traditions of the 
Chagga), published in 1953, by Sam Ntiro, from Machame, a commoner best known as 
an artist. While these texts highlight the work of elite intellectuals in the imagination of 
Chagga ethnicity, I argue in this chapter that they are a powerful example of the limits 
of imagination: the authors avoid talking in detail about many key events and conflicts 
in Chagga political history. Despite the different backgrounds of the authors, they agree 
in many aspects, but the authors differ on one key aspect: the role of the institution of 
chieftaincy. Whereas P.I. Marealle places the chief at the heart of the Chagga family, 
Ntiro presents a more democratic approach. I present these differences as providing a 
new perspective on the debate over the ease of the abolition of chieftaincy in 
Kilimanjaro after independence.  
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Chapter 4, “Nationalism, Ujamaa and the Chagga Elite”, examines how independence 
and the socialist project brought both new opportunities and setbacks for the Chagga 
elite. The relationship between Kilimanjaro and the nation has not always been smooth, 
and at times there have been secessionist rumblings. Nevertheless, the educational 
advantage that the Chagga elite had received from colonialism led them to take up key 
roles in the new state. Just as Chagga elites had engaged with the work of imagining a 
Chagga nation in the 1950s, so they contributed to the imagination of the Tanzanian 
nation. This chapter illustrates how the Chagga elite coped under the changing 
macropolitical and economic changes, through international migration and their 
maintaining of high levels of education.  
 
Chapter 5, “Chagga Elites and the Moral Economy of Kilimanjaro”, illustrates the 
engagement of elites with Kilimanjaro itself, and their involvement in the moral 
economy. It gives examples of how elite migration relates to this moral economy, 
including the issues surrounding housing, burial and Christmas visits. The chapter also 
deals with the issues and challenges that have emerged in Kilimanjaro, particularly after 
the liberalisation of the economy. This liberalisation brought new opportunities for the 
Chagga elite, as the more capitalist direction of the country fitted in more with the 
Chagga capitalist outlook and also the Chagga elite were in an ideal position to take 
advantage of the opportunities presented. However, at the same time, new challenges 
emerged from Kilimanjaro itself, in the form of crises of land shortages and a declining 
coffee price.  
 
Chapter 6, “Chagga Elites and Multiparty Democracy”, brings the thesis up to the 
present through an examination of the role of presidential candidates of Chagga 
ethnicity in Tanzania’s multiparty elections. This chapter focuses on the candidates 
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Augustine Mrema, in the 1995 elections, and Freeman Mbowe in 2005. It examines 
these figures in light of the role that Chagga elites have played in Tanzania’s political 
history, and explores the role of ethnicity in Tanzania’s multiparty democracy. While 
ethnicity does have a role to play, I argue that Tanzania does not face the collapse of 
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Chapter 2: Understandings of Kilimanjaro by 










On the 11th May 1848, the explorer and missionary Johannes Rebmann became the first 
European to see the snow-capped peak of Mount Kilimanjaro. Already well-known on 
the coast because of its role in trade in the region, once Kilimanjaro became known in 
Europe then it attracted a steady and growing stream of European visitors. The 
landscape of Kilimanjaro was considered to be particularly beautiful, with a climate 
suited to European habitation, and its inhabitants with souls suitable for conversion. 
This chapter examines how the landscape of Kilimanjaro was understood by Europeans 
in a multiplicity of ways – alpine peaks, Scottish glens, and English gardens, often all at 
the same time. Through this understanding of landscape came an understanding of the 
people who inhabited that landscape. This, I argue, formed a key role in the shaping of 
Chagga identity, and the imagination of a single Chagga ethnic group. 
 
Identity and place are closely linked. “When we think about social or cultural identity 
we inevitably tend to place it” (Tilley 2006: 14). The reverse is true, as the 
understanding of the landscape affects the way in which the local people are understood 
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by outsiders. Patrick Harries examines the accounts of Swiss missionaries to southern 
Africa in the late 19th century. He argues that, upon their first arrival, their gaze was 
shaped very much by a typical European aesthetic, and they lacked the cognitive ability 
to ‘see’ the landscape or its inhabitants. “It was only through their cognitive 
(re)organization of the land that the missionaries gradually took charge of their 
environment… By investigating how these representatives of the Enlightenment saw the 
physical world, or infused it with meaning, we may come to a closer understanding of 
the ways in which Europeans saw – or failed to see – the local population” (Harries 
2007: 97). I illustrate in this chapter how, from the earliest sighting of Kilimanjaro by 
European eyes, the landscape was more cognitively accessible for Europeans than much 
of the rest of East Africa; it was a far easier landscape to “see”. However, I develop the 
argument beyond Harries’s analysis, as the European understanding of African 
landscapes did not develop in isolation; rather “they are the product of historical 
dialogues and contestations amongst various African groups as well as with Europeans” 
(McGregor 2003: 88). There was often an implicit or explicit dialogue between local 
and European perceptions of landscape, blurring the distinction between “outside” and 
“inside” perspectives (Luig and Van Oppen 1997: 37). In the case of Kilimanjaro, I 
argue that this dialogue occurred between three groups: European visitors; their coastal 
and Zanzibari guides and informants; and elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. As 
such, it is essential to place the texts analysed in this chapter in the regional political 
and economic context.  
 
It was with chiefs that the earliest European writers had the most contact, in the 
context of great rivalries between the chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro. In terms of what the 
European sources can tell us about the political history of Kilimanjaro, the most 
striking feature is the absences in their presentation. The Europeans had a great deal of 
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contact with Chief Rindi (known to the Europeans as Mandara) of the chiefdom of 
Moshi, and later Chief Marealle7, of the chiefdom of Marangu. Almost completely 
absent from the European account is even the barest mention of Chief Sina of the 
chiefdom of Kibosho, even though he was arguably the most powerful of the chiefs 
during this time period. The reason for this, I shall illustrate, is that the rival chiefs 
Rindi and Marealle sought to downplay the significance of Sina, to bolster their own 
political influence. Given the shocking absence of even a mention of Sina in the 
European accounts, it is clear that they were hugely successful at this8. As such, even 
though the focus of this chapter is the writings of Europeans, the agency of Chagga 
people is evident to the modern reader, even when it was not to the original writer. 
 
In this chapter, I make use mostly of the published accounts of visitors to Kilimanjaro 
from 1848 until the 1920s. Yet similar perceptions of landscape discussed continue to 
the present. Towards the beginning of my own fieldwork in Tanzania, in December 
2005, I visited rural Kilimanjaro for the first time in several years, visiting the home of 
an informant in Marangu. I wrote in my fieldnotes,  
A lush lawn, hedges, flower beds, trees, and the occasional 
banana plant – it was like a particularly lush English garden 
(apart from the banana trees [sic]), the climate being 
perpetually the most perfect day of an English summer. 
(Fieldnotes, 27/12/2005)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The grandfather of Thomas Marealle, the future Paramount Chief. 
8 The over-estimating of the power and influence of chiefs seems to be a theme in the 
writing of Chagga history. The most notable example is probably Kathleen Stahl’s 1964 
work History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro, which amounts to the history of 
Kilimanjaro as a diplomatic history of chiefs. While her research had been conducted 
during the period of the paramountcy, by the time her work was published the 
institution of chieftaincy had been abolished in Tanzania. She herself notes in a brief 
preface that the transition in Kilimanjaro “was effected with ease” (Stahl 1964: 7), yet 
the content of her work gives no clue as to why this was the case. Stahl had clearly 
overplayed the role and importance of the influence and depth of chieftaincy. It is ironic 
that Stahl made this mistake, as it was her work that rehabilitated the reputation of  
Chief Sina of Kibosho in the academic literature, and that plays a key role in 
establishing the historical background to this chapter. 
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At the time I wrote that passage, I had yet to read the texts discussed in the chapter. 
The comparison to England, as I was unaware at the time, was a theme that had run 
through the descriptions of Kilimanjaro by English authors since their earliest visits. 
This is despite the fact that 19th century and 21st century Kilimanjaro are vastly different 
in many respects. The home that I was visiting in Kilimanjaro was that of a well-off 
family, who had put great work and effort into developing a lawn and garden around 
their home. Comparisons work in the other direction as well. A Chagga friend of mine, 
staying in Edinburgh for three months, enjoyed the city and found it easy to navigate. 
The reason for this, he informed me, was that Edinburgh Castle reminded him of the 
peak of Kilimanjaro. 
 
While the focus of this chapter is on earlier works, it has become almost a requirement 
that any book on Kilimanjaro begin with an evocative description of the mountain. The 
problem in an academic work is not the evocative passages per se, but when such images 
are used to make assumptions without sufficient basis. For example, in Marie Durrant’s 
2004 PhD thesis, examining the sense of community and place amongst Chagga people, 
has an early section entitled “The Place Called Kilimanjaro”, writing of the “impossible 
illusion” of the snow-covered peak (Durrant 2004: 5-6). Unfortunately, while Durrant’s 
work establishes Chagga people’s connectedness to their home community, it fails to 
even question the existence of Kilimanjaro itself as a place, and so ignores the 
complexities within Chagga identity. In another example, the historian of Chagga 
history Kathleen Stahl writes, “having a focus, a single great mountain. . . .has bred in 
the Chagga a sense of identity” (Stahl 1964: 20). Stahl offers no evidence that this is the 
case, and given that her work is essentially the history of the competition between the 
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rival chiefdoms, the assertion that the mountain provides a single focus would need 
further explanation that Stahl does not offer9. 
 
Kilimanjaro Before 1848 
 
There is also a long history of trade in Kilimanjaro, with the area having a longer history 
of regularly held markets than most of the rest of Tanzania (Pietilä 2007: 4). Interlocal 
trade, particularly vertical trade, took advantage of varying ecological features within 
the kihamba belt (Moore 1986: 23). However, while Kilimanjaro provided fertile soil 
and natural resources, it lacked several key resources: iron ore, clay suitable for pottery, 
and magaddi cooking soda (Moore 1977a: 7). Given that blacksmiths are present from 
the beginning of historical memory (Wimmelbücker 2002: 61), and that there is 
archaeological evidence of pottery from centuries before the migrations of people who 
would become Chagga (Fosbrooke and Sassoon 1965), there is long evidence of trade 
with neighbouring regions. As important was Kilimanjaro’s role in the wider regional 
economy, and, via the coastal trade networks, the global economy. In the precolonial 
economy, Kilimanjaro formed a provisioning stop for caravans, and chiefs also traded 
with the caravans with ivory and slaves (Wittenberg 2004: 103-142). These trade 
routes were a key source of the competition and warfare between chiefdoms. It was vital 
that a chief would be able to offer safety to caravans while encamped on Kilimanjaro; 
thus, chiefs sought to have political control over as large an area as possible. By 
encouraging more caravans to visit, more goods were available to the chief to provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A contemporary reviewer makes a similar criticism, noting that this passage is 
“influenced by what the Chagga thought an alien observer wanted to hear” (Ostheimer 
1965: 150). This criticism ignores the fact that Stahl’s book was commissioned in 1954 
by the Chagga Trust, an organisation established by the Chagga Council and mostly 
funded by the KNCU (KNCU 1956: 9). While by the time Stahl published her work in 
1965 the Chagga Council and the institution of chieftaincy had been abolished, it is still 
a national history. 
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goods from outside of Kilimanjaro to their subjects, a key way in which chiefs 
maintained power (Moore 1977a: 12-13).  
 
From the beginning of the 19th century onwards, the political history of Kilimanjaro was 
shaped by a series of chiefs that Stahl refers to as the “empire builders” (Stahl 1964: 
348). Charting the political history of 19th and 20thcentury Kilimanjaro, there is seen 
the rise of chiefs from various parts of the mountain rising in turn, and dominating large 
areas, although never the entirety of the mountain. This was done through various 
means: military, diplomatic and economic. Moore expresses caution at the use of the 
term empire builder, as the extent of political control that the chiefs had over their 
areas of influence was not always deep (Moore 1986: 30). Nevertheless, the individuals 
involved in the battle for political control for Kilimanjaro did have an impact that 
shaped its politics and economy. The earliest was Orombo, who until his death in 1837 
managed to unite the chiefs of eastern Kilimanjaro, in the area of Rombo now named 
after him, up to a zenith where he ruled over half of Kilimanjaro (Stahl 1964: 348). To 
a large degree the reason he held this position was through his control over the ivory 
trade (Moore 1986: 30-31). Orombo’s empire collapsed soon after his death, and 
subsequent decades saw the rise of the chiefdom of Kibosho (Stahl 1965: 40-42). In the 
timeframe covered by this chapter, there was the rise and fall of Chief Rindi of Moshi, 
his position largely secured through developing relations with Swahili traders and early 
European explorers (ibid.: 43). Subsequently, Marealle’s close relationship with the 
German colonial authorities would raise his chiefdom of Marangu into a dominant 
position, only for it to decline once Abdiel of Machame became the favourite of the 
British administration (ibid.: 46). The key theme in the political history of Kilimanjaro 
is that the mountain is placed in the broader regional political economy, and that the 
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greatest successes came to those chiefs able to take advantage of the opportunities made 
available by their relationship with outsiders. 
 
The political and linguistic differences within Kilimanjaro have led some commentators 
to doubt whether there is a single Chagga ethnic group. “[I]t can be very misleading to 
think of all of the people of Kilimanjaro who are usually called Chagga as a single ethnic 
group” (Samoff 1974: 74). More tellingly, many Chagga people themselves during the 
course of my fieldwork would draw attention to the variation across Kilimanjaro, and 
state that there was no such thing as Chagga. There is a large degree to which Chagga 
identity was defined by people from outside of Kilimanjaro, as the next section on the 
origins of the words “Chagga” and “Kilimanjaro” will discuss. 
 
The Meanings of Kilimanjaro 
 
The origins of the words “Kilimanjaro”, and most likely also “Chagga”, lie outside of 
the region. It is not so unusual for a major African landmark to have a name given by 
outsiders. Another example would be the large waterfall on the Zambezi: the name 
Victoria Falls has obvious imperial roots, but the best known name in the vernacular, 
Mosi-au-tunya (the smoke that thunders) is a name popularised by David Livingstone’s 
Kololo guides. Those Leya people living on the river itself had a different name for the 
waterfall, Syuungwe na mutitima (the heavy mist that resounds), a name with additional 
connotations with water, rain, and fertility (McGregor 2003: 721). As with 
Kilimanjaro, the name is given that represents the outsider’s view of the distinct 
signpost in the landscape10 . The important difference is that there is no indigenous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  Another similarity is that both the Victoria Falls and Kilimanjaro have beers named 
after them: “Mosi” beer in Zambia, and the beers Kilimanjaro and Kibo Gold in 
Tanzania. 
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Chagga name for the entirety of Kilimanjaro, only names for the two peaks: Kibo, the 
western most snow-capped peak, and the shorter, more rugged Mawenzi to the east. 
Establishing the true etymologies of the words “Kilimanjaro” and “Chagga” has been 
widely attempted and there is no commonly agreed-upon etymology. Rather than 
return to these debates, I argue that it is productive to attempt to analyse the words on 
the level of folk-etymologies. Folk etymologies can inform us about the cultural and 
social aspects of the group that uses the etymologies in question. “[U]nlike true 
etymologies, which can be esoteric or alien, folk etymologies only exist if they are 
meaningful to the community of their users” (Rundblad and Kronenfeld 2003: 129-
130). Approaching the etymological debate in this new way provides an insight into the 
social and cultural relations between Chagga people and both African and non-African 
outsiders. 
 
The name “Kilimanjaro” almost definitely originates from the coast of East Africa, as 
the word was known on the coast before it became known to Chagga people in the area 
(Johnston 1886: 1), and the earliest European visitors note that the name Kilimanjaro is 
not known by the people who live on its slopes (Krapf 1860: 255). One possibility is 
that the name means mountain of whiteness (Thomson 1887: 116). Another suggested 
etymology is that the word means “mountain of caravans”11 , an etymology that Krapf 
and Rebmann heard from the coastal porters who took them to Kilimanjaro, for whom 
the mountain offers “a landmark for the caravans seen everywhere from afar” (Krapf 
1860: 255). This derivation is recounted recently by Wimmelbücker (2002: 113) in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  This definition means that the word “Kilimanjaro” is of mixed heritage. The Swahili 
word mlima means mountain, yet the diminutive prefix ki- means that kilima would 
more literally be translated as small hill. Depending upon the commentator, this is 
either a problematic linguistic feature (Hutchinson 1965: 67) or a term of endearment 
(Wimmelbücker 2002: 113). The word njaro, said to mean caravan, is not of Swahili 
origin, but is given as being either from a Chagga dialect (Hutchinson 1965: 65) or from 
Taveta (Wimmelbücker 2002: 113). 
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regional history of Kilimanjaro that puts a great deal of emphasis on the placing of 
Kilimanjaro within the regional economy. Another etymology connected to trade routes 
is recounted, not without scepticism, by Hutchinson (1965: 66), concerning a coral 
outcrop in the sea north of Mombassa, used as a beacon by dhow sailors, known as 
“Kilimanjaro”. Kilimanjaro the mountain acted in a similar purpose, acting as a signpost 
for caravans travelling from the coast. While etymologies based upon regional trade are 
perennially cited in the literature, reflecting the continued importance given to trade in 
works on Kilimanjaro, some etymologies have fallen out of common use. For example, a 
popular early derivation of “Kilimanjaro” was that it referred to Njaro, a supposed spirit 
or demon of cold (Fischer 1884: 78; Johnston 1886: 1; Meyer 1891: 154)12 . This 
etymology fell into disuse in part because there was no other evidence for the existence 
of a spirit named Njaro apart from in the name of the mountain, yet the disuse also 
reflects a changing European view of Kilimanjaro, discussed further below. 
 
As with the word “Kilimanjaro”, the origin of the word “Chagga” is obscure. It is almost 
definitely of external origin (Stahl 1964: 39-40), again quite possibly from the coast 
(Hollis 1910: 256). Stahl notes that, in the writings of early explorers, the name Chagga 
is used by Europeans to refer to a place, rather than a people (Stahl 1964: 38). This 
assertion is not entirely correct: it is true that Krapf and Rebmann refer to “the 
inhabitants of Jagga” (Krapf 1860: 243), yet Stahl does not notice that barely two 
sentences later Krapf refers to the people as “Jaggas” (ibid.: 243). As such, from the 
earliest European contact, Chagga was used to refer to both the place and the people. 
While the name Kilimanjaro has been the subject of some interesting European folk-
etymologies, the origins of the name “Chagga” has been the focus of some discussion by 
Chagga people themselves. Many of these etymologies have a strong ironical component 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  A rare later reference to Njaro as a spirit of cold is made by Stuart-Watt (1930: 213). 
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that reflects the naming of some other places in Kilimanjaro (Stahl 1964: 39-40). An 
example is a discussion within a 2003 popular ethnohistory Asili ya Wachaga (Traditions 
of the Chagga) by Alice Makule. She offers a variety of explanations for the name 
“Chagga” that she has heard across Kilimanjaro (Makule 2003: 26-29). One etymology 
uncovered by Makule’s investigation suggests that the Chagga people were originally 
known to outsiders by the Swahili name Watu wa Vichakani (people of the 
forest/bush)13 . This was eventually shortened to Wachaka, and eventually Wachagga 
because, Makule reports, of the mispronunciation by German explorers in the area 
(ibid.: 28). While there is no doubt a number of variations of the spelling of the word 
by Europeans – Jagga (Krapf 1860: 453; Thornton 1865: 49); Chaga14  (Johnston 1885; 
Thomson 1887); and Dschagga (Gutmann 1935: 14) – none contain a ‘k’ consonant15 . 
Nevertheless, the etymology that is based on the mishearings of Germans not only 
provides another etymology from outsiders, but also provides an element of mockery of 
the ignorance of the colonial power, and the subversion of a misheard word being 
expropriated by Swahili-speakers themselves. Another explanation presented by Makule 
is also rich in irony, concerning Chagga relations to the neighbouring Pare ethnic group. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Similarly, one suggested etymology of the name of the neighbouring group 
“Wataveta” is “People of the plains” (Hollis 1910: 256). 
14  Occasionally written by Johnston (1886) as “Čaga”. 
15  The other question of Chagga etymology is whether the word is spelt with one g or 
two. The spelling with two gs is now ubiquitous in Tanzania to the extent that I did 
not encounter the word spelt with a single g. In the contemporary academic literature, 
with the exception of Thomas Spear (1997), the spelling is almost universally “Chagga”, 
the convention that I follow in this thesis. However, this would make the name 
probably unique in Bantu languages, as the double-g is meaningless (Werner 1924: 
:564). In German, however, the presence of the double consonant affects the 
pronunciation of the preceding vowel. There is evidence to believe, based upon a 
contemporary review of Dundas’ 1924 book Kilimanjaro and Its People, that the double-
g spelling was far from common in this period, and the review speculates that Dundas 
was influenced by his reading of Bruno Gutmann and the standard German spelling 
“Dschagga”, combining this with Johnston’s “Chaga” (Werner 1924: 564). If this is the 
case, then it is likely that Dundas’ work went a large way to popularising the spelling 
used in this thesis. Thomas Marealle insisted on the double g spelling (Marealle 1952: 
102). 
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The two groups have a long history of trade, competition and occasional warfare. This 
has developed into a long-standing utani (joking relationship) between Pare and Chagga 
peoples that has continued to this day, a lighthearted relationship of disrespect or insult 
at which usually no offence is taken, (Moreau 1944; Radcliffe-Brown 1949). According 
to Makule, the very names Pare and Chagga are based upon insults thrown at each 
other in battle; thus, the word “Chagga” is an insult in the Pare language, and vice-versa 
(Makule 2003: 27)16 . This folk-etymology provides an ironic definition that helps 
cement the utani between the two peoples. 
 
The folk-etymologies of “Kilimanjaro” and “Chagga” provide not only an ironic 
comment on social relations, but also, I argue, cement the point that the origins of 
Kilimanjaro and Chagga come from outside. It is to the outsiders that I now turn, 
examining the first Europeans to set eyes on Mount Kilimanjaro. 
 
The Snows of Kilimanjaro 
 
The first recorded sighting of Kilimanjaro was made by the German explorer-missionary 
Johannes Rebmann on 11th May 1848. Rebmann travelled in East Africa along with his 
fellow missionary Johann Ludwig Krapf on what was the earliest travels by Evangelical 
missionaries from the Church Missionary Society to East Africa (Beidelman 1982: 606). 
It was an important expedition insofar as it marked the first well-recorded European 
expedition to inland East Africa and marked the beginning of the classic period of East 
African exploration by Europeans (Bridges 1973: 220). Rebmann recorded the sighting 
in his journal, later printed in the journal of the Church Missionary Society: 
The mountains of Jagga gradually rose more distinctly to our 
sight. I observed something remarkably white on the top of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Other research connects the word Chagga with waha (to kill) (Wimmelbücker 2002: 
113), and the name Vagha exists in the Pare language (Kimambo 1969: 137). 
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high mountain… Soon after we sat down to rest a little, when I 
read the 111th  Psalm, at which I had just arrived in my daily 
reading. It made a singular impression on my mind in the view 
of the beautiful snow mountain so near to the Equator. [emphasis 
in original] (Rebmann 1850: 17) 
 
The writings of Krapf and Rebmann, the first based on direct European experience of 
the mountain, introduced many of the themes that would continue throughout the 
writings of other European visitors. First, they considered Kilimanjaro to be a place 
suitable for European inhabitation and cultivation: Krapf, on learning of his 
companion’s discovery, was delighted to hear of “a noble country in the interior, well 
fitted for cultivation” (Krapf 1860: 196). Secondly, they use Kilimanjaro as a direct 
metaphor for Chagga social structures. Finally, albeit to a less developed extent than 
later authors, they make a short comparison to Europe, referring to the snow (Rebmann 
1850: 17). 
 
News of the presence of a snow-mountain close to the equator reached Europe at a 
time when mountains were capturing the European imagination. Romanticism was 
expressed via poetry, as Shelley wrote about Mount Blanc: 
Far, far above, piercing the infinite sky, 
Mont Blanc appears – still, snowy, and serene; 
[…] 
Power dwells apart in its tranquillity 
Remote, serene, and inaccessible: 
And this, the naked countenance of earth, 
On which I gaze, even these primæval mountains 
Teach the adverting mind  
    (Shelley 2002 [1816]: 127) 
 
Kilimanjaro became the subject of poetry soon after its discovery. The American poet 
Bayard Taylor, who never saw Kilimanjaro himself, wrote the poem “Kilimandjaro” 
circa 1855. This poem itself mentions Mount Blanc. It opens (Daly and Taylor 1875: 
302-304): 
Hail to thee, monarch of African mountains, 
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Remote, inaccessible, silent, and lone– 
Who, from the heart of the tropical fervors, 
Liftest to heaven thine alien snows, 
Feeding forever the fountains that make thee 
Father of Nile and Creator of Egypt!  
 (Taylor 1855: 98)  
 
The snowfields of Kilimanjaro remain a theme throughout Bayard’s poem. Mountains 
and ice had captured the European imagination not only through the artistic and 
literate expressions of romanticism, but also through the leisure activities of the middle 
class. The Swiss Alps, in particular, became a popular destination during the “Golden 
Age” of mountaineering. Around the 1850s, a “Mont Blanc mania” developed, as 
Europeans and North Americans were attracted to the Swiss Alps in increasing 
numbers. Ice and glaciers, in particular, were transformed from potentially deadly 
threats into alluring, sublime landscape against which a man could test his mettle 
(Carey 2007: 503). For the British, this was connected to an anxiety about Britain’s 
decline and the pressing need to construct a British masculinity (Hansen 1995: 323). 
This desire for mountaineering had an imperial dimension. The vocabulary of Arctic and 
African exploration began to be used by Alpine climbers in this period (ibid.: 315-316). 
Alpine exploration allowed middle-class men with a few weeks’ holiday to travel to 
Switzerland and “act out the drama of the empire in the Alps. In this manner, the 
British conquest of the natural world came to symbolise British imperial domination of 
other territory during the 19th century” (ibid.: 323). Thus, African mountains 
themselves became a doubly important aspect of empire. The mountains of Africa, 
Wittenberg argues, became a topographical metaphor for Europeans to map and 
imagine racial differences and civilisational rank. “Accordingly, Africa’s snow-capped 
peaks were imagined as sublime, elevated sites of whiteness, in stark contrast to the 
supposed darkness of the African interior” (Wittenberg 2004: 64). While Wittenberg’s 
analysis of the role of the sublime wilderness of African peaks is strong, it does not give a 
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full account as, I argue, Europeans saw the landscape of Kilimanjaro in a multiplicity of 
ways.  
 
The presence of snow so close to the equator was not initially disbelieved by the 
geographical establishment in Europe. The debates that developed, however, highlight 
some of the concerns of geographers of this period. At the Royal Geographical Society 
in London, prior to 1852 the presence of snow on Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount 
Kenya was accepted without question (Hamilton 1849; MacQueen 1850; Smyth 
1851). This changed as, in 1852, William Desborough Cooley published Inner Africa 
laid open, a book that critiqued Krapf and Rebmann’s accounts. Cooley was a 
theoretical geographer of Africa, who never stepped foot on the continent yet frequently 
critiqued the leading explorers of his time based on his reading of classical geographies 
and the accounts of  Arab visitors to London (Bridges 1976b; Bridges 1976a)17 . In Inner 
Africa laid open, a central plank of Cooley’s strong condemnation of Krapf and 
Rebmann’s account of a snow-capped Kilimanjaro was a critique of the missionaries’ 
writing style; he described their prose as “studious… and affected”, and while in the 
presence of this “sublime scene” they should have “vivid impressions, conveyed in 
natural language” (Cooley 1852: 98). Thus, it was considered a weakness that Krapf 
and Rebmann’s writings lacked poetry, that their account lacked the sense of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  It was most likely Cooley who made the first use of the word Kilimanjaro in print. 
Three years before Krapf and Rebmann’s discovery in a piece based on the evidence of 
an Omani Arab from Zanzibar visiting Britain, Cooley wrote; “The most famous 
mountain of Eastern Africa is Kirimanjara, which we suppose, from a number of 
circumstances, to be the highest ridge crossed by the road to Monomoezi. The top of 
this mountain is strewed all over with red carnelian” (Cooley 1845: 213). The source of 
Cooley’s information was an interview with an Omani Arab from Zanzibar visiting 
Britain, Khamis bin Uthman (Bridges 1976a: 31). It seems unlikely that this source ever 
saw Kilimanjaro in person, yet here again the descriptions of sources from the East 
African coast are influential upon European writers. It is quite possible that the reason 
for Cooley’s strong denials of the presence of snow on the mountain was the defence of 
his own source, and by extension his methods. 
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sublime that was expected of authors witnessing such natural wonders. Krapf (1854) 
gave a vigorous defence of his account in a letter from East Africa, yet Cooley’s critique 
had done damage to the reputation of the relatively-unknown missionaries. For the next 
nine years the Royal Geographical Society largely doubted the presence of snow 
(Bridges 1976a: 41), until Von Decken reached high up the mountain and finally gave 
the presence of snow widespread acknowledgement (Murchison 1863: 2). Cooley, for 
his part, never acknowledged that there was anything more than intermittent freezing 
(Bridges 1976a: 41). This scientific debate was in part over the poetry of the 
descriptions of explorers, and only settled by mountaineers. In these debates over 
Kilimanjaro, I argue, the concerns of Romanticism collide. 
 
It is worth noting that most of the expeditions to Kilimanjaro, apart from those by a 
few of the missionaries, had a scientific purpose. Even those travelers visiting for 
primarily missionary concerns, such as Charles New in 1871 and Bishop Hannington in 
1885, although lacking a scientific background, collected botanical and etymological 
samples and returned them to Europe (Cotton 1930: 98-100). Writing on South-East 
Africa, Harries (2007: 113) argues that the scientific measurement of landscape was a 
method Europeans used to develop an understanding, and a domination, of African 
landscapes. This, I argue, was true for some of the landscapes of East Africa, and 
certainly visitors to Kilimanjaro attempted to measure the mountain, yet the landscape 
of Kilimanjaro was far more immediately accessible to the European gaze. Take, for 
example, the writings of Joseph Thomson who travelled widely in East Africa and to 
Kilimanjaro in 1883. Thomson was a geologist by training, and the scientific language 
and descriptions originating from geology are peppered through his work for a general 
audience. For example, three hills in his writings became “three, small parasitic, volcanic 
cones” (Thomson 1887: 75). It is through scientific measurement that Thomson 
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developed an understanding of much of the landscape of East Africa. Thomson visited 
the chiefdom of Moshi in 1883, which resulted in a vastly different descriptive passage: 
The villages occupies the top of a narrow ridge formed by a 
deep glen on either side. From the upper part of the small 
streams miniature canals, constructed with great skill, lead off 
the water and spread it over the entire ridge… A more rich and 
varied scene I have nowhere looked upon in Africa… Mochi, as 
it lay before me, had all the rich fertility and pleasing aspect of 
Taveta, with the advantage of a beautiful interchange of hill and 
glen… to the north towered, sovereign, majestic, awful in its 
silent calm, the snow-clad peak of Kibo. There was no feeling 
of confinement, and the blood courses more warmly through 
the veins, stimulated by the bracing mountain air, till one felt 
inclined to shout “Excelsior!” and climb the mountain 
heavenward. In Mochi one had none of that spirit of lotus-
eating indolence induced by the dreamy, poetic life of Taveta. 
(ibid.: 77-78) 
 
Thomson, a Scot, saw no need to stamp control over the landscape of Kilimanjaro 
through the use of scientific vocabulary, he immediately saw there the glens of his native 
Scotland. The landscape was already cognitively accessible to the European observer. 
Thomson’s description also features Kilimanjaro’s irrigation system, the human element 
being a necessary constituent in making a landscape to be considered picturesque during 
this period (Harries 2007: 103-104). In comparison to his descriptions of other African 
landscapes, the presence of a human element in the Kilimanjaro landscape reflects a very 
different understanding. The descriptions of the landscape elsewhere reflects an 
understanding that a “landscape of solid geology”, while not exactly timeless then 
reflecting the work of aeons (Bender 2002: S103). The descriptions of the land of 
Kilimanjaro, on the other hand, contains these elements but in addition has the element 
of a landscape shaped by human agency, on far shorter timescales. Thomson is also 
developing a moral geography of Kilimanjaro, beginning a theme that would develop 
through later writers. Because of the landscape, he considers the population of 
Kilimanjaro to be a vigorous, skilful, hard-working people.  
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This is a theme that would be developed by Harry Johnston, who in 1884 became the 
first European to spend an extended amount of time on Kilimanjaro (Oliver 1957: 52-
88). He was a very influential author in shaping the established European ideas of the 
landscape and people of Kilimanjaro. Johnston arrived in the territory of Moshi, under 
the control of Chief Rindi. Rindi already had strong connections to the British Consul 
on Zanzibar, and was an admirer of the consul, John Kirk, partly because Kirk had 
previously sent Rindi a gift of several cannon. Kirk had given Johnston a letter of 
introduction, in Arabic script, which eased initial relations between Rindi and Johnston 
(ibid.: 61-62). 
 
Johnston was a strong proponent of British colonisation of Kilimanjaro. By the 1880s, it 
was becoming clear to the colonial powers that Kilimanjaro was a “juicy plum” in East 
Africa (Pakenham 1997: 283). Much of Johnston’s writing had a clear imperial element. 
He had written:  
we camped out, and I, ravished with the beauty of scenery and 
with the magnificence of the view, set myself to work to create 
in imagination a fair city of civilisation which would rise on 
these grassy slopes, and dominate the cultivable lands below. 
Here, on these two hillocks, I would build my twin forts, and 
here would be my terraced vineyards; there cornfields and 
gardens, and there a handsome stone house, my preliminary 
palace… Then until darkness set in I stood on one of the seven 
hills of my African Rome, and pondered on the possibilities of 
its existence. (Johnston 1885: 153-154)  
 
In 1884, Johnston wrote from Kilimanjaro to Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, the 
parliamentary undersecretary at the Foreign Office (Chamberlain 1972: 536), to 
advocate that Kilimanjaro should become British:  
The whole elevated region which surrounds the two large 
snow-clad peaks of Kilimanjaro is about equal in extent to the 
country of Switzerland, with perhaps the Tyrol added, and 
comprises every scale of temperature and kind of climate from 
ordinary tropical heat to bitter cold, and from hot dank 
moisture to bracing dryness, glaring sunshine, and chilly mists. 
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The average climate… is that of a Devonshire summer, with a 
midday temperature of 74 degrees and a night-reading of 56 
degrees 
 
As well as Devon, Jonhston also compares the scenery to Switzerland: 
As to the scenery, I may say without exaggeration that I have 
never seen anything to equal it in beauty in an part of the earth 
I have yet visited. Sometimes I am reminded of Switzerland, 
when I see the eternal snows of the giant peaks, the dark 
sombre forests, and the thundering waterfalls; at other times I 
could believe myself in some English glade, when I stand knee-
deep in bracken, or when I pass along the lanes of Chagga, 
where blackberry and male fern flourish together with many 
other plants of the temperate zone. My health, I need hardly 
say, is perfect, for I am living in the climate of a genial English 
summer, and though my Zanzibar porters feel the cold at night, 
they are rapidly becoming habituate to the altered temperature, 
and are stronger and brisker than on the enervating coast-
lands… the Chagga people, being far from savages, have greatly 
studied the art of irrigation, and have brought down streams of 
water from the heights above in artificial channels… Here is a 
country as large as Switzerland, enjoying  singularly fertile soil 
and healthy climate, capable of producing every vegetable 
production of the tropical and temperate zones, free from the 
tsetze fly, and therefore adapted to the breeding of oxen 
(which, in common with sheep and goats, exist already in great 
herds), inhabited sparsely by peaceful agriculturalists, skilled in 
native manufactures and capable and desirous of instruction. 
Here is a land eminently suited for European colonisation, 
situated near midway between the Equatorial lakes and the 
coast. Within a few years it must be either English, French or 
German. (Johnston 1995  [1884]: 1-3) 
 
Here can be seen Johnston’s enthusiastic argument for the colonization of Kilimanjaro. 
The alpine descriptions are present, with Johnston’s exaggeratedly comparing the size of 
Kilimanjaro to the size of Switzerland. This exaggeration must have been, in part, 
because Johnston wanted to justify the expense of the colonisation, yet his choice of 
comparator is still informative. There is also the comparison of the climate of 
Kilimanjaro to that of southern England, a theme he developed in his other writings 
when he often compared Kilimanjaro to Hertfordshire or Devonshire (Johnston 1886: 
230,322,330). Using these multiplicities of description was not unusual; this example 
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comes from a review article in a missionary journal, entitled “The Switzerland of 
Africa”, which reviews the increasing literature produced by visitors to Kilimanjaro: 
The accounts of all these travelers unite in describing the 
scenery of this region as marvelously lovely. Totally different 
from the natural features of the burning continent, it combines 
the calm beauty of Devon, the luxuriance of the tropics, and 
the grandeur of Switzerland. If there is one part of Africa better 
adapted than another for the residence of Europeans, it seems 
to be this. (Morris 1885: 512-513) 
 
There is no contradiction in understanding landscape in such a fashion. Giercyn (2000: 
464) notes that places nest together “because the boundaries are (analytically and 
phenomenologically) elastic”: as Bender (2001: 6) describes it, they nest within one 
another “like Chinese boxes – except that the boxes are permeable”. Thus, there is no 
difficulty in an explorer such as Johnston seeing the peak of Kilimanjaro as a landscape 
reminiscent of Switzerland, and the village on its slopes as similar to an English village. 
 
While colonisation schemes such as that presented by Johnston commonly met with 
rejection from the Foreign Office (Erberlie 1965: 16), his proposal met with some 
approval with others in London. The reasons for this were that highlands presented the 
type of fertile uplands considered suitable for European colonisation, in order to 
develop trade with Zanzibar (Pakenham 1997: 282-283), and to strike a blow against 
Bismarck (Oliver 1957: 72). Yet this policy did not meet with the approval of Kirk, the 
British Consulate on Zanzibar, who felt that British colonisation on Zanzibar would 
weaken the strength of the Sultan that he had spent the previous 20 years building up. 
Kirk suggested instead that Kilimanjaro become part of the Sultan’s territory; this 
proposal had the support of much of the British cabinet (Pakenham 1997: 283-284). 
However, this was rejected by the Prime Minister, William Gladstone, who memorably 
wrote, “Terribly have I been puzzled and perplexed on finding a group of the soberest 
men among us to have concocted a scheme such as that touching the mountain country 
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behind Zanzibar with an unrememberable name” (cited by Gwynn and Tuckwell 1917: 
83-84). In the meantime, three Germans including Carl Peters arrived in East Africa 
and signed treaties with local chiefs, thus establishing the area as a German colony 
(Meritt 1978). 
 
House of God 
 
The people of Chagga ethnicity were attractive to the missionaries who came to East 
Africa. Missionaries, too, were desired by Chagga chiefs: in 1878, Rindi wrote to the 
Church Missionary Society in Mombassa, requesting Christian teachers to come to his 
chiefdom (Lenoble-Bart 2006: 12). Bishop Hannington from the CMS travelled to 
Moshi, and was greatly taken by the scenery: “God give Chagga to His son, for ‘tis a 
lovely spot. I frequently exclaimed to the men in rapture of delight, ‘England, England! 
You see England here.’ Yes, and that charming part of England, Devonshire.” 
(Hannington 1885: 612). The landscape of Kilimanjaro, according to the Bishop, made 
it ideally suitable for converting its populace to Christianity. Reverend Shaw, a later 
missionary from the CMS, was also very much taken by the scenery, and described 
Chagga as a “fine, well-built race. Their full development of bone and muscle being 
probably due to the exercise they all have to take in moving about on the steep hills: 
they seem intellectually superior to the general run of coast Natives” (Shaw 1887: 46). 
As well as the Protestants from the CMS, Catholic missionaries also came to 
Kilimanjaro (Lenoble-Bart 2006: 8-10). While the relationship between rival 
missionary denominations, local interests and foreign powers meant that the 
introduction of Christianity and mission education was not always smooth (ibid.: 8-10), 
it did have important lasting effects. First of all, while Christianity became the dominant 
global religion on the mountain, the mixture of Protestant and Catholic missionaries 
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meant that both faiths were represented. This formed another dimension by which 
Chagga ethnicity was not a single entity. Secondly, the opening of mission schools 
marked the beginning of the strong relationship between Chagga people and education 
that would place them in good stead in the future.  As mission schools began to open 
before the First World War, Chagga parents did not only educate their sons, but also 
sent their daughters to be educated. Indeed, at times the numbers of girls being 
educated exceeded those of boys (Vavrus 2002: 373). 
 
There was a strong spiritual or religious element for the Europeans themselves in the 
earliest accounts. The sublime, religious feelings felt by the Europeans are common 
before the 20th century. For example, Bishop Hannington (1885: 610) writes that both 
himself and his Zanzibari guides were “in ecstasies at the magnificent view before us”. 
Joseph Thomson (1887: : 80) saw it “in no way strange that the untutored savage… 
should see in this majestic mountain something more than a material existence, or, at 
least, should recognize it as the chosen abode of the Supreme Being.” This stands in 
contrast to the way that Kilimanjaro was written about in the middle of the 20th 
century, by which time the idea that Kilimanjaro was the seat of God was written about 
in a very different way, in terms of being the African “other”: “Many Africans, even 
those Europeanized, still think of Kilimanjaro as God’s throne. They pray to it” 
(Gunther 1955: 392). However, far from being the product of the African other, the 
idea that Kilimanjaro was the home of God was also one common in European thought. 
Indeed, by the time that Ernest Hemmingway used Kilimanjaro as a metaphor in his 
short story “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” in 1936, he was criticised by a contemporary 
reviewer for the idea of the white-capped mountain being the home of God as being 
over-familiar and clichéd (Evans 1961: 601). The position of the peak of Kilimanjaro in 
historical Chagga theology is not as simple as the Europeans may have suggested. The 
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Chagga conceptions of God centre around the sun, and the god named Ruwa, in 
Eastern and Central Kilimanjaro, or Iruuva in the West (Lema 1999: 41), and common 
to many languages in East Africa this word also means sun (Hinnels 1995). Kibo did 
have religious significance; there are reports that men making prayers or sacrifices would 
face Kibo (Dundas 1924: 146), and some burials are made with the corpse facing Kibo 
(Raum 1967 [1940]: 377). Thus, I argue that the idea of Kilimanjaro as the house of 
God is far closer to earlier European ideas about the peak, rather than indigenous 
Chagga theology. Whereas an approach to the mountain with a mystical dimension was 
expected of the earliest explorers, later it became common to assume that these were 
the views of Chagga people themselves. 
 
The Chiefly Chagga Elite and European Contact  
 
While the writers discussed in this chapter freely generalise about all the inhabitants of 
Kilimanjaro, it is clear from their writings that they dealt directly only with a narrow 
strata of Chagga society. Their contacts were almost entirely with chiefs, or their direct 
agents. Up until the point that some missionaries and district officials began to seek to 
write on broader sociological or anthropological concerns, for example, Gutmann and 
Dundas, the only Chagga that are named and characterised in the writings of Europeans 
are the chiefs. It is a characteristic of these individuals that the writers tended to 
generalise across all Chagga people. An example of this is the descriptions of Chief Rindi 
of Moshi, who had much contact with the early European visitors. They write positively 
of his physical characteristics (Johnston 1886: 103-104), his desire for knowledge, the 
presence of a Swahili interpreter in his court, and his strong knowledge of affairs of the 
coast (Hannington 1885: 162; Johnston 1886: 98; Thomson 1887: 76-77). Parallels are 
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visible here between these characterisations of the individual Rindi and later common 
essentialisations of people of Chagga ethnicity.  
 
The chiefs also sought to portray themselves as strong rulers, with absolute control and 
power. Rebmann compares the landscape of East Africa to the social structures he saw, 
comparing the lofty mountains of Kilimanjaro with the plains in the extent to which 
Chagga people elevated one leader to great heights (Rebmann 1850: 22). Thomson 
noted of Rindi, “The Wa-chaga, on hearing that their chief was coming, scuttled off in 
great trepidation, as if it was his habit to chop off the heads of all who came in his way – 
and indeed, it was one of his greatest delights to see the abject terror of his subjects, 
over whom he wielded the most absolute authority” (Thomson 1887: 82: 82). Later 
analysis has doubted that the chiefs had such all-encompassing power as they made 
themselves appear to outsiders. The political position of a chief was frequently more 
tenuous than they would make themselves out to be, assassination was a continual 
threat and many chiefs (including Rindi (Stahl 1965: 42)) spent long periods in exile. 
Even at home they were not always in as secure a position as they might at first have 
appeared. For example, Moore (1970: 329-330) argues that, while the chief did have 
the power to make judicial decisions, more often than not they would use judicial 
methods such as the age-group assembly. Thus, the chief did not stand openly and make 
decisions, rather the judicial procedures acknowledged the position of the chief while 
allowing him to avoid making a show of authority. The chiefs had good reason to make 
themselves seem as powerful as possible; as so much of the political power in 
Kilimanjaro rested with their relationship with outsiders, then there was much to gain 
by chiefs making themselves appear as strong as possible. 
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In their relations with the Europeans, chiefs made cunning and audacious moves to put 
themselves in a position of advantage over their rival chiefdoms. It was not unusual for 
explorers in East Africa to be used as pawns in the political games played by rulers 
(Bridges 1973: 230), but few cases are as vivid as the treatment of Chief Sina of 
Kibosho. Sina was one of the most powerful chiefs in Kilimanjaro’s history, ruling from 
c.1870 until 1897, and by the 1880s the extent of his influence and military might was 
unchallenged (Stahl 1965: 40-41). Stahl (1964) argues that, had the European powers 
not colonised East Africa, Kibosho would have become the chiefdom ruling the whole 
of Kilimanjaro. However, despite his being the most powerful chief by some margin, 
most of the European visitors had no contact with Sina. Further than that, neither the 
chiefdom of Kibosho nor Chief Sina is even mentioned by the European sources before 
the 1890s. This striking absence was not due to simple ignorance on the part of the 
Europeans, though it does indicate a naivety on their part regarding the political 
situation on Kilimanjaro. Rather, it was the actions of rival chiefs that were responsible. 
Chief Rindi, while being in a far weaker position militarily and politically, was 
diplomatically far more able. He extended his influence by writing to the world powers, 
including Queen Victoria and Kaiser Wilhelm, sending the latter an elephant tusk along 
with an envoy of his subjects (Meyer 1891: 89).  Probably more productively, Rindi 
also corresponded with John Kirk, the British Consul on Zanzibar (Stahl 1965: 43). 
This contact was what recommended Johnston to visit Rindi in Kilimanjaro. Rindi 
went to great lengths so that these outsiders did not realise the extent of Sina’s true 
power. It was not until the colonial period that the German officials began to realise the 
extent of Sina’s power, and fuelled by rumours probably spread by Rindi, crushed 
Kibosho militarily in 1891 (ibid.: 43). There was no way in which Rindi could hope to 
defeat Sina by force of arms, but he had managed to manipulate the Germans into 
destroying his rival.  
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Although naive as to the political situation on Kilimanjaro, the visitors can through 
their writings give some insight into the shifting power dynamics. Hans Meyer18 , the 
German who became the first person to climb Kilimanjaro in 1889, visited Kilimanjaro 
on several occasions. He first visited the chiefdom of Moshi, but was not impressed by 
Chief Rindi. The portrait Meyer offered of Rindi is that of an aging, malicious ruler, 
almost bed-bound; a greedy slave trader, jealously seizing all that he can from European 
visitors to his small, besieged kingdom (Meyer 1891: 84-102). Meyer contrasts his 
experience of Rindi of Moshi with that of the rival chief Marealle of Marangu, the 
grandfather of Thomas Marealle the future Paramount Chief: “Of all the sovereigns of 
Jagga, [Marealle] is the only one I ever met who was at once intelligent, courteous, 
modest, and amiable – the very type of all a young prince ought to be, his swarthy skin 
notwithstanding.” (ibid.: 262). This change in emphasis marks the start of one of the 
key power shifts, as it would be Marealle who became the German favourite during the 
initial period of their colonisation. Marealle too was able to wield German military 
might to his own advantage in defeating his rivals, including the chiefdom of Moshi 
(Stahl 1964: 308-336). 
 
Foreign Visitors and Chagga Unity 
 
For all the bravado displayed by the chiefs in their belittling of their opponents, none of 
them persuaded any visitor who stepped foot on Kilimanjaro that the entirety of the 
mountain was under a single political leadership. Yet one assumption that is never 
questioned by the European visitors is that there is anything but a single Chagga ethnic 
group. From the writings of Rebmann and Krapf onwards, that there might have been a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Meyer was one of the earliest European visitors to mention Kibosho. 
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variety of identities within Kilimanjaro is not questioned, even when they were well 
aware of the divisions that existed between rival chiefdoms. I have found no mention in 
the literature of any identifications of parts of Kilimanjaro as being sub-Chagga 
identities. Chagga internalisations of this unity in the examination of imaginations of 
Chagga ethnicity are the subject of the next chapter. The idea of there being a single 
Chagga ethnicity reflect the period of European, particularly German, thought at this 
time. Particularly in Central Europe, there was a search by intellectuals for lasting 
boundaries in the political fluidity following the Napoleonic wars. “[E]specially in the 
case of Germans, ideas of natural location and landscape became pivotal in the quest for 
political independence and unity” (Luig and Van Oppen 1997: 11). I argue that, upon 
reaching Kilimanjaro, the first visitors encountered a relatively contiguous landscape 
with a climate strikingly different from the plain, aiding their understanding that there 
was a single Chagga people.  
 
It is my contention that a further reason that they held this view was the influence of 
the coastal and Zanzibari caravans that took the visitors to Kilimanjaro – the first 
mention of Chagga as a single people by Rebmann and Krapf predates their first visit to 
Kilimanjaro, and is based upon accounts that they had heard at the coast (Krapf 1860: 
116-117). This does not mean that the traders necessarily saw Chagga in the same 
fashion as would later become the European ideas of “tribe”, but it does show that the 
origins of the idea of a Chagga people predate European contact. Finally, it appears that 
Chagga chiefs themselves played a role in portraying Kilimanjaro as a single entity. 
Johnston, before reaching Kilimanjaro, was under the assumption that Rindi was the 
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Paramount Chief of all of Kilimanjaro19  (Johnston 1886: 139). The assumption that can 
be drawn from this is that Johnston was acting under the influence of Kirk on Zanzibar, 
who had corresponded with Rindi. The benefits to Rindi of cultivating such an 
impression are obvious since it elevated his position in comparison to his rival 
chiefdoms. 
 
Thus, I argue that Chagga ethnicity is not simply the result of colonial “invention” out 
of whole-cloth, rather the product of various precolonial and colonial interactions. As 
described by Berman (1998: 311-312), ethnicities are “ambiguous, constantly contested 
and changing results of cultural politics; the outcome of an endless process in which 
they are always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in the 
process of creation”. These constructivist approaches emphasise the role of intellectuals, 
and other elite groups, in the articulation of ethnic or national identities (Berman 1998: 
327; Spear 2003: 5). As I will illustrate in later chapters, intellectuals played a key role 
in the imagination of Chagga ethnicity. Yet these intellectuals were not in a position to 
invent an ethnic group with no historical precedence. As Spear (2003: 26) writes, 
“Intellectuals need historical raw materials to construct their stories if their 
reinterpretations are to ring true.”  
 
Into the Colonial Period 
 
The start of colonialism in Kilimanjaro was brutal. Carl Peters served as the Imperial 
Commissioner to Kilimanjaro from 1891-2. A brutal racist, Peter’s career came to an 
end following a scandal when news of his atrocities reached Germany, in particular a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  The writings of Joseph Thomson and his descriptions of the politics of Kilimanjaro 
had yet to reach print by the time of Johnston’s expedition (Johnston 1885: 139), 
partially explaining Johnston’s initial ignorance. 
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case in which he had one of his concubines and her lover publicly executed (Reuss 
1981). The brutality of Peter’s reign is still remembered in Kilimanjaro to this day. One 
modern Chagga artist wrote of these continuing memories of this violence in 
Kilimanjaro, “After the execution, Peters erected his shameful monument, a gallows, 
outside the camp. I saw it when I was a child. ‘The Germans hanged our people there,’ 
I was told…” (Nicodemus 2008: 6). Military victories were necessary before the 
Germans considered that they had full control over the mountain. Persuaded by Rindi 
of Moshi shortly before his death, the Germans defeated Kibosho militarily in 1891 
(Stahl 1965: 43-44). As Marealle of Marangu became German favourite, so too did he 
instigate military attacks against his rivals. 
 
When it came to climbing the mountain, this was made far easier by the opening of the 
railway to the town of Moshi in 1913 and the construction of stone and metal huts, the 
Bismarck Hut at 8500ft and Peter’s Hut at 11,500ft, built in 1910 by a German settler 
(Cotton 1930: 97-121). Thus, by 1917, a guidebook to German East Africa notes, “A 
few years ago only a number of the hardiest climbers could boast having explored the 
glacier regions of German East Africa; to-day any tourist can climb the Kilimanjaro at 
his ease – he can even reach the craters of the two peaks on the back of a donkey” 
(Calvert 1917: 118). As the colonial period progressed, it was no longer necessary for a 
mountain climber to negotiate diplomatically with chiefs. Thus, there began to be 
visitors to Kilimanjaro whose interactions were not with chiefs, but with guides and 
porters. For example, Gillman’s visit in 1921, in which he has high praise for Chagga 
culture: “Nowhere in East Africa have I seen anything approaching the high standard of 
culture that is exhibited by the sturdy inhabitants of the cultivated zone of Kilimanjaro” 
(Gillman 1923: 6) While Gillman recognises the power of the chiefs, he himself did not 
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engage directly with them. His views, however, remain similar to those of the earlier 
writers.  
 
The conquering of Kilimanjaro, through reaching the summit, had a clear imperial 
element. Writing in 1890 of the first recorded successful ascent of Kilimanjaro in 1889, 
Hans Meyer wrote, “Kilimanjaro was discovered by a German – the missionary, 
Rebmann; it was first explored by a German – Baron von der Decken; and it seemed to 
be almost a national duty that a German should be the first to tread the summit of this 
mountain, probably the loftiest in Africa, and certainly the highest in the German 
Empire” (Meyer 1891: vi). The response of the British mountaineering community to 
the loss of Kilimanjaro to Germany was to place an increased emphasis on Mount 
Kenya, “in Kenya we had a mountain nearly as high, more striking in its physical 
features, more difficult of ascent, and possessing a flora quite as interesting as its 
German rival” (Mackinder 1900: 153). Mount Kenya, argued as being the harder 
mountain to climb and scientifically more interesting, was the more fitting test of 
British manhood. 
 
In 1916, during the First World War, Kilimanjaro fell to British forces. The initial 
changes were not great; the instructions given to the first British administrator sent 
there simply consisted of “Carry on” (Morison 1933: 140). Greater changes would 
occur following the First World War, when the colony of German East Africa came 
under British control under a League of Nations mandate. One important aspect here 
was the appointment to Kilimanjaro of Major Charles Dundas. As the District Officer 
for Kilimanjaro from 1919-24, he was instrumental in pushing for Chagga coffee 
production (Setel 1999: 262). Coffee had been grown in Kilimanjaro since 1896, but 
the planting of coffee by Chagga people was not encouraged by the Germans as it was a 
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danger to their own production (Ogutu 1972: 280). Dundas was involved with the 
establishment of the Kilimanjaro Native Planter’s Association (KNPA), representing the 
interests of  Chagga planters against European settlers (Moore 1977a: 17).  
 
In terms of coffee cultivation by Chagga farmers, coffee could be added to the existing 
methods of cultivation of bananas and vegetables in the kihamba, rather than replacing 
the older system. This leads to a large degree of continuation in both the system of 
agriculture and inheritance on the mountainside (Moore 1986: 117). Yet beyond this 
coffee cultivation would lead to massive changes in Kilimanjaro. Within the household, 
it altered the balance of power in favour of the men, as they took the right to the cash 
from coffee production as an adjunct to their heritable rights to the land, and saw no 
duty to share this cash with their wives (ibid.: 117). Coffee brought cultural change that 
Moore describes as a “cultural commitment to the market” (ibid.: 129), as Chagga 
farmers spent their coffee wealth on imported goods and educating their children. 
Coffee brought organisations to Kilimanjaro that cut across the divisions, such as the 
KNPA and its successor, the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union, and it is the coffee 
wealth that would later fund the Paramount Chief.  
 
Coffee wealth also brought about the introduction of a non-chiefly Chagga elite who 
would prove very influential. An example is Joseph Merinyo, a commoner from Moshi, 
who was an early adopter of coffee production. Merinyo, as a servant of a German 
settler at the time, had visited Germany in 1907-8 (Moore 1986: 118-119). He became 
an informant and convert of Bruno Gutmann, and was influential on Gutmann’s 
thinking on social anthropology. Gutmann saw that the introduction of the coffee cash 
crop had led to a change from a religious attitude towards agriculture to a secular 
economic attitude, and the persons who were early adopters of coffee production such 
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as Merinyo provided a manifestation of these processes for Gutmann (Winter 1979: 56-
57). Along with Petro Njau, also a commoner with coffee wealth, Merinyo would be 
influential in the early cooperative movement and later in the 1950s would lead the 
proto-nationalist Kilimanjaro Union party (Iliffe 1979: 491). Thus, the new elites that 
coffee wealth introduced would form a very important part in the political development 
of Kilimanjaro. 
 
Merinyo and Njau also served as chief informants for Dundas’s influential book on 
Kilimanjaro and the Chagga ethnic group, Kilimanjaro and Its People, published in 
English in 1924 and in a Swahili translation eight years later. Dundas has been accused 
of writing his monograph purely to advance his career in the Colonial Service – 
apparently successfully, as soon after the publication of his work he was promoted to 
assistant Chief Secretary, and later Secretary of Native Affairs, for Tanganyika Territory 
(Winter 1979: 4-5). In this post, he argued against the policy of Indirect Rule and the 
establishment of “chiefs” and “tribes” in Tanganyika; instead he prefered policies based 
upon villages and regions, arising from his knowledge of the inherent complexities 
within Chagga and other ethnic groups (Jerman 1998: 164). Kilimanjaro and Its People 
became a very influential book on Kilimanjaro. As with other writers, Dundas too 
begins with a description of the mountain, noting, “To the writer the pursuit of this 
study has seemed less induced by mere interest for research than compelled by the spell 
of the mountain” (Dundas 1924: 5). The book would later be described by Thomas 
Marealle, the Paramount Chief, as “the Chagga Bible” (Marealle 1955: 2). It is 
interesting that Thomas Marealle should describe a book written by an outsider such as 
Dundas in such a way, rather than a book written by a Chagga person, as in the texts 
discussed in Chapter Three. In part, there was a political motivation in this: Dundas 
describes the position of the Paramount Chief’s grandfather, Marealle I, as “virtually 
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that of a paramount Chief of the whole tribe” (Dundas 1924: 104). This assessment, 
while historians such as Stahl have diagreed with it, went some way to legitimising 
Thomas Marealle, Marealle I’s grandson, as a Paramount Chief. Yet there are other 
reasons why Dundas’s book would have such status. It is the view of an outsider, and it 
was perhaps seen that this was able to give him a wider, more inclusive scope covering a 
broader sweep of  Chagga identity. Given the drawbacks of the insider accounts 
discussed in the next chapter, this must have been appealing to T. Marealle and a wider 




The earliest European visitors to Kilimanjaro were frequently naive about the true 
political situation. Yet I argue that their work can still give us valuable information 
about the place and their work did prove influential on how later people saw 
Kilimanjaro, and how Chagga people would grow to see themselves. Through their 
work, several influences are evident. Their understanding of the landscape, frequently 
compared to the landscapes of Europe, came from the themes of Romanticism common 
in Europe at this time. At the same time, the influence of their coastal and Zanzibari 
guides and porters appears to be greater than the European travellers themselves give 
them credit for, as they clearly first reached Kilimanjaro with certain sets of ideas 
already in place. Finally, the influence on Chagga chiefs cannot be denied. 
 
However, as the next chapter will go on to discuss, the power of chiefs was already 
weakened, and a wealthy, educated non-chiefly elite was already on the rise. The next 
chapter will illustrate how both the chiefly and non-chiefly elite would present 
imaginations of Chagga ethnicity. 
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Chapter 3: Elite Imaginations of Ethnicity? 








This chapter20  examines some of the aspects of the intellectual work of imagining 
Chagga ethnicity in the 1940s and 1950s. This was the period of political change on 
Kilimanjaro that would culminate in a single ruler for the Chagga for the first time in 
their history. While the political aspects of this period have received much attention, 
this chapter illustrates how the intellectual imagination of Chagga ethnicity played an 
important role with an arguably longer-lasting impact. 
 
The focus of this chapter is two monographs published in Swahili by Chagga authors in 
the late colonial period. The first is Maisha ya Mchagga Hapa Duniani na Ahera 
(Hereafter Maisha), (as translated on the title page, The Life of a Mchagga here on 
Earth and After Death), by Petro Itosi Marealle, first published around 194721 . The 
second work is Desturi za Wachagga (hereafter Desturi) (Traditions of the Chagga), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  I would like to particularly thank the assistance of Bariki Manuo with this chapter 
and his help with the translation of Swahili texts. All errors in translation are my own. 
21  The year of publication is not altogether clear. The author’s acknowledgment is 
dated February 1947 (Marealle 2002 [1947]: xii), although Geider’s (2002: 281-282) 
bibliography of ethnohistories lists the date of publication as 1951. 
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written by Sam Ntiro and first published in 195322 . These two books provide an 
excellent opportunity for comparison as the authors are of different backgrounds: P.I. 
Marealle was a chief from Marangu, Ntiro was not from a chiefly background but was 
rather an academic and artist from the rival chiefdom of Machame. Of course, both 
authors are intellectual elites, but as I will show their different backgrounds have an 
impact on the approaches to some key issues. While this chapter juxtaposes Maisha and 
Desturi and their authors in order to draw out the themes in both works, the authors do 
not present the books as rivals to each other. Indeed, Ntiro (1972 [1953]: vi) notes in 
the acknowledgements of Desturi that P.I. Marealle had read the complete manuscript 
and had offered corrections to the text. Ntiro does not refer to Petro Itosi Marealle’s 
book directly; neither book makes reference to any other written source. This is not 
unusual for ethnohistories of this type from this period, which rarely make direct 
reference to other books or authors (Geider 2002: 271). The limits of such a 
comparison between the texts is acknowledged: it cannot be generalised from these two 
authors that all members of the respective Chagga elites thought along similar lines. 
Following Gopāla Śaraņa’s (1975: 53-57) distinction, the comparison is illustrative, and 
generalisations about elite Chagga thought cannot be made from only two texts.   
 
I have decided to use the term ethnohistory to describe these texts, following van 
Binsbergen’s use of the term “literate ethnohistory”, defined as “a half-product, halfway 
between such traditions and reminiscences as operate within a strictly local frame of 
reference, on the one hand, and scholarly argument, on the other” (van Binsbergen 
1992: 60). As such, this is a use of the term distinct from its other meaning, the 
subdiscipline of anthropology and history concerned with the history of ethnic groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Page references in this chapter refer to the 1973 reprint of Desturi, identical in 
pagination to the 1953 edition. Page references to Maisha refer to the more commonly-
available 2002 edition. 
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(Barnard and Spencer 2002: 763). I use this term despite the fact that, as will be 
discussed below, the historical content of the books is in some respects limited. A term 
used by Geider (2002: 256) that includes the type of texts discussed here is habari – a 
coastal Swahili genre that includes historiography, ethnography, biography and 
travelogue. However, I have decided against the use of this term as it implies a link 
between these Chagga ethnohistories and coastal Swahili texts that does not clearly 
exist, while at the same time hiding the comparison between these Swahili 
ethnohistories and those written in neighbouring countries in different vernaculars. I 
also avoid the term “vernacular history” used by Macola (2003), as in the context of 
these works it is not clear if the vernacular referred to is Swahili or a Chagga language. 
 
The Impact of the Texts 
 
With regard to the impact of the texts in Western academic work, they have largely 
been ignored in terms of adding to the scholarship of Kilimanjaro. Sally Falk Moore 
(1977a: 82), in a bibliography of books on Kilimanjaro, dismisses Desturi with the single 
sentence, “Nothing that is not in other sources”. Maisha received limited academic 
attention for its descriptions of historical carved rocks in Kilimanjaro used as teaching 
aids, and a section of Maisha was translated and reprinted in a European journal 
(Fosbrooke and Marealle 1952a; Fosbrooke and Marealle 1952b). However, apart from 
this limited attention, neither book has received much attention from European authors 
on the basis of their content – it is books largely by non-Chagga authors such as Bruno 
Gutmann, Charles Dundas and Kathleen Stahl that are the authorities generally in use 
in the Northern academic literature.  
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Swahili ethnohistories remain an area that is largely understudied. Geider (2002: 257), 
in an overview of the scope of the Swahili ethnohistory genre, notes, “The far-reaching 
neglect of these writings by the majority of anthropologists is quite striking.” To an 
extent, this may be due to the lack of English translation; in Zambia, an accurate 
English translation of the Bemba monograph Ifkolwe Fyandi na Bantu Bandi (My 
Ancestors and My People) played a vital role in positioning the text in historians’ 
understanding of precolonial Zambia (Macola 2001: 188). No complete translations of 
Maisha or Desturi exist, although sections of Maisha have appeared in the 
aforementioned work by Fosbrooke; and also the sections on education, proverbs and 
faith appeared in an issue of Tanganyika Notes and Records (Marealle and R.D.Swai 
1965). These sections of Maisha are more widely cited than other untranslated sections 
of the book, (for example, Koponen 1988: 413; Clack 2009: 323) indicating that 
appearing in translation does boost the academic attention texts receive. More 
Tanzanian works are beginning to appear in translation, for example Gregory Maddox’s 
2005 translation of Mathias Mnyampala’s Historia, Mila na Desturi za Wagogo (The 
History, Customs and Traditions of the Gogo) (Mnyampala 1995 [1954]). No such 
complete English translation exists of Maisha or Desturi. There is some evidence that 
these works in Tanzania are achieving more attention, for example in Geider’s (2002) 
overview of the ethnohistory genre in Tanzania. Hunter (2009) provides an 
examination of histories on Kilimanjaro that includes a discussion of Maisha; however, 
as I shall illustrate below, her analysis of Maisha is incomplete.  
 
Within Kilimanjaro, I argue that the impact was not as great as with similar texts in 
other parts of Africa. Macola argues that vernacular ethnohistories in Zambia were of 
great importance during the colonial period, as they: 
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provided the cultural rationale for the social and administrative 
engineering that colonial officials were then striving to put into 
practice. In this regard, vernacular authors played a more 
fundamental role than contemporaneous colonial historians, or 
the anthropologists of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. 
(Macola 2003: 253) 
 
Macola (2001: 188) contends that the vernacular text Ifikolwe Fyandi na Bantu Bandi 
became the “tribal bible” that shaped the ethnic consciousness of the royals and 
aristocrats of the Lunda ethnic group in Zambia. In the case of the Chagga 
ethnohistories, they did not have the same level of impact on Chagga consciousness. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, it was not one of the Chagga-authored 
ethnohistories that the Paramount Chief, Thomas Marealle, would describe as “the 
Chagga Bible”, but rather Charles Dundas’ Kilimanjaro and Its People (Marealle 1955: 
2). Similarly, it was later deemed necessary by the Chagga Trust to commission an 
outsider, Kathleen Stahl, to produce a history of the Chagga people (KNCU 1956: 9; 
Stahl 1964). It is outside authority, it would seem, that Chagga sought in order to 
provide an insight into their own history. Given the misunderstandings by European 
visitors described in Chapter Two of this thesis, it is perhaps surprising that so much 
weight is placed by Chagga people themselves on books written by outsiders. A possible 
solution is given by the analysis of the texts in this chapter, in which the gaps evident in 
their presentation of the past indicate the difficulties of the political minefield of a 
Chagga-authored publication during this period.  
 
Exactly how these ethnohistories were received in Kilimanjaro at this time is unknown, 
and something that I was not able to successfully reconstruct in my research. As Geider  
(2002: 278-279) observes of these type of texts, “Conditions of local reception are 
completely unknown. How are and were the texts used within the communities 
described? How are and were they valued on the local, regional and national levels?”. 
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The key question that remains unanswered is how these texts were read. Benedict 
Anderson (2006: 35) considers reading to be a private activity, “performed in silent 
privacy, in the lair of the skull”. This description of reading is not completely true of the 
period that Anderson was writing about, as texts were often read aloud in a social 
context (Wogan 2001: 409). It remains unknown whether, during this period, reading 
was a public or private activity on Kilimanjaro. It can be imagined that sections of the 
work were read aloud in the mbege bars of Kilimanjaro, stimulating debate between the 
literate and non-literate alike over the work’s contents, much as the television news in a 
Tanzanian bar today promotes a discussion of the events. Thus, the picture becomes 
closer to French salons and British coffee houses that Habemas (1991) argues led to the 
creation of the public sphere. On the other hand, it is possible that the books were 
rarefied objects, kept locked in the elite’s private libraries like the chief’s secret 
treasures; the places where I came across the books myself. This lack of information of 
how the texts were read is a limitation of this chapter. What I have ascertained, 
however, is that ethnohistories are of perennial popularity in Tanzania. Other ethnic 
groups in Tanzania have also produced a steady stream of ethnohistories over the 
decades (Geider 2002: 279-285). With regard to books on Chagga ethnicity, both 
Desturi and Maisha were reprinted in subsequent decades, the former in 1972 and the 
latter in 2002. A new Chagga ethnohistory in Swahili, Asili ya Wachaga na Baadhi ya Koo 
Zao (Traditions of the Chagga and Some of Their Clans) was published in 2003 
(Makule 2003). I attempted to buy a copy of this book in Dar es Salaam in 2006; it 
took me some time to locate a copy as the bookshops had all sold out, and the owners 
reported that it was a popular seller. These works must be popular enough to warrant 
continued production.  
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Historical Background 
 
The publication of these two monographs occurred during a period that would result in 
Kilimanjaro’s coming under a single leader for the first time in its history  – a period of 
complex political competition on Kilimanjaro within the framework of indirect rule. In 
1925, Governor Donald Cameron took up his post and indirect rule was established in 
Tanganyika (Iliffe 1979: 318-325). Cameron explained the motivations behind his 
policy in a speech in 1925: 
it is our duty to do everything in our power to develop the 
native on lines which will not Westernize him and turn him 
into a bad imitation  of a European… We must not destroy the 
African atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundation of 
his race… [we should] graft our higher civilization upon the 
soundly rooted native stock, stock that had its foundations in 
the hearts and minds and thoughts of the people, and therefore 
on which we could build more easily, moulding it and 
establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and 
higher standards, and yet all the time enlisting the real force of 
the spirit of the people, instead of killing all that out and trying 
to begin afresh. (Cameron; cited in Buell 1928: 451-452)  
 
The ideology of indirect rule bears similarities to the motivations for publishing the 
monographs that are the subject of this chapter. In Kilimanjaro, the introduction of 
indirect rule led to the establishment of the Council of Chagga Chiefs. While initially 
the chiefs remained fully sovereign over their territories and treasuries, in 1929 the 
Council was reformed and the treasuries of all the chiefs were amalgamated and a single 
court of appeal established (Moore 1970: 334). From 1929 until 1946, the twenty 
chiefs on the Council were all of equal status. 
 
The other key element of change on Kilimanjaro during this period was the growth of 
coffee growing. Iliffe (1979: 274) argues, “during the 1920s coffee-growing transformed 
the Chagga into peasants.” The number of coffee growers and trees exploded; in 1916 
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there were 100,000 trees; in 1925 close to a million; in 1935 nearly six million trees 
(Iliffe 1979: 274). Most of the growers had small plots, growing coffee in their existing 
vihamba (Iliffe 1979: 275). The chiefs were not separate from the coffee industry; as 
they frequently had large land-holdings and access to tribute labour, some chiefs became 
among the largest coffee farmers on Kilimanjaro. For example, in 1932 the retired chief 
of Machame, Shangali Ndeserua, had over 12,000 trees (Iliffe 1979: 275). Nevertheless, 
the introduction of coffee also led to the creation of both wealthy commoners, and of 
powerful, non-chiefly cooperative organisations: the Kilimanjaro Native Planters 
Association (KNPA) and its successor the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union 
(KNCU). The KNPA was formed in 1923, to represent the interests of Chagga coffee 
growers. It was an immediate success, fast becoming a “parallel, nonchiefly, 
nongovernmental organisation, mountainwide in its constituency” (Moore 1986: 124). 
The first president was Joseph Merinyo, as discussed in Chapter Two, an informant of 
Bruno Gutmann. While the KNPA defeated attempts by the British administration to 
bring the organisation under their control via the Council of Chiefs (ibid.: 122-123), 
the organisation did not survive the collapse in the coffee price in 1929-30 (Iliffe 1979: 
278-279). In 1932, the KNPA was transformed by government edict into the KNCU 
under the management of a European, A.L.B. Bennett (Moore 1986: 124). Despite this 
choppy beginning, and controversy in the early years as it was seen as a government 
institution, the KNCU “became a model for African progress for people throughout 
Tanganyika” (Iliffe 1979: 279). 
 
There was pressure from a variety of directions for the creation of a single political 
leader for Kilimanjaro from the 1930s, either in the form of a Paramount Chief or a 
president of the Chagga Council. As a British District Officer put it at the time, “The 
Chagga had finally realised that unity was strength and that their chiefs were too 
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conservative to give that full measure of cooperation necessary to achieve complete 
homogeneity” (cited in Kileo 2005: 44). In part, from the chiefs this was a response to 
the success of the KNPA/KNCU in creating a mountainwide organisation that crossed 
over the traditional boundaries and threatened the chiefs’ authority (Iliffe 1979: 331). 
The 21 chiefs on the council voted to elect a permanent president on the council on 2nd 
July 1934. The favoured candidate of the British administration, Chief Abdiel Shangali, 
came last with only three votes; Chief Abraham Salema of Moshi received four  votes; 
the victor by a significant margin, with 14 votes, was Chief Petro Itosi Marealle (Kileo 
2005: 44-46), the author of Maisha. P.I. Marealle, however, was never to become 
permanent president as, following the loss of their preferred candidate Chief Shangali, 
the British refused to ratify the results of the election (Lindsey 1965: 55). Petro Itosi 
Marealle had been thwarted in his attempt to become the leader of all of Chagga, 
although he would try again in subsequent decades. 
 
In 1946, the Chagga Council was reformed. The central change was the dividing of the 
chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro into three divisions, with three divisional chiefs (mwitori) 
effectively ruling over the fifteen existing chiefs. Other changes to the Council involved 
allowing commoners to have representation on the Council for the first time (Moore 
1986: 143). This was a development that was not popular amongst many of the chiefs 
themselves; they had rejected such a measure when it had been put before them in 
1944, but in 1946 the provincial commissioner simply appointed the divisional chiefs 
(Iliffe 1979: 491). The three divisional chiefs were Abdiel Shangali, ruling Hai division, 
John Maruma ruling Rombo division, and Petro Itosi Marealle becoming the divisional 
chief for Vunjo division (Stahl 1964: 22-23; Iliffe 1979: 491). These three divisional 
chiefs now effectively ruled over chiefs who had previously considered themselves their 
peers. In addition, while the existing chiefs were frequently appointed to their positions 
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(including P.I. Marealle (Stahl 1964: 335)), they had at least an historic claim to their 
rule, whereas the existence of the divisional chiefs had far weaker historic precedent 
(Samoff 1974: 20). It was the opposition to these divisional chiefs that would be 
consolidated to create the movement that would lead to the Paramount Chief. 
 
In 1947, Petro Njau and Joseph Merinyo formed the Kilimanjaro Union out of 
branches of the African Association in Kilimanjaro, and formed the political wing, the 
Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (KCCU) in 1949 (Iliffe 1979: 490-494). This was 
the commoner-led organisation that would agitate for the introduction of a Paramount 
Chief. Merinyo was previously the leader of the KNPA, and Petro Njau was another 
educated commoner. Working as a teacher at the time, Njau said in the 1920s, “I wish 
I could tear off this black skin of mine. We are every whit as good as the whiteman and 
as fit to control our own country.” (Njau, cited in Stuart-Watt 1930: 199). As leader of 
the KCCU, Njau placed his political position in neo-traditionalist terms (Iliffe 1979: 
492). Hunter describes how Njau used reconstructions of the past to justify his view 
that political authority lay with the citizens. Thus, he sought the creation of a 
Paramount Chief who would support the citizens’ rights against the abuses of power by 
the chiefs (Hunter 2009: 158-160). 
 
Njau’s KCCU was able to mobilise a broad range of support for the introduction of a 
Paramount Chief. Many of the chiefs on the Chagga Council too wanted a Paramount, 
although they preferred a chairman from the council voted in by themselves, while 
Njau’s KCCU argued for a popularly elected chief (Iliffe 1979: 492). The key issue that 
motivated the Chagga people, however, was land: 9,093 hectares of vihamba land that 
had been alienated for European use was due to be returned to Chagga use. The issue of 
how this land was to be redistributed, with accusations of the divisional chiefs abusing 
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their power, became one of the key issues (ibid.: 491). The KCCU having won the 
argument, the elections for the post of Paramount Chief occurred on 10th November 
1951. The KCCU had chosen as their candidate Thomas Marealle. T. Marealle was of 
royal blood. He was the grandson of the most famous chiefs of Kilimanjaro’s past, 
Marealle, ruler of the chiefdom of Marangu from c.1880 until his retirement in 1912 
(Stahl 1964: 308-336). Prior to his selection as candidate by the KCCU, T. Marealle 
was not directly involved in Kilimanjaro’s active political scene. A promising civil 
servant, he was  sent to the UK for university courses and eventually becoming 
programme director of the Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station (Swahili Service) 
(Eckert 2006: 259-264). He stood against the three divisional chiefs of that time: Chief 
Abdiel Shangali of Hai, Chief John Maruma of Rombo, and Chief Petro Itosi Marealle 
of Vunjo. P.I. Marealle withdrew when it became clear that he stood little chance 
against his relative Thomas Marealle; Abdiel Shangali performed well in his home of 
Machame; but overall Thomas Marealle won a landslide victory with 15,661 of the 
24,002 votes cast (Iliffe 1979: 493). He was inaugurated as Paramount Chief on the 
17th January 1952. 
 
The period of the Paramount Chief ran from 1952 until 1960. This was, as Stahl 
describes it, a period of “Chagga self-awareness”: 
The new regime rode on the crest of popular enthusiasm arising 
from victory. Employing as its watchword the unity of all the 
Chagga people, it accomplished much. The face of Chaggaland 
was changed. The fine new buildings of the Chagga Council and 
Paramountcy Lodge beside it, and of the coffee co-operative… 
were cheering sights for visiting Africans from all over the 
Continent. The Chagga took zest in the feeling that they 
themselves were achieving something new. (Stahl 1965: 48) 
 
The texts that are the subject of this chapter were written at a time when there was a 
large political movement towards placing Kilimanjaro under a single leader for the first 
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time in its history. The unity discourse was strong, and would come to be developed 
through the Chagga nationalism under the Paramount Chief. I argue that the timing of 
the publication of Maisha and Desturi was one in which the imagination of Chagga 




While both Sam Ntiro and Petro Itosi Marealle were male, well-educated elites, their 
personal histories stand in contrast to each other. Sam Ntiro (1923-1993), the author 
of Desturi, is best known as one of Tanzania’s finest artists. Ntiro was born in the 
chiefdom of Machame. As a painter, he spent much time studying and teaching at 
Makerere College, Uganda. Indeed, it was while he was at Makerere that Desturi was 
published. In 1950, while visiting Kenya along with his tutor Mrs Trowell the Head of 
Art at Makerere, he was invited to a cocktail party attended by white settlers. The host 
of the party said of Ntiro,  
The Dean of Makerere spoke at the Njoro Club recently about 
the educated Africans and none of us had ever met one. So 
when we heard you were bringing one to Mrs Grant’s, we 
thought we’d hold a party to meet him and see what he was 
like. We are all astonished. He is charming and so cultured and 
interesting. (Frost 1978: 78-79) 
 
Ntiro’s post-independence career was spent in part in service to the Tanzanian state, 
and he was High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1961 until 1964, as well 
as producing public works of art such as the roundabouts in Arusha commemorating the 
tenth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration. 
 
Ntiro’s legacy in Tanzania rests upon his reputation as an artist, rather than his work 
Desturi. However, Desturi ties into his work as an artist. Ntiro’s painting frequently 
featured scenes of Chagga life on Kilimanjaro (Agthe 1994: 375). He has been described 
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as an artist who was “technically skilled in the use of Western academic methods to 
illustrate… traditional life” (Delaquis 1976: 50). This combination of the African 
society and the Western technique brings out similar themes in his writings. 
 
The background of Petro Itosi Marealle (1906-1982), the author of Maisha, stands in 
sharp contrast to that of Ntiro. P.I. Marealle was the son of Marealle, the chief of 
Marangu whose diplomatic skills with the German forces made Marangu one of the 
most important chiefdoms on Kilimanjaro. P.I. Marealle’s half-brother, Mlanga, 
initially took over from Marealle following his death in 1916, but proved to be a weak 
ruler and he was deposed by the British in 1932. P.I. Marealle took over as chief of 
Marangu at a young age (Stahl 1964: 335). By all accounts, P.I. Marealle proved a 
shrewd and capable ruler. While the chief of Machame, Abdiel Shangali, was the British 
favourite, P.I. Marealle remained an influential figure and maintained good relations 
with Abdiel Shangali (ibid.: 335). 
 
As with Nitro, P.I. Marealle was well-educated. As the son of a chief, P.I. Marealle 
benefited from the policy of the British administration, who sought to educate the 
offspring of the traditional aristocracy in Tanganyika in an attempt to prevent members 
of an educated non-aristocratic class from undermining their authority (Buell 1928: 
463-464). A central plank of this policy was the establishing of an elite school for the 
sons of chiefs at Tabora, modelled along the lines of Eton and Harrow (Stöger-Eising 
2000: 128), at which P.I. Marealle spent time as a clerk (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 128). 
The most famous alumnus of the school at Tabora was Julius Nyerere, indicating a 
certain self-defeating element of the British policy of educating the children of 
traditional rulers. P.I. Marealle had become chief at a young age, and in the 1940s he 
was seen as one of the progressive chiefs on the council (Lindsey 1965: 55). Given P.I. 
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Marealle’s political ambition, it seems likely that the motives for writing his book were 
in part personal advancement. When the book was written, he had already attempted 
once to be made the first Paramount Chief, and would do so again after its publication. 
However, P.I. Marealle also had academic concerns. While Ntiro was working in East 
Africa’s leading academic institution, P.I. Marealle had excellent contact with 
researchers and anthropologists in his chiefdom on Kilimanjaro. His home was close to 
the noted anthropologist and educationalist Otto Raum. In 1934, Bronislaw 
Malinowski visited Kilimanjaro, writing in a letter to his wife, 
Here I am among the Djagga who are among the most 
progressive of East Africa – all European dress, Christianity, 
new houses, cooperative societies etc… In the evenings I have 
here the chief [Petro Itosi Marealle] who is young, intelligent, 
keen on native custom and speaks good English. We discuss at 
times politics, at times anthropology. It will all make lots of 
difference to my grip on the subject I teach (Malinowski and 
Masson 1995: 200).  
 
Malinowski later corresponded with P.I. Marealle, as reported to the legal 
anthropologist Sally Falk Moore, who also became close to P.I. Marealle (Moore 2006: 
304). 
 
The presentation of the authors in the paratextual elements of the texts themselves is 
important as it shows how the authors were presented as trusted authorities. Maisha 
contains introductory notes by European authorities that are presented to give the text 
authority. The Reverend Richard Reusch, of the Leipzig Mission (Cotton 1930: 102) 
and with many years experience on Kilimanjaro, writes in his introductory note, “only a 
Chagga Chief of the calibre of Chief Petro or Chief Heri-Abdiel of Machame will be 
able to obtain this material from those old men and women, a European or a young 
Chagga will never be able to collect it” (Marealle 2002 [1947]: xiv). His position as 
Chief was clearly one of the key elements that gave the work authority, although his 
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education also played a role (ibid.: xiii). For the case of Ntiro, it is purely through his 
educational background that his authority lies – his position at the respected university 
of Makerere is in a prominent place in his book (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: i). 
 
I contend that the two authors stand in contrast to each other in a number of ways. 
The chiefdoms from which they originate, Machame and Marangu, were the subjects of 
the central political rivalry between chiefdoms of the mid-20th century – as seen by the 
rivalry between Chief Abdiel Shangali of Machame with both P.I. Marealle and Thomas 
Marealle over the Paramountcy, as well as the later conflict between Thomas Marealle 
and Solomon Eliufoo. Given the inter-chiefdom rivalries described in Chapter Two, it 
might be thought that this was the greatest difference between the two men. However, 
as this chapter will illustrate, within the context of the move towards Chagga unity and 
nationalism of this period, such intra-chiefdom rivalries had faded in importance. Of far 
more salience is the difference of their relationship to the institution of chieftaincy. 
 
The analysis of Gramsci on the role of intellectuals is of relevance. Gramsci analyses 
intellectuals in terms of their place within social relations. He writes, 
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain 
of an essential function in the world of economic production, 
creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of 
intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its 
own function not only in the economic but also in the social 
and political fields. (Gramsci 1971: 15) 
 
Gramsci (1971: 112) describes “organic” intellectuals as those that rose out of the 
“world of production”. Thus, in 19th century Europe, the bourgeoisie produced organic 
intellectuals through the capitalist entrepreneur and technical specialists (ibid: 5), 
whereas the proletariat produced its own intellectuals (Kurzman and Owens 2002: 66). 
This can be contrasted to the “traditional” intellectuals, who had no such links to the 
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world of production. In an example from colonial Tanganyika, Feierman (1990: 20-21) 
presents the Kilindi chiefs as traditional intellectuals. These chiefs viewed themselves as 
partially autonomous, and with some freedom as to which power blocks they chose to 
align themselves with, although in practice they usually compromised with the 
dominant social group.  
 
Within this framework, I present Ntiro as an organic intellectual emerging from the 
new, wealthy class of Chagga who had emerged from the introduction of coffee. P.I. 
Marealle, on the other hand, is very much in the mould of the traditional intellectual, 
being part of the chiefly class on Kilimanjaro. Within fifteen years of his work being 
published, the chiefs were abolished, and from that point traditional intellectuals such 
as P.I. Marealle were doomed. The distinction drawn by Gramsci is a valuable one in 
this instance because the political project of both authors is the same; that is, presenting 
a view of a unified Chagga ethnicity. The differences between the authors emerge over 
the issue of traditional political authority.  
 
The Language of Publication 
 
The works Maisha and Desturi were not only works of intellectual endeavour, but 
published works. Publication is not a simple transition between the author and reader 
“[p]ublishing, or rather the horizon of the publishable, precedes and constitutes both 
what can be written and read” (Malik 2008: 709). Within the context of the colonial 
state, low literacy levels meant that the development of nationalistic or ethnic 
sentiment produced through print was inevitably conducted by elites (Hagen 1997: 
110). Publication plays an important role in Benedict Anderson’s work on the rise of 
nations and nationalism in Europe and the imagined community. “What… made the 
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new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a 
system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of 
communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson 2006: 
42-43). This interplay, Anderson argues (2006: 43), led to the diversities of spoken 
vernaculars being assembled into a smaller number of print-languages. 
 
Publication, then, is an essentially political act. In a post-colonial Tanzanian example, 
Shetler (2002) discusses the ethical and political dilemmas she faced in deciding 
whether to publish written versions of the oral histories she gathered in the Mara 
region. Shetler argues that the transformation of oral traditions into a written form, and 
particularly a published form, is a political act that takes power away from some 
members of the community and puts it into the hands of literate men: 
Written knowledge does away with the need of community 
elders to imagine and shape the past as they discuss the case at 
hand over beer. It destroys the context in which oral tradition 
is preserved. Written histories demand conformity to one 
“true” history rather than a host of different kinds of histories 
told differently in different contexts, especially in a place where 
published books are rare. (Shetler 2002: 419-420) 
 
Shetler’s analysis is correct insofar as that publication creates an emphasis that favours 
the literate elite. Yet her assertion that published histories create “one ‘true’ history” 
denies the fact that texts exist in the context of ongoing debates about the past. Where 
multiple textual accounts exist, the texts exist within a state of competition in which 
“the memory of the past becomes a political tool” (Macola 2001: 194). The competing 
visions on Kilimanjaro and the way in which various texts are used is discussed further 
by Hunter (2009). 
 
Desturi was first published by the East African Literature Bureau under its Eagle Press 
imprint. The East African Literature Bureau was a publishing enterprise established in 
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1948 by the East Africa High Commission with a developmental aim to produce texts 
for the increasing number of literate East Africans (Richards 1960: 536-539). Desturi 
was the first of their series Desturi na Masimulizi Katika Africa ya Masahriki – Customs 
and Tradition in East Africa (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: iii). The series went on to publish 
ethnohistories on various other ethnic groups, including Mnyampala’s work on the 
Gogo (Mnyampala 1995 [1954]). A Publisher’s Note (in both English and Swahili) 
appeared at the beginning of each book in the series (Geider 2002: 269), I quote here 
from the note at the start of Desturi: 
[The series examines t]he customs and traditions which are still 
a living part of the social structure in most parts of East Africa. 
The series Custom and Tradition in East Africa, of which this 
volume is the first to be published, provides the means for 
African students and authors to explore this field as few 
Europeans can, to place on record for present and future 
students some of the customs with which they are familiar, and 
to preserve ancient oral tradition, which in this new age is not 
being handed on from elder to younger in the manner 
customary in days gone by… [This] series [is] designed to give 
young Africans as well as members of other races, an 
opportunity to study local history, traditions and customs, a 
study which, based as it is on a ‘concentrate of past experience’ 
can help in the building up of the balanced attitude to the 
complexities of modern life which a young nation must have if 
its achievements are to match its ideals. (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 
iii) 
 
The reference to “young nation” refers to the Tanganyikan state as a colonised nation 
consisting of a variety of ethnic groups, but it was easy for nationalists to understand 
this as a reference to an independent nation (Geider 2002: 269). I argue that there are 
striking similarities between the justification expressed in this introduction and the 
reasoning behind the introduction of indirect rule described by Cameron above. 
 
Language is usually considered to be of great importance for the imagination of 
ethnicity. Yet both Desturi and Maisha are written in Swahili as was common for 
ethnohistories written in this period (Geider 2002). By the time the texts were 
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published, Swahili was already well established as the lingua franca of the territory. 
Under German rule, after their failure to promote the German language in their colony, 
Swahili became the language of administration, the military and business (Pike 1986). 
By the time the British took over after the First World War, Swahili was well 
established as both a lingua franca and a medium of instruction in schools (Whiteley 
1956: 348). The first Swahili newspaper, Kwetu, was established in 1937 (Scotton 
1978: 1-6). Swahili had become the language used for all non-English publications by 
Africans in the territory, including ethnohistories. Maddox (1995: 5) points out the 
irony of this, as Swahili would ultimately serve the purposes of Tanganyikan 
nationalism. Anderson describes how print-capitalism assembled vernaculars into the 
print-languages that “laid the bases for national consciousnesses”. Print-languages 
created “unified fields of exchange and communication” that brought different readers 
of the same language together to form “the embryo of the nationally imagined 
community” (Anderson 2006: 44). Thus, this produces the irony that Maddox 
discusses: the use of Swahili in an ethnohistory that promotes one identity ends up 
promoting another. 
 
There are clues within the acknowledgments of Maisha that tie the author’s use of 
Swahili with the colonial regime’s language policy. P.I. Marealle, as well as thanking the 
assistance of Swahili teachers at the Teacher’s Training School in Marangu, also thanks 
the East African Inter-Territorial Language Committee who helped correct the Swahili 
in the work and gave it their approval (Marealle 2002 [1947]: xii). This committee was 
established in 1930 by the colonial governments to establish a common Swahili dialect 
across the territories of Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda. The committee 
contained representatives of the government and missionaries from each of the 
territories (Broomfield 1931: 85), with seemingly no involvement of Africans. The aim 
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of the committee was to establish a uniform Swahili dialect across the British empire in 
East Africa, as well as the aims of the missionary component who saw the debates as 
having “the desirable end of making Swahili a medium for introducing African peoples 
into the modern mental world of Europe” (Roehl 1930: 200). It was this committee 
that established the Zanzibari dialect of Swahili as the standard across East Africa23 , a 
privileged position that it retains to the present. P.I. Marealle sought to fit his work 
within this project of the colonial government, praising the work of the committee. P.I. 
Marealle is linking his work closely to the language policy of the administration. 
 
While Swahili was the lingua franca and the standard choice for published works, there 
is still an element of choice in the use of this language. Anderson (2006: 44) makes the 
claim that, of 16th century Europe, “[t]hen and now the bulk of mankind is monoglot”. 
This was not true of Kilimanjaro of the 1950s24 , as a large number of individuals would 
know Swahili, a vernacular Chagga language, and – in the case of elites such as Ntiro 
and P.I. Marealle at least – English. After 1945, a commentator observed that an 
“antagonism” between Swahili and the vernacular tongue had begun to emerge amongst 
Haya, Nyamwezi, Sukuma and Chagga, with some members of these groups pushing for 
the use of the vernacular and English (Whiteley 1956: 349). However, I argue that 
there were factors that prevented the ethnohistories being presented in a vernacular 
Chagga dialect. The differences between Chagga dialects made effective communication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  The debates on the committee over the form that the language would take were quite 
intense over the issue as to how man words of Arabic origin would be allowed in the 
official dialect of Swahili (Roehl 1930; Broomfield 1931). The eventual choice to allow 
words of Arabic origin into the language also has post-colonial relevance; the author 
Abdallah Khalid argues in favour of the Mombassa dialect, referred to as the “true 
Swahili language”, as opposed to Zanzibari Swahili, “the debased lingua franca form of 
our language, created by Arabs under Arab rule” (Khalid 1977: 120). 
24  There is evidence that it was not true for the 16th century that most people were 
monoglot (Wogan 2001), and on a global level presently there are more multilingual 
than monolingual people (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995: 41). 
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about complex political issues impossible. During the discussions between the chiefs 
over the establishment of a Paramount in 1934, the discussions were conducted in 
Swahili (Iliffe 1979: 331).There was enough uniformity during the Chagga nationalism 
of the paramountcy in the 1950s to produce a Chagga motto for the flag and an 
anthem25  in a Chagga dialect. However, more complex political debate or complex 
negotiations proved impossible:  
After the recent election of a Paramount Chief, the question 
arose as to what language the newly constituted Chaga nation 
should speak. None of the members of the dialect-cluster which 
makes up Chaga have been anxious for their particular dialect 
to be submerged, and it may be that it will be found necessary 
to displease everyone a little by using Swahili, rather than 
displease one section a great deal by using the dialect of 
another. (Whiteley 1956: 352) 
 
Publishing an ethnohistory in a Chagga vernacular would limit the audience for the 
work, making publication less commercially viable, a factor acknowledged in Anderson’s 
work on print-capitalism (Anderson 2006: 43). More importantly, however, was the 
project of both texts of portraying a unified Chagga identity. It is my contention that 
writing in one Chagga dialect would not only limit the audience to one part of the 
mountain, it would also essentially promote one identity over another. The irony 
highlighted by Maddox is only amplified in the Chagga case: in order to promote 
Chagga unity, it was necessary to not use a Chagga dialect. 
 
The Structure of the Texts 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  The lyrics of the Chagga anthem were: “Uka Kibong’oto mpaka Usseri/Lukundanyi 
woose, woose bin./Iruva nalutarame Kilimanjaro Chagga Council,/Iruva nalutarame 
Kilimanjaro Chagga Council”. In English, “From Kibongo to Usseri/We Chagga people 
love one another/May the lord continue to bless the Kilimanjaro Chagga Council/May 
the lord continue to bless the Kilimanjaro Chagga Council.” This anthem was sung in 
schools from the 1950s up until the end of 1960 (Kileo 2005: 82-83). 
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The main text of Desturi is divided into three sections: Kabla ya Wazungu (Before the 
Europeans) (pages 1-22); Ustaarabu wa Wazungu (The Civilisation of the Europeans) 
(pages 22-41) and Siku Zijazo (The Days Ahead) (pages 42-50). In a similar way to the 
European texts discussed in the previous chapter, Desturi begins with a description of 
the peak of Kilimanjaro and the beauty of the mountain (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 1-3). 
“Kibo ni mlima wenye kupendeza macho” (Kibo is a mountain that delights the eyes) 
(ibid.: 2). A structural oddity in Desturi is the placement of the section describing the 
kihamba banana garden. Rather than being placed at the point of the description of the 
landscape of Kilimanjaro at the start of the text, Ntiro places his discussion on the 
nature and importance of the kihamba in his final section describing contemporary 
concerns in Kilimanjaro (ibid.: 46-47). This placement emphasises the role of the 
kihamba in contemporary Chagga life: the kihamba was considered not part of the 
historical past, nor part of the natural beauty of the mountain, but rather part of the 
everyday life of the contemporary Chagga person. 
 
The title of P.I. Marealle’s book begins with Maisha ya – “Life of” – a common phrase 
in the titles of colonial Swahili biographies (Topan 1997: 303). As such, it has been 
considered a biography, not of an individual but of an ideal Chagga life; “marking the 
life-cycle stages of an ideal tribesman… the idea of maisha ‘life’ as the biography of a 
collectivity emerges here” (Geider 2002: 269). Maisha’s first six chapters follow that of a 
biography, describing the life of a Chagga person from birth until burial, before he goes 
on to outline Chagga religious beliefs, witchcraft and Chagga fables. The final section 
concerns the interaction between foreigners and Chagga people on Kilimanjaro. The 
structure of the first six chapters seems to me to be reminiscent of the 1940 work Chaga 
Childhood by the European anthropologist and educationalist Otto Raum. This work 
follows the structure of  Maisha in that it follows the lifecycle of a Chagga person from 
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conception and birth through to death and burial (Raum 1967 [1940]). Raum 
conducted his research while based for many years at the Teacher’s Training School26  
(ibid.: 56), close to P.I. Marealle’s home.  
 
I argue that the content of P.I. Marealle’s work does, in some ways, distinguish him 
from an earlier chiefly tradition. As described by Ntiro (1972 [1953]: 13-17), in earlier 
times the chief was a figure characterised by a great deal of secrecy: he was not often 
seen in public by the poorer members of society, and even the death of a chief was 
sometimes kept secret to avoid attacks from rival chiefdoms. It was often considered 
advisable for commoners to keep their dealings with the chief secret, as in the famous 
Chagga proverb, “Mangi kakuwika ambo, rika ngumwonyi” (If the Chief gives you a ring, 
hide it in your clothing.) (Dundas 1924: 345). Shetler (2002: 419) notes, of her work in 
the Mara region of Tanzania, that issues surrounding initiation ceremonies is of 
particular relevance to the balance of power between groups with regard to the 
publishing of previously secret information. P.I. Marealle, however, openly describes 
elements of the teaching given to initiates in the period of seclusion following the 
circumcision ceremony (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 40-42). Some secrets could be told by 
P.I. Marealle because they were no longer relevant: he describes how twelve sons of 
prominent people would be chosen to be taught the secrets of the chief and the location 
of his hidden treasure in case the chief had to flee due to war; the introduction of native 
treasuries made such teachings no longer necessary. In another example, in the past 
(according to Maisha, twenty years ago) there existed a fiction within Chagga 
households that during the male initiation the anus was sealed with a plug known as 
ngoso, meaning that an adult Chagga male did not defecate or produce flatulence (see 
also (Raum 1967 [1940]: 318-319; Moore 1976)). During the period of seclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Now Marangu Teachers’ Training College 
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following circumcision, initiates were told the truth that this was a fiction, and taught 
ways of maintaining the fiction within the household. P.I. Marealle openly describes the 
secret about a fiction that was once performed in every Chagga household, according to 
P.I. Marealle’s reckoning, within his lifetime. This openness with what was once a 
closely-guarded secret reveals, I argue, the changing role of the chieftaincy in 
Kilimanjaro. The chief had moved from a secretive figure, spending much time hidden 
from the populace, to a much more public role. Thomas Marealle’s role as Paramount, 




Both Maisha and Desturi attempt to portray a view of a single, united Chagga ethnicity. 
This is not such a straightforward task, as within what is now known as the Chagga 
ethnic group there exists much variety; linguistic, historical and political divides create a 
diverse sense of Chagga ethnicity. During my fieldwork, after I would tell both 
informants and other Tanzanians that I was researching the Chagga ethnic group, by far 
the most common follow-up question from them was whether they were a single ethnic 
group. Nevertheless, both Maisha and Desturi come up with very similar descriptions, 
and to an extent definitions, of the Chagga ethnic group, and ways of explaining the 
diversity within Chagga ethnicity. 
 
P.I. Marealle describes, and to an extent defines, the Chagga ethnic group simply: 
“Wachagga ni watu wanaokaa kwenye mtelemko wa upande wa kusini wa mlima wa 
Kilimanjaro.” (Wachagga are people who live on the southern slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro) (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 118). He does not go into detail about the origins 
of these people, yet it is not correct to state, as Hunter does, that P.I. Marealle 
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“present[s] the Chagga as a unified group who had always lived on the slopes of 
Kilimanjaro” (Hunter 2009: 157). He writes earlier in the book, at the start of the 
section on marriage, “Wachaga27  ni watu wa kabila moja lenye watu wa koo za asili 
mbalimbali” (Chagga are people of one tribe with people of clans of various origins) 
(Marealle 2002 [1947]: 46). This variety of origins, P.I. Marealle tells us, leads the 
people in different places to have various different traditions, but marriage between 
different parts of Kilimanjaro means that over time the differences become less. Counter 
to Hunter’s argument that P.I. Marealle accepts nothing other than complete unity of a 
people who have lived on Kilimanjaro for an eternity, P.I. Marealle accepts a variety of 
origins for the various clans of Kilimanjaro. Ntiro writes in a very similar way about the 
variety on Kilimanjaro; “Kabila la Kichagga lilikuwa na koo nyingi – The Chagga tribe 
was many clans” (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 17). Accepting the variety between clans on 
Kilimanjaro is, for both P.I. Marealle and Ntiro, a very effective technique. It is a way of 
admitting that there is a variety of origins, histories and traditions on Kilimanjaro. At 
the same time, I argue that it diminishes the variations to the level of the clan, rather 
than as potential ethnicities.  
 
While P.I. Marealle’s treatment of Chagga ethnogenesis is vague, Ntiro has a more 
detailed account. He describes many neighbouring ethnic groups coming to Kilimanjaro 
from neighbouring areas, including Sambaa, Pare, Meru and Kilindi: “Makabila haya yote 
yalipokwisha ingia Kilimanjaro, ndipo jina la Wachagga lilipoanza. Nchi nzima ilikuwa na 
sehemu 22, na kila sehemu ilikuwa na “mangi” wake” (When these tribes all finished 
entering Kilimanjaro, the name Chagga began. Within the entire country there were 22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Despite the spelling of Chagga with a double g in the title of the book, in most of the 
text of Maisha P.I. Marealle spells the name with a single g. This is the opposite of 
Makule’s Asili ya Wachaga na Baadhi ya Koo Zao (2003), where, despite the title Chagga 
is spelt with a double g in the main text. 
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areas, and every area had its own chief) (ibid.: 6). Ntiro thus has more of a description 
of the population movements that would produce the Chagga ethnic group, but 
ultimately his idea of what makes the Chagga is the same as P.I. Marealle’s. It is an 
understanding of Chagga ethnicity based purely on the place Kilimanjaro.  
 
Further to the project of both authors of presenting a unified Chagga ethnicity, they 
also seek to present an inclusive Chagga ethnicity. Neither work is attempting to play 
power games in the intra-Chagga political conflicts, despite the authors being from 
chiefdoms that were fierce rivals during this period. It is through their presentation of 
history and conflict within Kilimanjaro that the works show their greatest attempts at 
presenting an inclusive Chagga ethnicity. History plays a key role in the imagination of 
ethnic identities. “Modern ethnic or minority identity is commonly sought through 
historicist argument: the present is understood by reference to the past, and the 
interpretation of the past is made to generate the present” (McDonald 1986: 333). 
Narratives of the past are of great cultural importance, and so these narratives are 
frequently a contested area. This makes the lack of detailed presentations by both texts 
all the more remarkable. 
 
Desturi has a section on the pre-colonial conflicts in Kilimanjaro, “Vita kati ya Wachagga 
Wenyewe”  (Chagga Civil Wars) (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 6-9). He puts the weight of these 
conflicts on the disputes and jealousy between rival Chagga chiefs. However, this 
section is noticeably lacking in detail. He mentions no chiefs or chiefdoms by name, nor 
does he offer any kind of timeframe. The acknowledgement that conflicts did exist is 
more detailed than in Maisha, where there is no mention of intra-Chagga conflict. The 
key clash presented in Maisha is between European and Chagga civilisations. It is only 
once European contact with Kilimanjaro begins that P.I. Marealle begins to use names 
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and dates, whereas such details are not present in earlier parts of the book. The lack of 
detail in both works is striking when compared to the works of European authors from 
this period. I argue that the reason for this lack of detail is that for Ntiro and P.I. 
Marealle it was not possible to give a more detailed description of intra-Chagga conflict. 
How could Ntiro, a Machame resident, provide an account of the Machame-Kibosho 
conflict that would not alienate one group? How could P.I. Marealle present an 
account of his father that did not alienate the chiefdoms that Marealle used the German 
military might to crush? During this period, I argue, the sensitivities of the intra-Chagga 
conflicts meant that they had to turn to outsiders for accounts of their own history if 
Chagga unity was to be maintained. 
 
 A comparison between these Chagga ethnohistories and those of the Yoruba from West 
Africa draws the nature of the unity discourse into sharper focus. Like the Chagga 
ethnic group, Yoruba identity had several potential foci of identity amongst various 
smaller cultural or political groupings, and it was far from self-evidentially inevitable 
that it was the Yoruba language grouping that would become the primary ethnic 
identity (Law 1996: 65). Yoruba intellectuals published many works, most notably 
Samuel Johnson’s nearly 700-page work The History of the Yoruba, from the Earliest 
Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate, published in 1921. This work was of key 
importance in the imagination of Yoruba identity, “through which the Yoruba have 
come to know themselves” (Peel 1989: 198). Johnson’s work, however, presents a 
particular view of Yoruba identity: one of a Christian identity that favoured Johnson’s 
own grouping within the Yoruba, the Oyo (ibid.). Johnson’s work stimulated rival 
accounts from authors from other Yoruba sub-groups, such that by the 1940s over 20 
books and pamphlets on local history had been printed (Law 1996: 55). The diversity 
within Yoruba identity means that comparisons can be made to Chagga identity, 
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although how this subsequently played out in the printed word took on a very different 
character. Unlike the Yoruba, rather than providing accounts of Chagga identity that 
favour their particular subgroup, both Maisha and Daima attempt to be inclusive in 
their imagination of Chagga ethnicity. 
  
Community and Ujamaa 
 
Both texts discuss the role of community and working together, features of Chagga 
society of which both texts show approval. Ntiro describes how, within the clan (ukoo) 
people performed many tasks together – helping each other with problems, the brewing 
of beer, and the building of houses. “Watu wa ukoo mmoja walijisaidia wenyewe kwa kila 
njia” (People of one ukoo they helped each other through every means) (Ntiro 1972 
[1953]: 19). Through marriage, Ntiro argues, the members of different clans came 
together. P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, has a far more detailed description of  the 
sense of a Chagga community, of what he refers to as ujamaa. It is P.I. Marealle’s 
conception of ujamaa upon which the rest of this subsection focuses. 
 
Ujamaa is a term best-known as the Swahili word that Nyerere would later use to 
describe his model of African Socialism. Nyerere translates it’s meaning in 1962 as 
“familyhood” (Nyerere 1962b: 170), although it is a word with no precise English 
translation (Stöger-Eising 2000: 130). This lack of a precise translation would have 
appealed to P.I. Marealle, as he believed that the concept of ujamaa was one that did 
not exist in European society:  
Wachaga walifanya kazi zote kwa ujamaa, na mazao ya kazi hizo 
yalitumiwa kwa ujamaa pia. Hivi hapakuwako mtu aliyekosa 
kupata baraka ya ujamaa huo. Ustaarabu wa kigeni, hasa wa 
Kizungu, haupatani na ujamaa na namna hii  (Wachaga did all 
work with ujamaa, and the products of this work was used with 
ujamaa also. Thus, a person without an error gets the blessing 
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of socialism. Foreign civilization, especially Europeans, do not 
have this sort of ujamaa). (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 121)  
 
Out of this lack of a European conception of ujamaa came the clash between European 
and Chagga civilisations (ibid.: 121).  
 
Coming across a reference to ujamaa as a broader feature of an African society a decade 
before Nyerere wrote on the subject invites comparisons. Of course, there are essential 
differences between the writings of one of Africa’s most notable socialists and a leader of 
one of Tanganyika’s most capitalist ethnic groups: Nyerere puts a great emphasis on the 
damage caused by capitalism, class and excess individual wealth (for example, Nyerere 
1962b); P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, places emphasis on the hierarchical structure 
of ujamaa. However, there are also striking similarities between the work of the two 
men. For both, ujamaa is a kinship metaphor, expanded to include those outside of the 
immediate family circle (Nyerere 1962b: 170; Marealle 2002 [1947]: 121). Ujamaa is 
understood not only as an actual characteristic of traditional society, but also as a 
normative dimension of the direction that society must take, combining both ujamaa 
and aspects of European modes of thought. For example, Nyerere (1968: 2) writes “We 
are doing this by emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organisation, and 
extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology and 
enable us to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century world.” P.I. Marealle 
(2002 [1947]: 121) writes too of combining ujamaa with the good aspects of European 
culture as the main challenge facing Chagga society.  
 
The other aspect of similarities between Nyerere and P.I. Marealle is that both works 
were written at key moments in their political careers – both men were, after all, 
politicians as well as scholars. Nyerere wrote the first important formulation of his 
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ideas, Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism, during the period in 1962 when he had 
resigned as Prime Minister in order to focus upon building TANU as an effective 
political organisation. The ideology of ujamaa would become key in that project (Pratt 
1976: 114-121). P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, was still aiming to become the 
Paramount Chief. Both men had the aims of uniting their peoples behind an ideology. 
As Sprinzak observes, this is a theme that runs through the works of many African 
socialist leaders: “By universalising the communal character of traditional society, 
African leaders are not seeking support for indigenous institutions, but wish rather to 
deploy their deeply-rooted social orientations for new and broader national purposes” 
(Sprinzak 1973: 645). The P.I. Marealle example shows that this was not limited to 
post-independence socialist leaders, but was also present in the works of pre-
independence nation-builders. 
  
The presence of a Chagga concept of ujamaa has an impact on our understanding of 
Nyerere’s own political thought. A debate within the literature is whether Nyerere’s 
political philosophy was able to appeal to the people through its presentation of the 
myth of the past; Lofchie (1976: 488) argues that Nyerere’s philosophy would not 
appeal to the broad Tanzanian society as it would not appeal to the life-experiences of 
the Tanzania people. Metz (1982: 381) on the other hand argues that the appeal to a 
past set of egalitarian values is powerful precisely because it does not correspond to 
those life-experiences. The presence of a Chagga conception of ujamaa shows that the 
idea did have a broad appeal across Tanzanian society. This is particularly true when 
the very different societies from which Nyerere and P.I. Marealle emerged are 
considered. 
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Stöger-Eising (2000: 130) argues that Nyerere’s political philosophy arose through his 
background as a member of the Zanaki ethnic group. Zanaki society is understood as 
being an egalitarian, acephalous society (ibid.), very different from Chagga society with 
its strong institution of chieftaincy. Of course, Nyerere himself never claimed his 
philosophy was specifically Zanaki but rather African. The presence of the Chagga 
ujamaa adds to the strength of this position. However, it also serves to illustrate 
Bienen’s (1970: 252) point that the ujamaa philosophy was imprecise and it could lead 
to a multiplicity of government policies. This is particularly true when considering 
Nyerere’s own leadership style: while the writings of Nyerere might reflect an 
acephalous, Zanaki concept of ujamaa, his leadership frequently bordered on the 
authoritarian that reflects a more Chagga form of ujamaa. 
 
The Institution of Chieftaincy 
 
The key difference between Maisha and Desturi is the role of the institution of 
chieftaincy contained within the texts. Perhaps unsurprisingly given his background, P.I. 
Marealle goes to some lengths to establish the importance of the chief within the 
Chagga sense of ujamaa. Ntiro, on the other hand, places a great emphasis on the 
democratic aspects of the chieftaincy. 
  
The important step that Maisha takes is in tying the chief to the family through the 
concept of ujamaa. P.I. Marealle (2002 [1947]: 121) writes, “Ukichungulia historia ya 
ujamaa wa Kichaga utanona ya kwamba unaanzia nyumbani, kisha ndani ya koo, na kilele 
chake ujamaa huo ni umangi wa nchi.” (If you look at the history of Chagga ujamaa, you 
will see that you begin at home, then inside the clan, and at the peak of that is the 
chiefdom of the country). Thus, there is a pyramid from the home, above that the clan, 
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and finally the chiefdom. This not only places the chiefdom, and by extension the chief, 
in an exalted position, but also places the chief as part of the family. Support for P.I. 
Marealle’s interpretation is reflected in the later anthropology on Kilimanjaro. Sally 
Falk Moore (1986: 59) describes the Chagga chief as the “universal kinsman”. A man 
was required to share a slaughtered animal or brewed beer within the lineage, and so 
too he could ask members of his lineage for meat or beer for a ritual occasion. A chief 
could claim from his subjects cattle, goats, beer and labour; “this was done in a kinship 
metaphor, an analogy to the obligation of one kinsmen to another” (Moore 1986: 59). I 
argue that this is the idea that is expressed through P.I. Marealle’s description of 
ujamaa. 
 
Maisha’s presentation of the chieftaincy could hardly place it in a stronger position. It 
lies in a central place both within ujamaa – both the family itself, and this central idea 
of the Chagga worldview. As P.I. Marealle argues that ujamaa is not present amongst 
the Europeans, it follows from his argument that the chieftaincy itself is not European 
but Chagga. This is of great importance in the political situation of the time. With the 
creation of divisional chiefs on Kilimanjaro, a move with little historical precedent, the 
institution of the chieftaincy was under threat of being described as a foreign 
imposition. Given that there is reason to believe that P.I. Marealle wrote his work 
sometime prior to 1947, he is perhaps not referring directly to his status as divisional 
chief. Yet he himself was installed as Mangi by the British administration, so he was 
potentially in a weakened position. 
  
Ntiro, on the other hand, places an emphasis on the democratic aspects of the 
chieftaincy. He does concede that historically the chief played an important role in 
almost all aspects of the lives of people (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 17), yet Ntiro places great 
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emphasis on the freedom and choice in the selection of Chagga leadership – chieftaincy, 
in his view, is essentially democratic. He writes, “Wachagga wanapenda uhuru wa 
kuchagua “mangi” wao. (Chagga love the freedom of choosing their chief) (ibid.: 46). In 
particular, he describes the political development of the last previous few years, the 
problems with the divisional chiefs, and how an elected Paramount has improved the 
situation. Ntiro ends the section with the expression that the future would have more 
democracy and choice: “miaka ijayo bila shaka utawala wa Kichagga utakuwa na uhuru 
kuliko sasa.” (in future years, without a doubt, the government of Chagga will have 
freedom compared to now) (ibid.: 46). This statement is easy to read as a proto-
nationalist expression of freedom. It also has ideas that are very similar to Petro Njau’s 
KCCU. With the emphasis on freedom and the beneficial nature of change, Ntiro’s 
conception is markedly different from P.I. Marealle’s reliance on tradition. 
 
Two very different ideas about the chieftaincy emerge from these two authors. Under 
P.I. Marealle’s conception, it would seem almost impossible to eliminate the chief 
without the destruction of the Chagga way of life. For Ntiro, democratic leadership for 
Kilimanjaro was the important factor. As I go on to show, the post-independence 
abolition of chieftaincy occurred smoothly in Kilimanjaro; in fact, Chagga people 
themselves voted out the Paramount Chief in favour of an elected President. I argue 
that the two competing elite conceptions of Chagga ethnicity highlighted in this chapter 
provides a valuable insight into how this occurred. 
 
By the late fifties, the popularity of Thomas Marealle personally and the position of the 
Paramount Chief had begun to decline. Thomas Marealle was increasingly seen as 
arrogant and abusing his position. In one incident, Thomas Marealle took offence at the 
way in which students heading to Makerere had allegedly snubbed him, and forced the 
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students in front of the Chagga Council with masale plants to beg forgiveness. Amongst 
those students was Edwin Mtei, future Minister of Finance and governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania; he writes of the incident, “the Mangi Mkuu did not endear himself to the 
future political leaders of Tanganyika” (Mtei 2009: 38). A weakness of the constitution 
of the Chagga Council was that there was no mechanism for replacing or deposing a 
sitting chief; presumably, Thomas Marealle was elected for life (Lindsey 1965: 75). 
 
At the same time, TANU was becoming an increasing force in Tanganyika. TANU did 
not want to be seen to be directly involved in an internal ethnic conflict; TANU’s 1954 
founding document had called for a united nation, strongly opposed to ethnic or tribal 
divisions (Feierman 1990: 225-226). However, the principle Chagga party opposed to 
the paramountcy, the Chagga Democratic Party (CDP), has been described as “TANU 
in an ethnic robe28 ” (Mramba, cited in Iliffe 1979: 568). The paramountcy debate was a 
pressing one for Nyerere and TANU, as the successes that the Chagga Council brought 
had proven influential on other ethnic groups in Tanganyika (Iliffe 1979: 569). Nyerere 
was keen to present an example of the rejection of chiefly rule by the local people 
concerned (Samoff 1974: 22). 
 
When Thomas Marealle attempted to gain additional powers, including making the 
position of Paramount Chief hereditary, he also attracted the opposition of the 
divisional chiefs. The pro-Marealle KCCU attempted to oust the divisional chiefs from 
office, a move that failed and in the subsequent elections of 1958 anti-Paramountcy 
candidates won all the councillor’s seats on the Council. This resulted in deadlock 
between Marealle and the Council, and the British administration saw no choice but to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Bienen notes that the later operative myths of TANU was that its origins lay in the 
TAA and cooperative societies. However, he argues that ethnic unions did in fact play a 
role, citing the case of the Bukoba Buhaya Union (Bienen 1970: 24-25). 
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hold the 1960 referendum on the abolition of the chieftaincy (Twining 1960). The 
referendum of 1960 resulted in a majority of eight to one in favour of a President over a 
Paramount Chief (Iliffe 1979: 568). The Chagga people rejected the Paramount Chief 
in favour of a commoner from Machame, Solomon Eliufoo. After independence, the 
Makerere-educated Eliufoo was appointed Nyerere’s minister for education in February 
1962, a post he held for many years (Pratt 1976: 51). P.I. Marealle was appointed 
acting President of the Chagga Council (Stahl 1969: 220). He was at last leader of the 
Chagga Council, but only for a brief few months. The Chagga Council was abolished 
months later, and in 1963 the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act stripped chiefs of 
all official powers and responsibilities in the administrative and legal systems of 
Tanganyika (Pratt 1976: 194, 285n142). The transition was achieved remarcably 
smoothly. 
 
The texts that are the subject of this chapter provide an insight into the intellectual 
background to this change. The justification for the institution of chieftaincy provided 
by P.I. Marealle proved to be easily wiped away. However, the competing idea of the 
democratic basis of Chagga ethnicity provided by Ntiro proved more durable. The 
traditional elite, and with it the traditional intellectuals such as P.I. Marealle, were 
destroyed along with the end of British administration. There remained, however, an 
imagination of Chagga ethnicity from the organic intellectual of the non-chiefly elite 
who were now in a dominant position on Kilimanjaro. Thus, the type of elite typified 
by Ntiro provided a continued imagination of Chagga ethnicity. The imagination of 
Chagga ethnicity, I argue, lay not only in the pomp and ceremony of the Paramount 
Chief, nor in the strong role of the chieftaincy described by P.I. Marealle. Rather, the 
ideas portrayed by Ntiro would prove far more durable. Of course, Chagga ethnicity 
would play a very different role in the Independent – and detribalised – Tanzania, as 
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The intellectual imaginations of Chagga ethnicity presented in this chapter illustrate a 
breadth to the project of imagining the Chagga group. The authors were of different 
backgrounds, both in terms of coming from rival chiefdoms and also from differing elite 
backgrounds. The fact that they came from rival chiefdoms, and yet both presented a 
project of Chagga unity, indicates that the intra-chiefdom rivalries described in Chapter 
Two had been subsumed by a broader idea of Chagga ethnicity. Yet I argue that the 
conflict between the traditional intellectual P.I. Marealle, and the organic intellectual 
from the new wealthy elite on Kilimanjaro, Ntiro, is played out in their pages. The 
elimination of the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro – not only achieved through government 
edict but by the Chagga rejecting the institution through a democratic vote – ended the 
power of the traditional elite. 
 
Kileo describes the fate of the chiefs of Kilimanjaro as “From Chiefs to Paupers”: 
Times have really changed for Chagga Chiefs. There are no 
more guarantees of free alcohol ‘mbege’, no more songs in 
praise of the chiefs, no more goats ‘ndafu’ and no more gifts of 
the fattest bull. Life has become a nightmare for Kilimanjaro’s 
few remaining traditional figureheads. (Kileo 2005: 135) 
 
P.I. Marealle’s life was not so difficult following the abolition of the chieftaincy. As the 
next chapter will illustrate, the more powerful chiefs, including P.I. Marealle and 
Thomas Marealle, had a comfortable life following independence. Potential rivals to 
Nyerere’s government were frequently awarded with postings abroad. However, as 
Nyerere turned towards a socialist direction for Tanzania, the more important rivals 
	   121	  
came not from a now-defunct traditional elite, but rather the capitalist-orientated 
Chagga elite. 
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After Tanzania achieved independence in 1961, members of the Chagga elite were in a 
position to take up important and powerful positions in the new state. Just as the 1950s 
had seen work put towards the imagining of Chagga ethnicity, now many members of 
the Chagga elite set about the work of imagining the Tanzanian nation. However, the 
relationship between Kilimanjaro and the Tanzanian state was not always smooth. 
Particularly after 1967, as Tanzania moved in a more decisively socialist direction, 
relations between the capitalistic Chagga and the state were sometimes strained. 
Despite the aim of equalising development across Tanzania, this chapter argues that 
members of the Chagga elite were able to stay in a strong and powerful position in 
Tanzanian society. 
 
It is a truism that, in most postcolonial African states, those ethnic groups that received 
the most advantages during the colonial period were left in an advantageous position 
after independence. Nevertheless, I argue that it is still informative to examine a 
particular case – that of Chagga in Tanzania – in more detail. The Tanzanian case is of 
particular interest as a state praised for its unity and stability. A 1999 edited collection, 
Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, contains a chapter on how Zimbabwe and 
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Tanzania had been successful in maintaining peace through containing potential conflict 
(Dashwood and Pratt 1999). Writing in 1999, as well as praising the successes of 
Tanzania, Dashwood and Pratt praise Zimbabwe’s “relative [success] in maintaining 
both political and economic stability” (ibid.: 224). Subsequent events in Zimbabwe 
have arguably shown these claims of the stability of Zimbabwe to be flawed. While 
Tanzania does not face the same issues that developed later in Zimbabwe, the example 
of the Dashwood and Pratt chapter is an example of how the divisions that remain in a 
society can remain despite the apparent stability. 
  
Much of the direction that Tanzania was taking is expressed through the writings of 
President Julius Nyerere who served from 1962 until 1985. In his view, “the ideal 
society is based on human equality and on a combination of the freedom and unity of its 
members” (Nyerere 1966: 8). This chapter provides a new interpretation of how the 
attempt to introduce such a society in Tanzania resulted in certain gaps between these 
concepts, and how the attempts to pursue the causes of equality and unity resulted in 
the ability of Chagga people to retain the advantages they had moving into the post-
colonial period. Key to this, I argue, is migration; particularly international migration 
with regard to the elite. This is closely linked to specifically Chagga norms of land 
inheritance and migration. 
 
Migration and the kihamba 
 
Past norms of Chagga land inheritance developed to encourage migration. A distinction 
is drawn in the norms of Chagga inheritance between the kihamba – the banana grove 
within which the Chagga man and his wife build their home – and the shamba farmland 
producing mainly maize further down the mountain (Moore 1986: 82-84). It is the 
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kihamba that contains the Chagga man’s home for himself and his wife; it is also where a 
Chagga person hopes one day to be buried. In the inheritance of kihamba land, the 
father had an obligation to provide a developed kihamba for his eldest son upon his 
marrying, whereas the youngest son would eventually inherit the father’s own kihamba 
(Moore 1986: 82-83). Thus, middle sons were left without any inherited kihamba land. 
They were expected to find their own kihamba, either through their brothers or inlaws, 
or most commonly through clearing bush to form a new kihamba (Moore 1986: 83; 
Setel 1999: 43). As the population increased and land became scarcer in Kilimanjaro’s 
kihamba belt, this presented a growing issue of landless middle sons. By the 1950s, it 
was becoming increasingly difficult for the middle sons to find new lands to settle 
(Munger 1952: 181-182), necessitating many to seek their fortunes beyond 
Kilimanjaro. Land shortage was a large push-factor for out-migration from Kilimanjaro. 
By 1957, members of the Chagga ethnic group were found in every region of Tanganika 
save one. “All this for members of a cultural group that was known to stigmatise any 
land off and away from Mount Kilimanjaro as uniformly unfit for habitation by decent 
human beings” (Setel 1999: 68). 
 
However, I present the argument that elite migration was not due to landlessness. As 
the examples in this chapter illustrate, the elites in question may have lived elsewhere in 
Tanzania or abroad, yet maintained a kihamba back in Kilimanjaro. Von Clemm (1964: 
104) observed that absentee kihamba land ownership was noted as a growing 
phenomenon back in the 1960s. International travel for Chagga people was older29 , and 
had at times proved to be an influential force. Hans Meyer reported in 1891 that Chief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  One informant claimed that the number of Chagga who travelled to Europe for 
education declined after independence, particularly after the introduction of Education 
for Self-Reliance placed the emphasis on primary education, because state scholarships 
to study abroad stopped (Fieldnotes, 16/8/2005). However, I did not manage to find 
any evidence supporting this claim.  
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Rindi had sent Chagga envoys to the Kaiser in Germany, along with a gift of an elephant 
tusk (Meyer 1891: 89, 97, 102). Meyer met the returned envoys during his time in 
Rindi’s chiefdom, viewing them with some distaste as they begged while at the same 
time the trip to Europe had given them an arrogant sense of superiority: “Unfortunately 
their contact with civilisation has not improved them” (ibid.: 97). Later colonial visits 
by Chagga individuals to Europe had more positive outcomes. As highlighted in Chapter 
2, Joseph Merinyo travelled to Germany in 1907, a trip that proved influential in 
teaching him about German peasant co-operative movements, inspiring him to take up 
coffee growing and eventually leading to the establishment of the KNPA discussed in 
Chapter 3. Several of the people discussed in this chapter had studied outside of Africa 
prior to independence. Thomas Marealle, the Paramount Chief, studied in the UK from 
1944 until 1946, at Cambridge and the London School of Economics, completing a 
course on social welfare (A New African Supreme Chief  1952: 3). The future minister, 
Asanterabi Nsilo Swai, studied at the University of New Delhi in the fifties, where he 
graduated with an honours degree. The post-independence travels of these individuals 




The success of nation-building in Tanzania is much praised. Nyerere himself judged it as 
a success. As early as 1968, his overall assessment of Tanzania’s unity is strong: “Our 
country is one of those in Africa which is highly praised for its unity. We have no 
tribalism, no religious quarrelling, no colour discrimination, and we oppose 
discrimination and oppression on grounds of tribe, religion, or colour, wherever it 
exists” (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 74). Nyerere certainly paid heed to the religious30  and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  See (Heilman and Kaiser 2002). 
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racial31  issues within Tanzania, yet the ethnic divisions received particular attention. 
For instance, as discussed in more detail below, the regional quota system was designed 
to correct for ethnic inequalities, rather than religious or other factors. The focus placed 
on the role of ethnicity in nation-building is curious in the light of the ethnic structure 
of the nation. Authors on Tanzania regularly note that the diverse ethnic makeup of 
Tanzania – usually cited as over 120 groups, only one of which makes up more than 5% 
of the population – is an important factor in the nation’s unity and stability (Hyden 
1999: 146; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999: 93-94; Nyang'oro 2004: 7-10). This is part of 
what Susan Geiger (1997: 8-9) refers to as the “lacks and absences” theories of 
Tanzanian nationalism. These theories that focus on the absences in Tanzania reduce 
the nationalist movement to being “essentially passive and lacking in substance and 
power” (ibid.: 8). I agree with Geiger’s critique; however, Geiger’s focus on TANU 
activists is in danger of overlooking non-TANU actors. My own research presented in 
this chapter emphasises the agency of both state and non-state actors. 
 
One of the reasons that ethnicity received such focus was that, unlike other identities, it 
is by its very nature regional in character. Nyerere was clearly concerned about 
secessionist threats. He seemed to be acutely aware of the difficulties faced by other 
nations in Africa, particularly his neighbours. For example, upon dissolving the 
Sukumaland Federal Council, Nyerere stated that “we can’t have another Katanga here” 
(cited by Iliffe 1979: 569). The Sukuma people are by far the largest ethnic group in 
Tanzania, numbering around 4 million and making up around 13% of the total 
population (Nyang'oro 2004: 7). When the Sukumaland Federal Council was 
threatened with abolition in 1960, they cited the successes achieved by the Chagga 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  See, for example, the debates about race surrounding early multiparty democracy in 
Tanzania (Brennan 2005). 
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Council as a reason for their continued existence, and hoped that they would achieve 
similar successes through a Sukuma council. Nyerere saw a lot at stake here from a 
group inspired by the Chagga example.  
 
While it seems unlikely that Nyerere faced a genuine secessionist threat from any region 
of Tanzania, there were certainly rumours of the threat from the wealthier peoples such 
as Chagga and Haya (Bjerk 2008: 158). My own research reveals that there were regular 
rumours of Chagga secessionism from the 1950s through to the 1970s, as evidenced in 
contemporary reports32 . In 1949, a British Intelligence report on the newly-founded 
Kilimanjaro Union stated that “[i]ts declared object – that is to say, declared to its own 
‘inner circle’ – is the overthrow of European Government and the establishment of 
independent 100% African Government over the Northern Province” (Colonial Office 
1949a). While the British clearly saw the Kilimanjaro Union as an organisation calling 
for independence, at that time it was not altogether clear whether they were calling for 
Tanganyikan independence or independence for Kilimanjaro. Chagga politics was also 
extremely insular; “Although wealthy, educated and politically minded, the Chagga were 
not a serious threat to territorial unity because they devoted so much energy to internal 
affairs” (Glickman 1972: 131). 
 
Ideas of Chagga secessionism resurfaced in the 1970s. The level of unhappiness by 
Chagga people towards the socialist direction of Tanzania led one British diplomat to 
write: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  Such claims of Chagga separatist movements are difficult to research in modern-day 
Tanzania. Attempts to discuss the issue with informed sources would usually lead to a 
referral to attempts by British settlers on formerly-German farms in the 1920s calling 
for Kilimanjaro to be transferred to Kenya, with its more settler-friendly government 
(Iliffe 1979: 276). 
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Meanwhile, there is one aspect of the national scene often 
forgotten but which I also believe to be significant in the 
present situation: the attitude of the influential and 
conservative Chagga tribe in the north. When I was there at the 
end of last month I heard some wild talk which even included 
suggestions of them seceding to Kenya or rallying around Chief 
Marealle33  in an effort to achieve “independence”. All this 
should not be taken too seriously. But underlying it there is an 
active dislike of socialist policies on the part of this intelligent 
and individualistic people. It is not something the Government 
can safely ignore; and it may be significant that no Chagga-
owned properties have so far appeared in the list of 
expropriations (Phillips 1971). 
 
Similarly, a British reporter commented upon calls for Kilimanjaro to join Kenya: “Well 
informed quarters in Kenya believe that there are close contacts between the Chagga 
and the Luo tribesmen in Kenya, and that their purpose is to have Kilimanjaro 
returned34  to Kenya” (Listowel 1972). Paul Bjerk (2008: 158-159) dismisses the 
secessionist threat from Kilimanjaro on the basis that Thomas Marealle saw himself as a 
rival to Nyerere for the national leadership of Tanzania, rather than leader of a separate 
leader of Kilimanjaro. While Bjerk is correct in that the secessionist threat was not 
serious, I argue that it does not seem likely that T. Marealle himself led the calls. T. 
Marealle’s own position seems to be closer to that of a Tanganyikan nationalist, albeit 
one with different views of the role of traditional leaders within the state. 
 
While there may have been little genuine threat from secessionist movements in 
Tanzania, the threat of tribalism was still taken seriously. The approach to dealing with 
questions of ethnicity in Tanzania was well described by Nyerere in a 1968 radio 
broadcast marking Independence Day, Nyerere gave a speech that highlighted several 
issues he saw as pertinent to Tanzanian society. He set out his concerns about tribalism 
in Tanzania: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Presumably, this is a reference to Thomas Marealle, the former Paramount Chief. 
34  The reporter Judith Listowel repeats the untrue myth that Queen Victoria had given 
the mountain to the German Kaiser. 
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I have begun to hear whispers about tribalism. Just after 
independence, we got complaints that people were being 
appointed to government positions on the basis of tribalism, 
and we immediately appointed a commission to look into the 
allegations. The commission proved without any doubt that 
there was no tribalism in the allocation of jobs in government. 
But just recently, I began to hear this complaint again. I did not 
treat it lightly. We called some of these people who were saying 
there is tribalism, and told them to give their evidence either to 
me or to Chief Mang’enya35  (the ombudsman). We promised 
to investigate immediately. But they have not given us one 
shred of evidence. (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 74-75) 
 
Nyerere went on to explain how it was that members of certain ethnic groups were 
placed in an advantageous position during colonialism: 
Tanzanians who had the opportunity for higher education 
during colonial rule were mostly Wahaya, Wachagga, and 
Wanyakyusa. And because most of the education was provided 
by missionaries, most of these people are also Christians. And 
when we replace Europeans who hold responsible jobs, and give 
those jobs to Tanzanians, the people who get them come 
mostly from these three tribes. Therefore, if you ask me why 
Wahaya, Wachagga, and Wanyakyusa have most of the jobs 
which require higher education, the answer is very obvious.  
They are the ones who got higher education during colonial 
times. I would say, look at the positions in politics, where a 
person is not asked about his educational qualifications. Look 
at Parliament, the National Executive, the Central Committee 
of TANU, and at the Cabinet. How many Wanyakyusa, 
Wahaya, or Wachagga are members? You will find that perhaps 
there aren’t any, or there is one or two. (ibid.: 75) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  Erasto Mbwana Mang’enya was a chief of the Bondei ethnic group, from the 
Usambara mountains in north-eastern Tanzania. Chief Mang’enya, one of the earliest 
Tanganikans to receive a university degree, had a strong involvement with Bondei 
nationalism in the late fifties, yet was successfully able to rewrite his life history to make 
an accommodation with Tanganyikan nationalism, downplaying the ethnic component 
in favour of his role within the civil service (Willis 1993). Parallels can be seen between 
Mang’enya’s tactics and those of P.I. Marealle. Mang’enya, however, was able to rise to 
higher heights in government circles than P.I. Marealle: Mang’enya was not only the 
first Chairman of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, he later became an 
ambassador to the United Nations, and Speaker of the National Assembly (Norton 
1973: 616; Mtei 2009: 25). Before becoming chief of the Bondei, Mang’enya was head 
teacher at Old Moshi Secondary School. As such, he would have met or taught many of 
the Chagga people discussed in this chapter, including Edwin Mtei and Wilbert Kleruu 
(Mtei 2009: 20). 
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Statistics from the period support the suggestion that, in the National Assembly, the 
ethnic makeup of the members broadly reflected the ethnic makeup of the country 
(Wilson 1966: 445-447; Hopkins 1971: 75-76). However, in terms of the 
administrative elite, some ethnic groups were significantly over-represented, the very 
groups Nyerere mentions: Haya, Chagga and Nyakyusa (Hopkins 1971: 75-76). 
Nyerere went on to get to the heart of how ethnicity was considered in Tanzania: 
It is the job of the government to help, even favour, the more 
backward parts of the country, especially regarding education. 
We are doing this and will continue to do so. But if a Mchagga, 
a Mhaya or a Mnyakyusa young man were denied a job because 
of his tribe – when he is capable and there is no other 
Tanzanian with the necessary qualifications – then we would be 
practising a very stupid and very evil kind of tribalism which led 
to the establishment of Biafra36 . I beg you, my brothers, avoid 
anything that could bring our country into this kind of disgrace. 
(Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 76) 
 
Two themes can be developed illustrating the tackling of the uneven development 
between ethnic groups in Tanzania. The first is the importance of education – this is 
clearly the factor that Nyerere sees as the roots of the inequalities between the various 
ethnic groups in Tanzania. The policy of Education for Self Reliance (ESR) was  an 
attempt to deal with this, as discussed below. The second factor involved is the shutting 
down of accusations of tribalism. Making allegations of tribalism was itself dangerous, 
and “once people begin to think in these terms, then tribalism has begun to enter into 
our society” (ibid.: 75). 
  
An important illustration of the role of ethnicity in Tanzania is through the census. The 
use of censuses by colonial powers is discussed by Benedict Anderson (2006: 164-170) 
as a way the colonial state was imagined. The census ascribes fixed identities to the 
colonial subjects: “The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  On April 13th 1968, against the recommendation of his entire cabinet (Ismail 1999: 
518), Nyerere recognised Biafra. 
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has one – and only one – extremely clear place. No fractions” (ibid.: 166). Thus, the 
multiplicity of an individual’s identities that existed in pre-colonial Tanzania (Iliffe 
1979: 318) were reduced to boxes to be ticked; one single ethnic identity had to be 
assigned to each person, there was no room for a person to claim more complex ties or 
identities. As such, the census became a tool by which the colonial state imagined itself; 
a census made the population “bounded, determinate, and therefore – in principle – 
countable” (Anderson 2006).  The census would also come to play a role in the 
imagination of the post-colonial Tanzanian state as well. The last census of the colonial 
period, in 1957, was also the last to ask the question of the ethnicity of the respondent. 
Subsequent post-independence censuses have not asked the question in the interests of 
national unity (Gulliver 1969: 36-37). Similarly, the question of religious affiliation was 
not asked following the 1967 census37  (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 697-698). Thus, I 
argue, while the colonial-era state was imagined through a census that defined people 
through their ethnic identity, the imagination of the post-colonial state was one in 
which these identities were not of any official relevance. With questions of ethnicity not 
being asked, and the subject becoming taboo, Nyerere sought to aid the unity of 
Tanzania. Yet I argue that this in itself did not promote his other cause, equality. If 
ethnicity were not to be talked about, then this was to the benefit of those ethnic 
groups in an advantageous position, including Chagga. 
 
As is most vividly evidenced through the secessionist rumblings, Kilimanjaro’s 
relationship with the nation did not always run smooth. This is perhaps not surprising: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  The question of religious belief is one in which the quantifying nature of censuses is of 
political salience. While the 1957 census reported  that Muslims outnumbered 
Christians by a ratio of 3:2, the 1967 census reported roughly equal numbers of the two 
faiths. The 1967 census was the last time this question was asked. There is a suspicion 
amongst some Tanzanian Muslims that the numbers of members of their faith were 
deliberately lowered in the 1967 census (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 698). 
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given the great efforts put towards Chagga nationalism in the 1950s, the change in focus 
to Tanzanian nationalism was a jolt. Nevertheless, just as many Chagga people worked 
hard at the nationalism of the fifties, so did many work towards the Tanzanian 
nationalism. As the next section illustrates, it was not only Chagga people themselves 
who were put to work on imagining the Tanzanian nation; so was the mountain itself. 
 
Imagining Kilimanjaro, Imagining Tanzania 
 
At midnight on the 9th December 1961, as ceremonies marking the emergence of a new 
nation were being conducted in Dar es Salaam, Lieutenant Alexander Nyirenda, the first 
African commissioned officer in Tanganyika’s military, raised the flag of the newly 
independent nation at the summit of Mount Kilimanjaro (Taylor 1963: 218). The 
name of the peak of Mount Kilimanjaro was originally named by Hans Meyer, the first 
European to reach its peak, as Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze. This was renamed at 
independence to Uhuru Peak (Latham and Latham 1995: 72) – Freedom Peak38 . The 
continent’s highest peak was renamed in honour of the newly-independent nation. 
 
The use of Mount Kilimanjaro as a Tanzanian nationalist symbol predates 
independence. Addressing the Tanganyikan parliament in October 1959, the then Chief 
Minister Nyerere (1966 [1959]: 72) said, “we, the people of Tanganyika, would like to 
light a candle and put it on the top of Mount Kilimanjaro which would shine beyond 
our borders giving hope where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  While the summit may have been renamed along nationalist lines, there seems to 
have been no call to rename other features high on the mountain that retained their 
colonial names. So, there remains on Kilimanjaro features named after European 
explorers and missionaries: Gillman’s Point, named after the German scholar and 
mountain climber (Light 1947); the Rebmann Glacier, named after the missionary; 
Decken Glacier, named after Baron Von Decken; and numerous others. Neither was 
there any attempt to rename these features, or indeed the peak itself, during Chagga 
nationalism. 
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where before there was only humiliation.” At the same time as Nyerere spoke, Mount 
Kilimanjaro was still serving the interests of Chagga nationalism, as seen by the flag of 
the Chagga Council. The flag pictured here was on a billboard commemorating the 
death of  T. Marealle at Mengeni grounds in Marangu. Here, the peak of Kibo is 
pictured, along with the plants of coffee, banana and masale, and a leopard signifying 
chiefly authority. It is my argument that Mount Kilimanjaro was used as a nationalist 
symbol by both of these competing sources of identity. 
Figure 2: The Flag of the Chagga Council 
 
 
Nyerere’s 1959 speech occurred at a time when TANU faced something of a battle in 
winning Kilimanjaro over to their cause. There is a danger in drawing too much 
meaning from the use of Kilimanjaro in the context of Nyerere’s speech and other visual 
uses of the mountain. Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman draw attention to the 
development of Israeli national symbols, putting their development in terms of 
“aesthetics versus ideology”, arguing that aesthetics had a greater impact in the 
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development of Israel’s national symbols than ideology and meaning (Handelman and 
Shamgar-Handelman 1993: 444-445). There is no doubt that the aesthetic value of 
Mount Kilimanjaro plays an important role in its use as a symbol, easily drawn as a 
visual representation and also a piece of alliteration in Nyerere’s speech. That does not 
mean that they are free of ideological meaning; following Dominguez’s critique of 
Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, there is not such a binary distinction between 
ideology and aesthetics as they suggest (Dominguez 1993: 452). 
  
In subsequent decades, Kilimanjaro became a key part of the branding of the nation of 
Tanzania. The long-standing tourism slogan for Tanzania was “Tanzania: The Land of 
Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar” 39 . There was undoubtedly a commercial imperative to this, 
to correct misconceptions by foreign tourists. Indeed, in 2006 the Tanzanian Tourist 
Board contracted an advertising agency to start a campaign to highlight the fact that 
Mount Kilimanjaro was in Tanzania, not Kenya, thus encouraging tourists to holiday in 
Tanzania (Personal email 10th January 2007). Yet the nationhood presented through 
tourisms has a consequence beyond the commercial interests of attracting foreign 
exchange earnings; “it goes to the heart of a people because it serves to define their 
cultural identity and to make this visible, both to themselves, and to ‘others’” (Palmer 
1999: 316). Within the African context, Fürsich and Robins argue that the discourse 
presented by African governments attempts to distinguish themselves from other nations 
as brands, as well as to present themselves as cohesive and concordant states (Fürsich 
and Robins 2004: 147). However, they conclude that the unequal nature of the global 
economy means that such branding directly addresses Western tourists, possibly 
hindering more constructive identity work (ibid.: 148).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  However, the slogan has since been altered to “Tanzania: The Land of Kilimanjaro, 
Zanzibar and the Serengeti”, which breaks the direct metonymic link between 
Kilimanjaro and mainland Tanzania. 
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With the case of the branding of Tanzania as the Land of Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar, 
however, I argue that there is constructive identity work being performed that is 
addressing the local audience. The clear example is that the branding places an emphasis 
on the union between the mainland and Zanzibar, a union which has seen stresses and 
strains since Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined together in 1964 (see, for example, Shivji 
2008). That this political dimension came into Tanzania’s branding was not ignored 
within the country, with one prominent businessman criticising the branding: “The 
worst part of the tourism brand… was to link ‘Kilimanjaro’ and ‘Zanzibar’. Clearly, 
Zanzibar is a unique and powerful brand by and of itself. The politics of the Union 
should not creep into the commercial arena or ventures… Zanzibar has its own 
distinctive essence and mysticism” (Mwapachu 2005: 185). Mwapachu sees the slogan 
as furthering the state’s own internal political agenda over Zanzibar. While 
Kilimanjaro’s place within Tanzania is not nearly as problematic as the simmering 
conflict on Zanzibar, it nevertheless presents the region of mainland Tanzania with the 
strongest example of an ethnic nationalism and a somewhat problematic relationship 
with the state. One reading of the tourism slogan would place Kilimanjaro as a 
metonym for mainland Tanzania, a theme that is present in other expressions. For 
example, the football team for mainland Tanzania is called the Kilimanjaro Stars. 
Another use of the name Kilimanjaro for the tourist market was the Kilimanjaro Hotel 
in Dar es Salaam. Opened in 1965 through the National Development Corporation and 
a private company, this hotel was aimed at being the most luxurious in the country 
(Ministry of Information and Tourism 1968: 162, 198). Despite the state involvement, 
Nyerere made it clear that this was a place for outside visitors, not Tanzanians, as the 
overt show of wealth by Tanzanians was discouraged (Condon 1967: 352). Indeed, the 
morally dangerous nature of the hotel was reflected in a Swahili pulp novel of 1988, in 
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which it is a place of utter luxury, the “spatial ‘top’ of Dar es Salaam”, an immoral and 
corrupt city (Blommaert 1993: 26). 
 
Yet I contend that there are plenty of examples where Kilimanjaro is used in the 
branding of commercial products very much aimed at the local market. There have been 
a number of beers using the name or image of Kilimanjaro. Tanzania Breweries 
produces Kilimanjaro Premium Lager, and the now-defunct brand Snow Cap, whereas 
Kibo Breweries previously produced a beer named Kibo Gold, named after the larger of 
Kilimanjaro’s peaks. The use of the image of the mountain on this beer led Tanzania 
Breweries to seek an injunction against Kibo breweries. The injunction was rejected, as 
while the peak appeared on both brands, it was found by the judge that this would not 
create deception (Kihwelo 2006: 681). Thus the image or name is used in a broad range 
of products from various companies. Few have any direct link to the mountain itself. A 
notable exception is Kilimanjaro bottled drinking water, produced by Bonite Bottlers in 
Moshi. Bonite Bottlers is owned by Reginald Mengi, the media tycoon and “Tanzania’s 
Silvio Berlusconi” (Lusekelo 2005), of Chagga ethnicity from Machame. Unlike other 
mountain-branded products, Kilimanjaro drinking water bases its brand on the place 
and landscape of the snow-capped mountain.  
 
Just as the imagery of the mountain was being used for nationalist purposes by the state, 
I argue that many Chagga people were involved with the important work of imagining 
the Tanzanian nation. Given the educational advantages of many of the Chagga elite, it 
is not surprising that many were placed in powerful and influential positions in the 
Tanzanian state. The example of one cabinet minister will be discussed further below. 
Chagga people played a very important role in the imagination of the Tanzanian nation. 
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Sam Ntiro, the author of Desturi za Wachagga, after serving as High Commissioner to 
the UK, went on to become the Commissioner of Culture in Dar es Salaam from 1962 
until 1972 (Ng'weno 1968: 69). As highlighted in the work of Kelly Askew (2006), the 
cultural policy of the state was an important component of Tanzania nationalism. Ntiro 
also produced public works of art, such as the roundabout in Arusha commemorating 
the Arusha Declaration. 
 
Historians who are of Chagga ethnicity would become influential in the history 
department of the University of Dar es Salaam. To the extent that there was genuinely a 
“Dar es Salaam School” of history, it has been understood as referring to histories 
nationalist in viewpoint, aimed at uncovering African initiatives in Tanzanian history40  
(Denoon and Kuper 1970). While much work was done by expatriate historians such as 
Terrence Ranger41  and John Iliffe, it was a 1969 volume edited by two Tanzanians, A 
History of Tanzania (Kimambo and Temu 1969), that marked the compilation of a 
coherent picture of the history of Tanzania (Denoon and Kuper 1970: 332). The 
editors of this work, Arnold Temu and Isaria Kimambo, are both of Chagga ethnicity. It 
is my contention that, just as the Chagga historians discussed in the previous chapter 
had worked hard on Chagga nationalism, so Chagga historians produced works of 
Tanzanian nationalism. 
 
Numerous other examples exist of Chagga playing important roles in other aspects of 
the crafting of Tanzanian national identity. In a largely rural society without a domestic 
television service, symbols such as the currency were important ways whereby the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  Parallels can be drawn between the Tanzanian nationalist histories and the Chagga 
nationalist histories examined in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
41  Ranger (1971) himself strenuously objected to the suggestion that there was a single 
Dar es Salaam School of history. See also the response of Denoon and Kuper (1971). 
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reaches a broad audience for their images and symbols of national identity. In 1965, 
following the dissolving of the East African Currency Board, Tanzania introduced its 
first post-independence currency. The design work was conducted by Messrs Thomas 
de la Rue, but the main design choices were made by the Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, Edwin Mtei, and Nsilo Swai (Mtei 2009: 85-86). Both of these men were of 
Chagga ethnicity.  
 
Despite the tensions that existed between the moneyed Chagga and the state, there is 
no denying the strong influence of members of the Chagga elite in the imagining of 
Tanzania. Nevertheless, relations between the Chagga elite and the state would become 
particularly strained after the introduction of socialism in Tanzania following the 
Arusha Declaration of 1967. 
 
Socialism on Kilimanjaro 
 
“There was no impact of socialism on Kilimanjaro,” a successful businessman told me a 
few days after Christmas 2005 as we stood in his kihamba in Marangu. He was based in 
Dar es Salaam, but had built for himself a large home in Marangu, and had turned his 
kihamba into a garden with a fine lawn, imported plants in the shrubbery and a handful 
of well-tended banana plants. “Nyerere came and said that the Chagga were already 
socialist, because of the coffee cooperative.” But was that true, I asked, were Chagga 
socialist? That “depends on how you look at things” (Fieldnotes 27/12/05).  
 
Socialism is generally not a popular position amongst Chagga people; “they were 
bourgeois people and the values, outlook, and standards of a bourgeoisie were an 
anomaly in the classless society which the central Government aimed to create” (Stahl 
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1969: 221). An example from my research is John, from Kibosho, who has been a 
businessman since the 1950s. He opened a specialist shop in Moshi in 1957, and soon 
after opened a branch in Arusha. The Moshi branch has proven to be a successful 
business, and is still in business today, run by John’s son (Fieldnotes, 27/10/05). John is 
an example of the Chagga entrepreneurs who entered the commercial sector prior to 
independence. While Asian traders dominated much of the trade in colonial 
Tanganyika, Chagga entrepreneurs were the only group of Africans who were able to 
edge out the Asian traders (Bryceson 1993: 92). Chagga entrepreneurs were able to 
challenge the dominance of Asian wholesale traders in Kilimanjaro (Wright 1955: 112), 
whereas the KNPA and KNCU both sought to exclude Asians from the coffee market 
(Curtis 1992: 513). John is an example of the entrepreneurial group of Chagga who 
were able to do well in an Asian-dominated sector before independence. 
 
John also owns a bar several kilometres outside of Moshi, which he has been developing 
since 1965. We talked about his experiences of attempting to do business during the 
socialist period. John was reticent to criticise Nyerere; the strongest words against the 
former President was a “Well, he did things I didn’t like.” Pressing him on this, I found 
he was referring to the socialist policies that followed the Arusha Declaration. Of 
particular concern was the nationalisation of buildings that occurred; his bar just 
happened to be slightly below the minimum size of buildings that were nationalised; if 
he had built a larger structure prior to the nationalisations then he fears that it would 
have been nationalised. This he put down to luck. Mostly, however, to survive in 
business during the socialist period it was necessary to be flexible, and to not fight the 
government (Fieldnotes 16/3/2006). 
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The implementation of socialism in Tanzania was not even across the country42 . The 
policy which had probably the largest impact on rural Tanzania – the ujamaa 
villagisation programme – was not implemented to any significant degree in the kihamba 
belt of Kilimanjaro. Nyerere spoke in his inaugural speech as President in 1962 of the 
need for Tanganyikans to live in “proper villages” (Nyerere 1962a: 182). In September 
1967, Nyerere issued the second post-Arusha Declaration policy document after ESR, 
Socialism and Rural Development (Nyerere 1968 [1967]-b). This called for Tanzanians 
to live in collective villages, a voluntary process between 1967 and 1973 but with more 
of an element of coercion between 1973 and 1976 (Mpangala 2000: 82-83). While the 
official figures for the population movements are often called into doubt, the numbers 
are still large: Nyerere claims that around 70% of the population of Tanzania “moved 
their homes” over the course of 3 years43  (Nyerere 1977: 41-42). Despite scepticism 
over some of the figures, Hyden (1980: 130) describes the compulsory villagisation 
programme in rural Tanzania 1974-75 as the largest resettlement in the history of 
Africa. However, implementation was not even across Tanzania. Mtwara and Lindi 
regions had villagisation implemented quickly in 1972-74, as according to the 
government the civil war in neighbouring Mozambique put a scattered population at 
risk (Seppälä 2000: 50). Uptake in the more prosperous areas of Tanzania, including 
Tanga, Kilimanjaro and West Lake, was far slower (Briggs 1979: 698).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  The sharpest distinction is between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar; the socialist 
programmes were “pursued quite independently of each other” (Askew 2006: 20). The 
form of socialism on Zanzibar was far closer to the Marxist-Leninist socialisms of 
Eastern Europe (ibid.: 20). The focus of this thesis is on the mainland of Tanzania. For 
more on Zanzibari socialism, see (Tordoff and Mazrui 1972; Askew 2006). 
43  There is some doubt over the reliability of the government figures. Village leaders 
faced a great incentive to massage figures upwards as ujamaa villages with high levels of 
communal farming were prioritised in access to social services and credit (Samoff 1981: 
300-301). Similarly, figures giving the numbers of people actually physically moved can 
be exaggerated, as these are derived from the figures of those living in collectivised 
villages, rather than those physically moved (Hyden 1980: 130). 
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No people from the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro were moved to form new villages. The 
possibility, however, was considered to be very serious. Chagga farmers threatened to 
burn down the mountain rather than be moved from their homes (Ellis 1974: 44). In 
October 1973, the Prime Minister visited Kilimanjaro, and reassured the Chagga 
people that nobody would be moved. Chagga people, he argued, were already living 
together in villages, and he encouraged the people of Kilimanjaro to work hard on their 
existing land (Mosha 1976: 27). As such, the introduction of ujamaa villages in 
Tanzania amounted to a reorganisation of local government. The boundaries of new 
villages were drawn on the kihamba belt, effectively defining existing areas as ujamaa 
villages. These were Stage I villages, in the “formative” stage before any real evidence of 
communal living or work had been demonstrated (United Republic of Tanzania 1972: 
62-63). These villages were actually defined along the lines of old sub-mitaa 
patrilineages, and gave patrilineages a political presence that had not existed since pre-
colonial times (Moore 1986: 139). 
 
While there does appear to be a certain degree of political upset surrounding the 
possibility of villagisation in Kilimanjaro, which necessitated a visit from the Prime 
Minister to calm the situation down, it does not follow from this that the reason that 
proper ujamaa villagisation was not introduced in Kilimanjaro was the potential 
political upset it could cause. The reasons are perhaps more prosaic: the parts of 
Tanzania with well-established perennial crop cultures, particularly coffee and bananas, 
did not see any resettlement (Shao 1986: 221).  
 
Even though, like Mount Kilimanjaro, the Pare mountains did not experience any 
forced population movements or the introduction of substantive villagisation projects, it 
does not follow that the villagisation programme had no effect on Pare people. The 
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increasingly authoritarian state, Sheridan argues, reduced the state’s efficacy and 
authority, and as such led to resource abuse. Rather than direct action, it was the 
“political ambiguities and contradictions” that damaged the indigenous common 
property management regimes (Sheridan 2004). In the case of the Chagga elite, 
however, I found that there does not seem to be a memory that the villagisation 
programme had a detrimental effect. This is possibly because the restructuring that 
resulted from villagisation returned power to the mitaa lineage lands, thus fitting into 
Chagga traditional authority rather than acting against it. I found that it is also the case 
that the anger of the Chagga elite was directed more towards issues such as the effect of 
nationalisation on the coffee cooperative. 
 
The post-Arusha Declaration 5-year plan states, “The co-operative is basically a 
socialist institution” (United Republic of Tanzania 1969: 31), before noting that a co-
operative is only such if it does not take on the characteristics of a marketing 
organisation for capitalist farmers. Yet the nationalisation of cooperatives in the 
seventies was “a disaster”; the marketing organisations that replaced the cooperatives 
caused prices to lag behind the international migration, and payments were often 
delayed (McHenry 1994: 112-113). For a coffee growing area like Kilimanjaro, the 
impact was particularly severe: during the coffee boom of the late seventies, farmers in 
Kenya received 76% of the world price, whereas farmers in Tanzania only received 44% 
(Bevan, Collier et al. 1989: 43). Furthermore, the changes brought to the KNCU are 
remembered as having a particularly detrimental effect in Kilimanjaro. The Chagga 
businessman whose quote opened this section, doubting that socialism had much 
impact on Kilimanjaro, stated that the “disastrous” nationalisation of the marketing 
arm of the KNCU was the big impact of socialism on Kilimanjaro. According to him, 
the size of the workforce rose from ten to 600 (Fieldnotes 27/12/05). The 
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nationalisation of the KNCU is given by Thomas, a businesmman living in Moshi, as 
the reason that socialism was unpopular in Kilimanjaro. The KNCU belonged to the 
farmers, Thomas argues, but the government saw it as a political organ and wanted it 
run by the government. The nationalisation of the KNCU had particular importance to 
Chagga people not only because the price they received for their coffee dropped. 
Rather, the KNCU was recognised as doing a great service to the Chagga people, 
particularly during the 1950s. “Whatever Chagga had, came out of coffee” (Fieldnotes, 
28/12/2005). 
 
While the nationalisation of the KNCU was considered problematic, Chagga people 
were still capable of speaking socialist rhetoric. Sally Falk Moore reports a Ward 
Chairman on the issue: “The Chagga… have no problem with this… We have always 
done things in an ujamaa manner. We share everything with our brothers. We do 
everything together with our neighbours. You can ask anyone. We already have ujamaa” 
(cited in Moore 1977b: 158). A similar presentation was noted by G.R. Mboya, who 
investigated the uptake of ujamaa villages in Kilimanjaro in 1972. A local leader, asked 
his opinion of ujamaa villages, said, “But these… are nothing but Ujamaa villages… We 
build our houses together and we celebrate such occasions such as Saba Saba44 , 
Independence Day and New Year’s Day together” (Mboya 1971: 65). Mboya is 
dismissive of these claims, questioning whether these examples of cooperation are really 
representative of an ujamaa village. While the kihamba belt did not see anybody forced 
from their homes, a handful of ujamaa villages were introduced in the lowlands of 
Kilimanjaro. Fred Lerise charts the history of one such village, called Chekereni and 
located just south of Moshi town. This village did attract Chagga migrants, who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Saba Saba is a national holiday in Tanzania on 7th July, commemorating the 
formation of TANU on 7th July 1954 (Mazrui 1999: 1). 
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principally moved into the village because they lacked land on the kihamba belt to allow 
their children to inherit: “Land-seekers became ‘socialists’ in order to fulfil their 
cultural obligations” (Lerise 2005: 27). There is a theme running through the post-
independence political discourse in Kilimanjaro which is the downplaying of ideology in 
favour of pragmatism. In Joel Samoff’s study of politics in Moshi town, he found that 
the important factor for constituents in choosing candidates for elected office was what 
the candidate could do for his constituents, rather than any ideological concerns. 
“Ideologues, and especially ideologues who are radical in the Tanzanian context, are 
simply not found in Tanzanian politics” (Samoff 1974: 165). This theme that runs 
through post-independence Chagga politics will be examined in more detail in the final 
chapter. 
 
While Chagga people were not keen on the implementation of socialist policies in the 
kihamba belt, some Chagga were enthusiastic implementers of the policies elsewhere in 
Tanzania. An example is Dr Wilbert Kleruu, from Mwika in Kilimanjaro. As with many 
of the other Chagga elite, he too was educated at Old Moshi Secondary School, Tabora 
and Makerere. After this he attained a PhD in Political Science from the University of 
California. Kleruu returned to Tanzania, where in 1971 he was appointed by the 
President as Regional Commissioner for Iringa. Despite his Chagga ethnicity, Kleruu 
became an enthusiastic implementer of ujamaa villagisation. In 1971, the number of 
ujamaa villages in Iringa region during that year increased from 22 to 629 (Coulson 
1975: 56). He took particular steps to bring capitalist maize farmers into ujamaa 
villages (Resnick 1981: 191). He was murdered at Christmas 1971 by a Hehe maize 
farmer.  
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The murder of Kleruu has been interpreted in a variety of ways. The murder was 
reported by a British newspaper as “Tanzania’s first political murder”, allegedly as a 
result of the “resentment of wealthy peasants against the state that had decided to 
collectivise their land” (Listowel 1972). For D.A. Low, it marked a “moment of truth” 
over whether Nyerere would force through coercive collectivisation policies (Low 1996: 
52-53). For a Marxist such as John Saul, the murder is understood as being a result of 
his efforts to isolate a kulak class of rich peasants to release the energies of poorer 
peasants (Saul 1974: 62). Others had a more prosaic analysis of the murder, arguing 
that Kleruu had an “abrasive personality” (Ayres 1972), and there were rumours that he 
had insulted the murderer (Raikes 1979: 315-316). Nevertheless, as a British 
commentator noted, “If you recall the traditional peasants’ strong feeling for the land 
you will appreciate that Kleruu was in a hornet’s nest and regardless of who pulled the 
trigger there is little doubt that there are many people in the area who were happy to 
see him out of the way” (Ayres 1972). Whatever the understandings of the murder, the 
TANU publicity machine turned to make Kleruu a martyr “pioneer of socialism” 
(ibid.). Over half the cabinet, including Nyerere, attended his funeral. Kleruu was 
buried following Chagga tradition in his kihamba in Mwika, Kilimanjaro (Hasu 1999: 
453). The man who had put so much effort into moving people away from their 




The elimination of the chieftaincy left some former Chagga chiefs in a difficult social 
and economic position, “paupers” as Edward Kileo (2005: 135) describes them. I argue 
that there were, however, some notable exceptions. The more powerful chiefs were 
given positions by the state. The Chagga divisional chiefs were given the chairmanships 
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of various Dar es Salaam based bodies (Mramba 1967: 110). Chief Adiel Shangali 
became chairman of the National Tourist Board (Tripp 1999: 44). Petro Itosi Marealle, 
the author of Maisha ya Mchagga hapa Duniani na Ahera discussed in the previous 
chapter, became respected as a TANU elder. He was Chairman of the Local 
Government Service Commission, and more prestigiously sat on the Presidential 
Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State45  (United Republic 
of Tanzania 1973: 1). Interestingly, he is listed in the report of the commission as 
“Chief P.I. Marealle, M.B.E., an elder and Chairman of the Local Government Service 
Commission” (ibid.: 1). Sally Falk Moore, close to P.I. Marealle and his family for many 
decades, had P.I. Marealle describe it to her that Nyerere appointed him to a high 
position because he would much rather that P.I. Marealle be in Dar es Salaam, where 
he could be watched, than on Kilimanjaro where he could mobilise political opposition 
(Moore 1996: 590). Indeed, P.I. Marealle proved to be a skilled political operator. 
Moore reports that, despite there being no evidence of this during the 1950s, after 
independence P.I. Marealle claimed that he had been a secret member of TANU all 
along, and that he only hid this to keep out of trouble with the colonial government. 
Moore describes this as a “characteristically canny story to cover up his original 
opposition” (ibid.: 590). In any event, P.I. Marealle became a TANU elder. During the 
inauguration of Julius Nyerere46 , there was a symbolic handing over of power to Nyerere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  The Commission operated under relatively tight terms of reference set by Nyerere. 
The goal was the setting up of a one party state in Tanzania in the context of what 
Nyerere referred to as the “national ethic”, a commitment to individual liberty, social 
justice, democratic participation and racial equality (Pratt 1976: 202-203). Given these 
terms of reference, it is difficult to extract P.I. Marealle’s own opinions from that of the 
committee. Certainly, at the time there was little internal or external opposition to the 
establishment of the one-party state (Brennan 2005: 250). The key issue with the 
Commission, which led to Oscar Kambona’s refusing to sign the final report, was the 
call for a more authoritarian model of the one party state than the one the Commission 
advocated (Pratt 1976: 203-204). 
46  Sources differ as to whether this event occurred at the swearing in of Nyerere as 
Prime Minister at independence in December 1961 (Maddox 2005: 86), at Nyerere’s 
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by two chiefs. The chiefs chosen for this were Chief Mazengo, at that time Paramount 
Chief of the Ugogo Federation of the Central Province, and Chief Petro Itosi Marealle 
(Feierman 1990: 229; Maddox 2005: 86). According to Maddox’s account, widespread 
opposition to TANU amongst the chiefs made finding chiefs willing to perform this 
ceremony a difficult task. Mazengo, Maddox tells us, had been a secret member of 
TANU during the 1950s (Maddox 2005: 86), presumably a more accurate assertion 
than P.I. Marealle’s more dubious claim of pre-independence membership.  
 
While P.I. Marealle was able to remain in Tanzania and work closely with Nyerere’s 
government, other leaders were placed in positions abroad. A particular case is Thomas 
Marealle, the former Paramount Chief. At the time he left office, he was not at his most 
popular, his reputation in Kilimanjaro was not helped by his attempts, after 
independence, to sue the Kilimanjaro District Council for damages related to the 
abolition of his office. He was awarded nearly 100 million shillings by the high court, 
based on a lifetime’s future earnings (Eckert 2006: 262); however, national legislation 
was soon passed to deny him compensation (McAuslan and Ghai 1966: 488; Wambali 
2008: 285). “From this event and until very recently, Marealle’s image was that of the 
prototype of a decadent and greedy chief who had firmly collaborated with the British 
rulers” (Eckert 2006: 262). While his reputation may have not been at its strongest at 
the time he left office – he was, after all, voted out – he was still one of the most 
powerful Africans pre-independence who was not a member of TANU. The potential 
was certainly there for him to form a locus of opposition, as seen with the secessionist 
rumours. Nyerere gave T. Marealle a position abroad. T. Marealle was appointed to the 
World Food Programme, with the United Nations, based in Rome. T. Marealle put it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
inauguration as President of the Republic in 1962, (Feierman 1990: 229), or in 1965 
following the electoral confirmation as President (Mramba 1967: 110). Unfortunately, I 
was unable to find any firm evidence to clarify this confusion.  
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like this in an interview with a Tanzanian newspaper The Express in 2006: “Because of 
my achievements, I was called to join the United Nation’s FAO/WFP programme. I 
was in charge of all aid directed to Third World Countries. I was based in Rome, Italy 
for the entire 13 years of my service.” (T. Marealle, cited in Chuwa 2006). While T. 
Marealle may have put it this way more than 40 years later, at the time he was not 
happy with the situation. As a family member of T. Marealle put it to me, T. Marealle 
was “very bitter” about being moved into a position abroad, but “as he was working 
with the UN he had to accept the situation” (Fieldnotes, 25/3/2007). Yet, it is my 
contention that T. Marealle  with his period of service to the state, died a Tanzanian 
national hero(Chagga Paramount Chief Marealle I I Departs. 3rd March 2007  2007). 
At his funeral in 2007, he was both a Chagga (Tindwa 2007) and a national hero. The 
time in exile proved to be an effective tool for the rehabilitation of T. Marealle’s 
character.  
 
The impact of this political move by Nyerere, while it only applied to a few select 
individuals, is understood by some Chagga as a key reason why the elimination of 
chieftaincy was smoothly achieved in Kilimanjaro. Emanuelle (Fieldnotes 7/3/2006), for 
example, argued strongly that it was the strategic thinking of Nyerere that resulted in 
the smooth transition from the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro. By giving the former ethnic 
leaders positions either domestically or abroad, Emanuelle argued, both the leaders 
themselves and their followers were placated. The leaders, receiving a well-paid position 
frequently abroad, were themselves satisfied with the quality of their lives, whereas their 
supporters were placated by seeing that their leader was in a senior position. I put it to 
Emanuelle the position presented to me by Edward Kileo, that it was the loss of 
legitimacy and trust in the leaders during the late colonial period that led to the smooth 
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abolition of the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro. Emanuelle, however, argued that it was 
Nyerere’s strategic thinking that was the more important factor. 
 
The story of P.I. Marealle’s son, known as the Colonel, illustrates how the foreign 
postings were used politically by Nyerere. I interviewed the Colonel’s wife. The Colonel 
and his wife, known as Mama Itosi, married in 1965, with Mama Itosi working as a 
secondary-school teacher while her husband continued his career in the military. In 
1974, however, the couple moved to China, and later Japan, on government service for 
4 years (Fieldnotes, 25/3/2007). The reason for this, revealed by Sally Falk Moore, is 
Colonel Marealle’s alleged involvement in a 1974 coup attempt against Nyerere’s 
government (Moore 1996: 590). 
 
Tanzania has seen a number of attempted military insurrections against the government. 
By far the most serious was the January 1964 King’s African Rifles mutiny, in which a 
dispute over soldiers’ pay and a call for more rapid replacement of British officers by 
Tanzanians, escalated into a revolt of two battalions. Soldiers openly walked the streets 
of Dar es Salaam, Nyerere went into hiding, and after five days had no choice but to call 
in the British military to restore order (Pratt 1976: 178-179). This revolt resulted in a 
restructuring, and politicising, of the military and its renaming as the Tanzania People’s 
Defence Force (Omari 2002: 94). While relations between the military and the 
governing party were mostly strong, “the 1964 mutiny was not an isolated event” (ibid.: 
97). Another aborted coup attempt occurred in January 1983, aimed squarely at the 
unpopularity of Nyerere’s regime. The coup was defeated by the security services the 
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day before it was due to take place, with nine officers being sentenced to life 
imprisonment47  (Mwakikagile 2004: 509-515). 
 
The 1974 coup attempt that involved Colonel Marealle did not reach such an advanced 
stage. Indeed, it was later described thus by P.I. Marealle, the Colonel’s father: “They 
were simply army fellows drinking together and joking around. The talk of a coup was 
not serious” (P.I. Marealle, cited in Moore 1996: 590). Indeed, nobody was imprisoned 
or even tried over the 1974 coup. More than fifty officers that were reportedly involved 
in the coup were “removed from the army and given insignificant posts in parastatals”48  
(Mwakikagile 2004: 515). As one of the purported ringleaders, Colonel Marealle was 
given a diplomatic posting in China49 . The 1974 event differs from other military events 
in being understood as being along ethnic lines. A captain jailed for his role in the later 
1983 coup attempt, described the 1974 event as “rather tribal by officers mainly from 
the Chagga group” (ibid.: 515). The coup attempt was not widely discussed in 
contemporary Tanzania, but an Internet source wrote on a messageboard: 
In fact, in the seventies, I think it was in 1974 or a little later, 
many Chaga army officers, at least 50 of them (which is A 
LOT), were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government 
of Mwalimu Nyerere. The coup plot was exclusively Chaga. No 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Mwakikagile quotes an army captain, jailed following the 1983 coup attempt: 
“during Mwalimu’s era, they were very keen to conceal any news of coups, as that 
would indicate the truth that the regime was not all that popular” (Mwakikagile 2004: 
515). By its very nature, this claim is unverifiable. 
48  In February 1975, General Sam Sarakikya, head of the army since 1964, was moved 
to become Minister of National Culture and Sport. The next two in the army hierarchy, 
an Asian and a CHAGGA, were passed over in favour of a TANU regional secretary 
(Pachter 1982: 606). This move was probably not directly related to the 1974 coup 
attempt, but rather was indicative of a policy “of making sure that the office corps does 
not become entrenched, and that it remains loyal to the party” (Pachter 1982: 606). 
49  Moore (Moore 1996: 589-590) argues that the reason that Colonel Marealle was not 
imprisoned or even executed was due to his father “call[ing] in the debt” of his not 
causing political opposition  to TANU following independence. However, that none of 
the other 50 officers involved were tried indicates an unwillingness of Nyerere to 
directly punish anybody for this coup, as part of his strategic response to the crisis at 
hand. 
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other army officers from other tribes were involved. The Chagas 
are not bad people anymore than anybody else, but had the 
coup succeeded, you know what would have happened. Other 
Tanzanians would have been saying the Chaga wanted to take 
over the country. Which is simply not true. I don't believe for 
one moment that most Chagas feel that way. But that would 
have been the perception, and there could have been a backlash 
against them. (Ndugu 2004) 
 
This quote not only illustrates how the 1974 coup is understood along ethnic lines, it 
also gives an illustration of how ethnicity is talked about in contemporary Tanzania. 
The commentator, despite accusing army officers of Chagga ethnicity being behind an 
attempted coup, is attempting to avoid any accusations of outright tribalism. The ideas 
about the dangers of tribalism introduced by Nyerere still have a salience and relevance 
in contemporary Tanzania. 
 
Mama Itosi and her husband lived in China and Japan, working for the Tanzanian state 
as diplomats, before moving to London to conduct business. They returned to Tanzania 
to live in Marangu in 1984. This was a curious time to return, at the height of the 
Tanzanian economic crisis. Mama Itosi admitted that the situation was difficult in 
1984. “Things were really bad, there was a shortage of food and goods. But I had no 
regrets for returning. Things were hard, but we managed to live through it.” I asked if 
the timing of their return was connected to the politics at this time; while Nyerere was 
still in office in 1984, it may have been becoming apparent to them that he would soon 
be leaving office. This connection was firmly denied by Mama Itosi. “People [in 
Marangu] were saying to us, things could not get worse, so we decided to return to 
help.” The activities of Mama Itosi following their return to Marangu will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Asanterabi Nsilo Swai 
 
The international migration of the Chagga elite was certainly not limited to members of 
the traditional elite. Asanterabi Nsilo Swai, a senior member of TANU before 
independence, was made a senior minister, becoming one of the key architects of 
Tanzania’s pre-Arusha Declaration economic planning. In 1967, he joined the UN, and 
served in New York until his retirement in 1984, when he returned to his home in 
Machame.  
 
Nsilo Swai was born in 192550 , in Nkuu, Machame. He studied at Makerere at the end 
of the forties. In 1958, he became the first General Manager of the Meru Cooperative 
Union. The Meru ethnic group inhabit Mount Meru, only 80 km west of Kilimanjaro 
and close to the town of Arusha. There is strong evidence that the historical origins of 
the Meru ethnic group come from western Kilimanjaro; at the very least, the Meru and 
Chagga share much of the same culture and similar political and social structures. The 
Meru language is very close to the dialect spoken in Nsilo Swai’s home of Machame 
(see Spear (1997: 17-34). The Meru Native Authority appointed a Chagga, Nsilo Swai, 
as General Manager, rather than an individual of Meru ethnicity, as “[t]here were no 
Meru tribesmen who had any knowledge of business” (Japhet and Seaton 1967: 63). 
This is a case of how Chagga individuals had influence beyond the borders of 
Kilimanjaro. 
  
Nsilo Swai served as MP for Arusha District and Maasailand from 1960-65. In the first 
single-party election in 1965, he stood and won in the newly-formed Arusha Urban 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  The source of the biographical details for Nsilo Swai comes from the document 
“Historia fupi ya maharemu Asanterabi Zephania Nsilo Swai – A short history of the 
deceased, Asanterabi Zephania Nsilo Swai”, produced for mourners at his 1990 funeral 
in Machame.  
	   153	  
constituency. This is an example of a person of Chagga ethnicity winning a constituency 
outside of Kilimanjaro. Arusha is a town 70 kilometres west of Moshi town, away from 
the area dominated by the Chagga ethnic group . The ethnic groups nearby to Arusha 
are Meru, Arusha and Masai. The population of Arusha town is ethnically diverse, 
attracting during the colonial period unskilled workers from all over the territory to 
work on nearby estates (Cliffe and Puritt 1967: 162). However, Chagga people also 
moved there to conduct business, for example John who opened up a specialist 
electronics store in the fifties, and the case of Adiel’s family discussed below. In the 
1957 census, the last time a question of ethnicity was asked, the Chagga ethnic group 
was by far the largest ethnic group in Arusha town, making 20% of the total population 
(ibid.: 162). The 1965 election was a very close result for Nsilo Swai. While Nsilo Swai 
drew his main base of support from the Chagga community, he also drew upon other 
educated workers and Christians in the town (ibid.: 174). Nsilo Swai’s opponent was 
not from Arusha town either, he was a Muslim from the coast, and as such drew his 
support from Muslims in the town (ibid.: 174). The final result was close, with Nsilo 
Swai only receiving a very slim majority of 160, in part because he had spent so much 
time away from his constituency as a minister (ibid.: 174). Within Tanzania’s one-party 
democracy system, it was not unusual for government ministers to lose their seats, for 
example the minister Paul Bomani’s loss of his seat in 196551  (van Donge and Liviga 
1986: 629). While the result was close for Nsilo Swai in 1965, it at least shows how a 
Chagga politician was able to attain electoral success outside of Kilimanjaro, in large 
part due to the large Chagga populations present elsewhere in Tanzania. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  However, as the President had the power to also appoint MPs, being voted out in 
their own constituency was not necessarily the end of a cabinet career (van Donge and 
Liviga 1986: 628-629). 
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As a Minister, Nsilo Swai played an important role in developing Tanzania’s52  1963 
Five Year Plan. This placed an emphasis on raising Tanzania’s GDP through the 
development of industry, and placing an emphasis on the importance of foreign capital 
(van Arkadie 1973). The plan came under criticism from MPs representing poorer parts 
of Tanzania, who argued that the plan benefited the wealthier and more industrialised 
regions at the expense of the less well-off parts of the country (Bienen 1970: 301-302). 
The wealthier parts of Tanzania include, of course, Nsilo Swai’s own home of 
Kilimanjaro. I argue that it would be incorrect to characterise the plan as purely 
benefiting the Chagga people: it also contained measures disadvantageous to the 
Kilimanjaro economy, such as a 5% levy on crops not required for food consumption, 
thus hitting the Chagga coffee crop (ibid.: 300). 
 
The other aspect of Nsilo Swai’s political career is his role in the independence struggles 
of other southern African nations. In the private library of Nsilo Swai’s home in 
Machame, the walls are covered in pictures of him meeting many illustrious world 
leaders, from Robert Kennedy to Haile Selassie. Yet at the same time as these pictures 
were taken, more covert meetings were taking place in Dar es Salaam with the leaders 
of the struggles for independence in southern Africa. Refugees from South Africa flowed 
to Tanganyika in the early sixties (Bjerk 2008: 272-276). In 1962, Nelson Mandela 
covertly visited Dar es Salaam to raise support for the ANC. During this stay, he stayed 
in Nsilo Swai’s house in Dar es Salaam. Intending to return to Dar es Salaam at a later 
date, Mandela left behind a number of personal items at Nsilo Swai’s home, including a 
pair of boots. However, Mandela did not get the opportunity to return before his arrest 
and imprisonment. His boots were not returned to him for another 33 years. In 1995, 
Nsilo Swai’s widow travelled to South Africa to personally return the boots to Mandela 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  The plan only applied to mainland Tanzania (Bienen 1970: 281). 
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(Sikawa 2009). As shall be discussed below, Tanzania’s position during this period has 
helped Tanzania’s international reputation.  
 
Nsilo Swai, after serving in Nyerere’s cabinet until 1967, moved to New York to work 
as Tanzania’s representative to the United Nations. Bjerk suggests that Nsilo Swai was 
moved to New York to calm internal divisions within the cabinet (Bjerk 2008: 308). 
Amongst some other Chagga, it was believed that Nsilo Swai was moved because he was 
not able to put his full support behind the direction that Tanzania was moving 
following the Arusha Declaration (Fieldnotes, 10/1/2011). His period in the United 
Nations is cited by some other Chagga as being important in opening doors to others 
working in the UN (Fieldnotes, 7/3/2006). To be fair, I could find no evidence that 
Nsilo Swai’s appointment led directly to the employment of other Chagga in positions; 
while Nsilo Swai certainly received letters from others of Chagga ethnicity, seeking 
employment. However, there is no evidence that anyone was employed because of these 
contacts. There was a number of people of Chagga ethnicity employed by the UN 
during this period (see, for example, (Temu 2007): this could in part be due to the 
educational advantages of the Chagga elite. Nsilo Swai retired in 1984, when he 
returned to Machame. This was the same year that Mama Itosi and her husband 
returned to Marangu. During his retirement, he worked for various business 




Adiel was a European-educated Chagga, who worked in a senior position in an 
international organisation before running a parastatal and eventually entering private 
business. In these respects, his life history does not differ from others examined in this 
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chapter. However, Adiel proved himself to be unique in my research in some important 
viewpoints. Adiel’s family is from Old Moshi, where Adiel has inherited a kihamba even 
though he has no house there and puts “no economic use to the land”. His father was a 
teacher who moved his family to Arusha soon after Adiel’s birth, in the 1950s. His 
father’s brother followed him there soon after, where he established a successful 
business, and according to Adiel their family remains wealthy and well-known in 
Arusha. Adiel was educated in the UK in the sixties, before getting a job working for the 
East African Community based in Nairobi. He started working as a lawyer, but he was 
given the opportunity to specialise and began specialising in Telecommunications. This 
provided many opportunities for Adiel, as the telecommunication system in Nairobi was 
far more advanced than in Tanzania. Thus, when the EAC acrimoniously collapsed in 
1977, Adiel returned to Tanzania to lead a parastatal. He was director from 1977 until 
1987. Then he moved to the USA to work for a private company. It was there that his 
children were educated. In 1994, he returned to Tanzania to start his own business, 
along with his son, in Dar es Salaam. This was his first time operating his own business, 
a “sink or swim” situation as he describes it. 
 
Adiel’s experiences highlight the advantages that working abroad gave for members of 
the Chagga elite. Adiel saw that working in the technologically more advanced 
environment of Nairobi gave him a comparative advantage upon returning to Tanzania. 
Similarly, Adiel’s work in a parastatal placed him in a strong position once the economy 
was liberalised. It was not uncommon for Chagga people who once worked in 
parastatals to set up new businesses after liberalisation that took advantage of their 
skills. “Precision Air is owned by Chagga people, set up by former directors of Air 
Tanzania. Another example – Chagga were high up in the Tanzania Audit Corporation, 
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so were in a position at liberalisation to take a more active role in the private sector” 
(Emanuelle, fieldnotes, 15/1/2006). 
 
While Adiel’s life history followed themes that were not uncommon for members of the 
Chagga elite, some of Adiel’s views towards Kilimanjaro were unique amongst all of my 
informants. He described a situation in which there was a common idea amongst 
Chagga people to still see Kilimanjaro and Moshi as their home; even Chagga friends of 
his, who had spent their entire lives in Dar es Salaam, still saw Moshi or Kilimanjaro as 
their real home. Adiel criticised this view as “primitive”. Adiel explained that he had far 
stronger feelings towards Arusha than Old Moshi, as this was where he had been 
brought up. Throughout our conversation, he used the word “home” to refer to Arusha, 
rather than either Moshi or Old Moshi. His dismissal of the Chagga connection to 
Kilimanjaro prompted me to probe further. I asked Adiel where he will be buried. This 
was a question I commonly asked informants; for Chagga people, the almost inevitable 
response was that they would be buried on their kihamba back in rural Kilimanjaro. 
Adiel, on the other hand, said that he had “never thought about it!” He explained that 
it was important for a lot of Chagga people to be buried back on their kihamba, joking 
“maybe this is just as well because space is becoming sparse in Dar es Salaam!”. If he 
were to be knocked down by a car, he was sure his relatives “would take him back 
home”, by which he was referring to Arusha, where both his parents were buried. For 
Christmas, the other great occasion when Chagga people would return to Kilimanjaro, 
he would often visit Arusha, a “hangover” as he put it from the time when both his 
parents were alive and still living in the town. This stands in contrast to other Chagga 
elites discussed in this chapter who, although living and working away from Kilimanjaro 
for most of their careers, still ensured that they would be buried back in their own 
kihamba. 
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Yet Adiel was not a man who considered Chagga traditions to be unimportant. He 
bemoaned the fact that “people are slowly losing their culture. In 20 or 30 years, 
culture will be completely diluted. Modern technology in particular is to blame. 
Americans are culprits number one. The way that Americans do things are copied by 
people all over the world.” Adiel saw the Chagga traditions as very valuable, and they 
were practised within his family in Arusha. His father would teach him about Chagga 
meat-sharing ceremonies, which they would practise in his household. Adiel spoke a 
little of the Chagga dialect of Old Moshi, if only to a limited extent. Perhaps most 
strikingly, with regard to his father’s land in Arusha, they followed certain norms that 
would normally apply only to the kihamba land of Kilimanjaro. His father obtained 
pieces of land for his sons53  close to his own, while Adiel’s youngest brother remained in 
the father’s house and inherited that land when his father died. Adiel’s relationship to 
Kilimanjaro and the kihamba system differed remarkably from that of my other 
informants. Even those individuals who lived and worked in Dar es Salaam, and for 
whom the Chagga traditions of visiting during Christmastime were more honoured in 
the breach than the observance, would still offer up an account which valued such visits.  
 
The Legacy of Nyerere 
 
In Dar es Salaam (Fieldnotes 3/11/2005), I sat in a bar drinking with Stanley, a Chagga 
businessman. He had recently returned from an international trade fair. Even though he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  The traditional norms of land inheritance was that only the oldest son was provided 
with a kihamba once he married, with the youngest son inheriting the father’s kihamba 
and middle sons expected to clear and cultivate bush to start their own vihamba 
(Moore 1986: 82-83). However, amongst the elite at least, during the period of my 
research it was considered unfair not provide the middle sons with an inheritance, and 
so many sought to provide each son with a kihamba. Therefore, while Adiel’s example 
does not directly follow Chagga traditional norms, it closely mirrors contemporary 
Chagga practice. 
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was in his forties, and had been living in the UK with his parents and was educated 
there during the time Nyerere was president, Stanley had an extremely negative view of 
Nyerere and his socialist policies, dismissing them and Nyerere personally as being bad 
for Tanzania. His periods abroad doing business had been productive, he told me, 
because Tanzania had a strong reputation abroad. I asked him why this was the case, 
and he replied with a single word: “Nyerere”. 
 
Coming from a man who was no fan of Nyerere’s socialist policies, this was a surprising 
utterance. Stanley went on to explain that Nyerere’s international reputation aided him 
while on such international visits. One way of examining the international views held of 
Nyerere abroad is through an examination of the obituaries that followed his death in 
1999. Within Africa, the South African ANC was one of the first to respond, releasing a 
statement praising Nyerere’s role in the anti-Apartheid struggle: “The organisation 
[ANC] weeps in memory of this giant amongst men… The ANC pays homage to a true 
African legend, a man deserving of great admiration, respect and affection” (ANC 1999). 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe offered similar praise for Nyerere’s role in their own 
struggle for independence (BBC 1999). Respects were paid in other African nations, 
with the flags in Kenya flying at half-mast for four days, and President Chiluba of 
Zambia praising the “great guide” of African politics ("Julius Nyerere: Press Coverage 
from the Internet"  1999). Praise too came from leaders outside of Africa, with 
President Clinton of the USA sending his respects, and with Prime Minister Blair of the 
UK praising Nyerere as “a leading African statesman of his time” (ibid."Julius Nyerere: 
Press Coverage from the Internet"). He also received the highest praise from James D. 
Wolfenshohn, then president of the World Bank, an organisation that Nyerere had not 
seen eye-to-eye with on issues over the years: “the ideals he represented will remain a 
source of inspiration and comfort for all of us. That is a legacy which even President 
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Nyerere – modest as he was – would have been proud of.” (Wolfenshohn, cited in 
"Julius Nyerere: Press Coverage from the Internet"  1999). 
 
The press coverage within the Western media emphasised two sides to the legacy of 
Julius Nyerere: on the one hand, that of the morally upstanding leader who left a legacy 
of peace and stability for Tanzania, and on the other hand a leader who implemented 
policies that we economically disastrous. For example, in The Independent, the obituary 
stated of Nyerere’s economic policies, “Tanzania’s economy is still struggling to recover. 
Probably the economic programmes… were the biggest mistakes of Nyerere’s career” 
and yet concludes “Africa needs more leaders of Nyerere’s quality, integrity and 
wisdom” (Porteous 1999). The Economist provided an account which, while respecting 
Nyerere’s character, was ultimately damning of his time as President: “He was a 
magnificent teacher: articulate, questioning, stimulating, caring. He should never have 
been given charge of an economy” (Obituary: Julius Nyerere  1999). 
 
The international press’s response to Nyerere’s death is critiqued by Cranford Pratt. 
While he acknowledges that the response included expressions of respect and affection, 
he concludes that the international obituaries and retrospectives of Nyerere’s life made 
“critical and sweeping judgements that, after all, because of his socialist policies, 
Nyerere had not served his people well” (Pratt 1999: 137). He sees a discontinuity 
between this international judgement and the emotional response within Tanzania. 
Pratt’s argument, however, is flawed. As Askew illustrates, there was indeed a 
disconnect between the international press’s focus on his economic legacies and the 
domestic Tanzanian response. Within Tanzania, both the official statements and the 
music composed in response to his death made no mention or analysis of ujamaa 
socialism (Askew 2006: 15-16). For Stanley the businessman, however, the irony is that 
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it is the proponent of African socialism that assists his essentially capitalist business 
dealings. 
  
Education on Kilimanjaro 
 
At independence, Tanzania had very few trained African professionals. There were only 
twelve African doctors registered in the territory, and five interns (Iliffe 1998: 112). By 
mid-1964, there were only twenty Tanganyikan graduate teachers working in the 
country (Tordoff 1967: 201). Furthermore, the limited number of secondary schools in 
the territory meant that many of the future elite attended the same schools. In a study 
defining the elite as those appearing in the 1963-64 edition of Who’s Who in East Africa, 
Gordon M. Wilson provides an insight into the educational background of those who 
appeared in the book. 30% of the elite were educated at Tabora Government School, 
St Andrew’s, Minaki had 8%, St Mary’s, Tabora had 5% and Old Moshi Secondary 
School had 5% (Wilson 1966: 440). Old Moshi Secondary School was the destination 
of many Chagga who would go on to be part of the elite. Edwin Mtei, the future 
Minister of Finance and founding member of the CHADEMA opposition party, gives 
some clue in his autobiography as the density of future members of the Tanzanian elite 
who were present at the school at this time. Mtei would walk to school with Wilfred 
Marealle, Arnold Temu (historian) and Wilbert Kleruu. His teachers at the time 
included Solomon Eliufoo, later President of the Chagga Council and education 
minister. This is only to mention a few of the names Mtei mentions (Mtei 2009). Given 
that most Tanzanians had only primary education, opportunities opened domestically 
for those with secondary or tertiary education. Peter Temu from Mamba, Kilimanjaro 
graduated from Makerere in 1962 with a honours degree in economics: 
Young Tanzanians who graduated then never looked for jobs… 
Any young Tanzanian with secondary school education or 
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better, was virtually assured of an office job, and anyone 
holding a university degree was simply hot cake!… I realized 
[visiting Stanford University in 1966] that while my country 
regarded me as a highly educated man, the wider world did not. 
(Temu 2007: 4-5) 
Temu would go on to gain a PhD, and as with T. Marealle and Nsilo Swai, took up a 
job with the United Nations. 
 
Education was considered by Nyerere to be an important aspect of nation-building. As 
Nyerere said, “The education provided by Tanzania for the students of Tanzania must 
serve the purposes of Tanzania” (Nyerere 1968 [1967]-a: 290). The post-Arusha 
Declaration aims of the education system were outlined in the document Education for 
Self-Reliance (ESR), presented by Nyerere in March 1967. ESR aimed to reflect the 
skills needs of an economy for which most worked in the rural sector. Thus, the 
emphasis was on primary education as a goal in itself, not as preparation for further 
academic study, and adult literacy programmes (Wedgewood 2005: 7). In terms of 
primary education, Tanzania did make some impressive achievements in literacy and 
primary school enrolment. Between 1966 and 1981, there was a six-fold increase in the 
number of primary school enrolments, reaching 97% gross enrolment by 1981 (Buchert 
1994: 112). However, the focus on primary education meant that the post-primary 
sector stagnated. This resulted in Tanzania’s having one of the lowest enrolment rates 
for secondary schools in the world, at under 5% in 1978 (Ergas 1982: 579). The 
number of students enrolled in state secondary schools actually declined between 1977 
and 1984 (Cooksey 1986: 184). This also resulted in low levels of attainment in 
English, with the numbers of people who could use English effectively estimated at 15% 
in 1972 (Mkilifi 1972: 204).  
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For entry to the limited numbers of secondary schools in Tanzania, a regional quota 
system was introduced, in an attempt to correct the disparities between areas of 
Tanzania that dated back to the colonial period (see also (O'Connor 1974: 75; Ergas 
1982: 579; Cooksey 1986; Wedgewood 2005: 13). The quota system was an attempt 
to deal with the disparities between ethnic groups (Samoff 1987: 354-357). Samoff 
notes that this is one indication that the early postcolonial Tanzanian state was 
primarily concerned with the political saliency of ethnicity, as opposed to the other 
divisions within Tanzanian society along the lines of religion, race class or gender. 
However, as a way of fixing ethnic disparities, Samoff notes that a regional quota is an 
imperfect measure: the regions of Tanzania are an invention of the post-colonial state, 
with no historical basis back to the colonial inequalities. In detribalised Tanzania, it 
was not possible for an official body to ask the students to enter their ethnicity on an 
application form. Within Kilimanjaro Region, for example, it was not possible to 
differentiate between separate numbers for Chagga or Pare pupils entering secondary 
school. I argue that there is a gap between the government policies of detribalisation 
and the attempts to even out the colonial legacy of inequalities, a gap between policies 
of equality and policies of unity. Through this gap Chagga people were able to continue 
to educate their children. 
 
While the drawbacks of ESR have been discussed in the literature (see, for example, 
Cooksey’s (1986) demolition of the policy), my research uncovered new ways in which 
the system could be manipulated to get around regional quota limitations. The method 
by which Chagga students were able to manipulate the system was described to me by 
Emmanuel: 
At independence, there was a quota system for pupils 
transitioning from primary school to secondary school. This 
was on a regional basis. Because a good number of Chagga were 
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teachers in other regions, Chagga could send their kids to other 
regions to stay with them. They would also change their names, 
and drop their clan names. So they would be applying from a 
different region, and would not have a Chagga name, so there 




The effectiveness of this method was confirmed by a senior headmaster of Chagga 
ethnicity, at the time of my research a head teacher at a secondary school in Kilimanjaro 
Region.  
Some people applying to Secondary School [during ESR] 
would drop their surname, so the people looking at the 
application did not know that they were Chagga. They might 
think, ‘We have too many Chagga already!’ But now, the 
selection process is fair, so people don’t do that now. It’s not 
possible to tell if someone is Chagga from what they write as 
their town on the form – someone putting Mwanza, for 
example, may be a Chagga who has moved there (Fieldnotes 
21/10/2005).  
 
Thus, Chagga students were able to take advantage of their social position to get 
around the official quota. The fact that Chagga people were by this stage spread all over 
Tanzania played an important role in enabling people of Chagga ethnicity to continue 




Nyerere’s projects of nation-building and ujamaa socialism provided potential problems 
for the Chagga elite. However, in practice, many of this elite were able to stay in a 
powerful position throughout the socialist period. Some of the ways in which they 
would do this was through the contrivance of the state, for example by being provided 
with state-sponsored positions abroad. In other ways, for example through the 
education system, they manipulated the state’s policies to their own ends. Chagga 
ethnicity plays a key role in this. The inequalities that existed in Tanzania stemmed 
from the policies of the colonial state. Furthermore, the methods used by the Chagga 
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elite tie closely to Chagga concepts of migration. At the same time that the migration 
took the Chagga elite away from Kilimanjaro, the desire to return for retirement, or at 
least burial, was maintained. With the broadly capitalistic Chagga outlook, and the 
advantageous position maintained through the socialist period, then the Chagga elite 
were in an excellent position to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by 
the liberalisation of the economy. However, there were also new challenges brought by 
the changing economic and political environment. This is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chagga ethnicity, I argue in this thesis, is intimately linked with place: the kihamba, and 
Kilimanjaro itself. This chapter seeks to explore the relationship between Chagga elites 
and life on the mountainside. Migration, as outlined in Chapter 4, has long been an 
important feature of the lives of elites. This chapter argues that elites are very much a 
part of the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. It explores the ways in which elite migrants 
continue to make their presence felt back home, through the building of houses and 
return visits for burials and Christmas. The chapter also examines how Kilimanjaro is 
perceived as facing difficulties, particularly following the liberalisation of the economy, 
and some of the ways in which elites are attempting to address these new challenges. 
 
Kilimanjaro Region remains, by many developmental indices, among the most 
developed areas of Tanzania. The 2000/01 Tanzanian Household Budget Survey reveals 
Kilimanjaro Region to be the region, outside of Dar es Salaam, with the highest rates of 
adult literacy; highest primary net enrolment ratio; largest percentage of households 
with access to mains electricity and with modern materials used for roofing (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2002a: 23-27). While the accounts of Kilimanjaro being amongst 
the most developed area of Tanzania are accurate, a number of studies in recent years 
have highlighted the disparities that exist between the well-off and less well-off in 
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Kilimanjaro. Philip W. Setel’s work on HIV/AIDS seeks to analyse that Kilimanjaro 
has amongst the highest rates of HIV infection in the country (Setel 1999: 1). This, 
Setel argues, reveals the paradox and contradictions of modernity for Chagga people:  
On one hand, colonial and postcolonial institutions (such as 
the church and Western education) were seen as escape routes 
from increasingly crowded mountain slopes where, over time, 
fewer and fewer households could be successfully sustained by 
agriculture. On the other hand, these same ‘escape routes’ 
came to be associated with vulnerability to AIDS. (ibid.: 3)  
 
Another sometimes harrowing account is Mary Howard and Ann V. Millard’s (1997) 
account of child malnutrition on Kilimanjaro. Despite the relative wealth present 
amongst Chagga people, rates of child malnutrition have been amongst the highest in 
the country. There is, Howard and Millard argue, a widening gap between the wealthy 
and the poor on the mountain. The poor are increasingly stigmatised and marginalised; 
“Hawa watu (these people) was a common referent to the poor – sometimes used by 
their own kin to convey a sense of distance or otherness from themselves”  (ibid.: 4). To 
research elites is not to ignore the social problems of Kilimanjaro. Indeed, the social 
divisions in rural Kilimanjaro are all too visible. It is particularly evident through 
housing in the rural areas, where the large houses of the wealthy surrounded by fine 
gardens, stand next to the cinder brick houses of the less well-off. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines aspects of the elite 
place in the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. After exploring the concept of the moral 
economy, it examines one of the historical manifestations of this, Kazi ya Jumatatu. 
Attention then turns to the role of elite migration in Kilimanjaro, and the three most 
important ways that elites make their presence felt on the mountainside: through the 
construction of large and fine homes, burials, and the return visit for the Christmas 
celebrations. The second section of the chapter is on the perceptions of change, again 
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focused on the kihamba belt, particularly the impact of the liberalisation of the 
economy from the 1980s onwards. While elements of social change have been 
highlighted throughout the chapter, the second section focuses on the perceived crisis 
facing Kilimanjaro. This involves the land shortages and the decline of the coffee price, 
and a perceived change in the role of education for a younger generation. Many of these 
changes are directly linked to the liberalisation of the economy. Finally, the chapter 
examines one of the ways that elites have responded to these problems, through the 
creation of local NGOs. 
 
The Moral Economy 
 
The concept of the moral economy is, I argue, an important one for developing an 
understanding of the role of elites in Kilimanjaro. I am not the first author to draw 
attention to the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. Tuulikki Pietilä (2007: 12-13) uses a 
distinction in her work between the cash economy and the moral economy on 
Kilimanjaro. The moral economy consists of the requirements of gift-giving, feeding, 
patronage and feasting. It is not necessarily the case that those rich in the cash economy 
are any less part of this moral economy. Moore places the distinction between the cash 
and moral economy in terms of “tradition” and “modernity”. “Failure to maintain 
tradition … is also something with which the well-off can belabour the poor. The well-
to-do can be at once both more modern and more traditional than their less fortunate 
relatives… The poor cannot afford to be properly traditional, and they certainly cannot 
afford to be modern” (Moore 1986: 300). Tradition is not an unchanging set of traits 
handed down from the past, but is rather subject to change and contains both 
continuities and discontinuities with the past (Handler and Linnekin 1984). Some of 
the traditions of previous generations were readily abandoned by subsequent ones, most 
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strikingly the traditional rule of the chiefs. Nevertheless, as we shall see, in many other 
areas traditions persist. 
 
There is a danger, in drawing on these themes, that a dichotomy can be created, as with 
James Ferguson’s distinction between the “cosmopolitanism” of the city and the 
“localism” of the rural community (Ferguson 1999: 211-212). Rather, the interplays 
between urban and rural, cosmopolitanism and localism, can play out in very different 
ways. For example, amongst the Manjaco people of Guinea-Bissau, Eric Gable (2006: 
387) argues that locality and cosmopolitanism “were not imagined as separate or 
opposed moral spaces”. The village was not associated with a constructive 
communalism, nor was cosmopolitanism associated with a destructive individuality 
(ibid.: 387). Nevertheless, with the Chagga case, it is worthwhile to draw a distinction 
between the moral economy on the one hand and the cash economy on the other. 
Following Moore and Pietilä, it can be informative to see how these distinctions play 
out in Kilimanjaro, as this chapter illustrates. 
 
It is the kihamba belt that forms the basis for Chagga ethnicity. The ancestral homeland 
is placed in an important position for the imagination of many ethnicities. Kristen 
Cheney (2004), for example, finds that Ugandan children, even those who had little 
actual connection with their rural ancestral homes, imagined the rural areas to be 
integral to their ethnic identity. In the Chagga case, the distinction should not be drawn 
between rural and urban, but rather between the kihamba belt and everywhere else. Not 
all migrants from Kilimanjaro moved into urban environments, many moved to other 
rural parts of Tanzania. As I conducted research in Dar es Salaam, Moshi and rural 
Kilimanjaro, there is an aspect of Chagga migration that I did not significantly cover. 
W. Arens (1973) examines a polyethnic rural community one hundred miles east of 
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Kilimanjaro. The village in that study had a diverse ethnic population, having attracted 
migrants from all over Tanzania. Most were working as subsistence farmers. A notable 
exception were members of the Chagga ethnic group who lived up to their 
entrepreneurial reputation. Trade in the village was almost completely dominated by 
people of Chagga ethnicity, and those who were engaged in farming were producing a 
surplus which they would sell through networks of  Chagga traders. Furthermore, both 
Chagga people themselves and others in the village saw the Chagga ethnic group as 
uniquely distinct from others in the village: 
 the Chagga entrepreneurs… employ common ethnicity to 
facilitate the achievement of their economic ends. In effect, 
they have chosen to seize upon the advantages afforded by 
emphasising ethnicity and in the process have ‘tribalised’ 
themselves. Their failure to blend socially and culturally in the 
community is intentional. They are not merely representatives 
of another tribe but rather a distinct socio-economic group or 
class. However, it is ethnicity which is the symbol of their 
economic position. (Arens 1973: 446-448) 
 
As can be seen, Chagga in a rural community away from the kihamba belt behaved as 
entrepreneurs and traders in a similar way to their behaviour in the urban environment. 
Thus, I argue that the distinction that should be drawn is not a rural-urban distinction 
but rather between the kihamba belt and elsewhere. 
 
Furthermore, while the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro is the basis of the Chagga moral 
world, I found that it is not the case that it is static and unchanging. As will be 
discussed, the building in Kilimanjaro has resulted in a place that is understood as 
looking radically different from previous years. One man, Frank, who had gone to 
school in Machame, described how when he was a schoolboy it was not possible to see 
the sky because of the tree and banana plant coverage (Fieldnotes, 15/7/2006). Indeed, 
there is evidence that the tree coverage in the kihamba belt has declined since the 1960s 
(Soini 2005b: 315). The change seen in the rural areas stands in contrast to the very 
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slow rate of change understood in the development of Moshi town. The town of Moshi 
is frequently viewed as being a town that is not developing or changing (Fieldnotes, 
21/10/2005). It is rural Kilimanjaro that is dynamic and changing, the nearest urban 
environment is constant and stagnant. 
 
This chapter examines the elite involvement in the moral economy. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the danger of many studies of the moral economy is that elites are portrayed 
as little more than clients in the patron-client relationships (Berman 1998; de Sardan 
1999). I wish to examine the role of the elite in a more nuanced fashion, as I shall do 
below. First, however, it is worth exploring the concept of the moral economy in more 
detail through the examination of two key features: meat sharing, and communal work. 
 
The Moral Economy in Kilimanjaro: Meat and Work 
 
To illustrate the issues surrounding the moral economy in Kilimanjaro, and its relation 
to the cash economy, I will give two examples. The first is the role of meat, and the role 
this has in both the cash and the moral economies. This is an example of the persistence 
of the moral economy. The second example, that of the requirement to give labour for 
communal projects, has seen a marked decline in the post-independence period. I 
examine some of the moral discussions surrounding this. 
 
The role of meat in the moral economy is an interesting case that illustrates the 
distinction, and interaction, between the moral and cash economies. Moore draws this 
distinction: when slaughtering a man’s own cow or goat for a slaughtering feast, a 
Chagga man has an obligation to share the meat within the lineage, with specific 
portions being reserved for specific family members (Moore 1986: 70-72). Not inviting 
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a relative, or failing to send a relative the specified portion, was a social snub that can 
result in serious fracture within the lineage (ibid.: 215). The meat-sharing was thus one 
of the most important aspects of lineage life, and remains so in contemporary Chagga 
life.  However, as Moore observes, it is also possible to buy meat by the kilogram from 
one of the many butchers shops present in the rural communities. This meat is bought 
in cash and for consumption at home, with no obligation to share within the lineage 
according to the meat-sharing norms. Moore notes the distinction here: meat from the 
slaughtering feast played a vital role within the lineage, yet was also a food that could be 
bought in cash from a shop. It is “both sacred and secular” (ibid.: 132). James Ferguson 
(1999: xvi-xvii) was a student of Sally Falk Moore, and similar themes exist in their 
work. 
  
It should not be thought that Moore was simply observing a society on the cusp of 
social change. The importance of the lineage meat-sharing remains a key aspect of 
lineage life, although it is perhaps less common as the number of cattle owned on 
Kilimanjaro has declined. Meat continues to have a role in both the moral and the cash 
economy. There have been further developments in the Chagga diet since Moore’s 
research. Pork is a meat that has grown in popularity in Kilimanjaro over the last few 
decades, and nowadays pork butcheries are a common sight in all parts of the mountain. 
It is a meat that has been accepted into the Chagga diet. Yet this is not a meat that is 
considered suitable to be part of the meat-sharing norms (Fieldnotes 15/7/2007). It is a 
meat that is only bought and sold as part of the cash economy, it has not entered into 
the moral sphere of meat-sharing.. Unlike chicken, according to one informant a meat 
that was itself a comparatively new introduction to the Chagga diet (Fieldnotes 
12/3/2006), a pig is a large enough animal to make it ideal for these ceremonies. It 
seems that, it all other respects apart from the meat-sharing, pork is considered a meat 
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in the same category as goat or beef. Yet while other meats, as Moore states, can be 
both “sacred and secular”, pork is only secular. How, then, to explain my observation 
that pork has remained in the sphere of the cash economy and not entered into the 
moral economy? The only explanation I can see is that this is because pork is a new 
introduction to the Chagga diet. The moral economy, in this instance, has been 
resistant to change. 
 
Another instance of the use of meat, for which Chagga are known widely across 
Tanzania, is a particular practise at Chagga weddings. Early in my fieldwork, I attended 
a wedding between two Chagga people at the YMCA in Moshi, a popular location for 
wedding ceremonies. Towards the end of the ceremony, wheeled out to the crowd was 
a trolley on which stood a whole barbecued goat. The goat was arranged in a standing 
position on the trolley. Its head had clearly removed before it was cooked, and had been 
replaced on the neck of the goat, with leaves placed in its mouth. I learnt from later 
ceremonies that the head was sometimes cooked as well, and decorated with carrots. 
The arrival of the goat was clearly a highlight of the ceremony, as the audience reacted 
with joy and ululation as the goat was moved too and fro infront of everyone. My 
Chagga friend told me that this was “Chagga cake” (Fieldnotes 7/12/2005). I thought at 
first that this was a jokey reference for my benefit, but I later discovered that the 
“Chagga cake” was well known both between Chagga people and with non-Chagga 
alike. The production of a whole barbecued goat was an essential feature of Chagga 
weddings. Furthermore, it was understood more broadly in Tanzania as being a 
peculiarly Chagga custom. 
 
A further aspect of the moral economy of Kilimanjaro, one in which seems to have been 
in decline for decades, is the concept of Kazi ya Jumatatu. Literally meaning “Work of 
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Monday”, the phrase refers to the day put aside each week for work on communal 
projects, mostly the maintenance of Kilimanjaro’s elaborate water projects. It is a 
practice that still exists in parts of Kilimanjaro, but is very much in decline. Because it is 
practiced to nowhere near the same extent as in the colonial period, I was unaware of 
the term until I came across it in a colonial-era report in the archives of the Lutheran 
Mission in Moshi. The report referred to the development of a water project, and 
stated that “The people are quite willing and ready to work [on the new water points] 
on communal day as ‘Kazi ya Jumatatu’” (Chagga Native Authority 1961). I did not 
know the meaning of the phrase, beyond the literal Swahili translation, so I asked a 
number of my informants. The most complete account was offered by Cornelius, as I 
wrote in my fieldnotes: 
Kazi ya Jumatatu refers to the communal work that was done 
every Monday. They would do work on furrows, roads etc. 
Even today in many places they still do this, but especially they 
did it under the authority of the chieftaincy. So, I ask, what if 
you live in the area but aren’t around? Well, the reply is, you 
have to give a certain amount of money, as you live there. 
Nowadays, Cornelius explains, much of the work is building 
schools. People have to bring stones etc., or money. 
‘Businessmen give a lot of money’. This is only for government 
schools (the government supplies the teachers), not private 
school… Cornelius explains, In Kilimanjaro, this occurred in 
any area under the chiefdoms. The day was used even to build 
homes for people who couldn’t build their own, poor people. 
The night before they would sound the alarm (drums and 
special whistles) to notify people that the next day was the Kazi 
ya Jumatatu. If you didn’t go to the work, people would come 
round to your home and take one of your possessions (a chair 
etc.) that they would eventually sell (Fieldnotes, 4/4/2007). 
 
The accounts given of this activity are interesting from an elite perspective, as it 
includes the ability of a wealthy member of society to give money rather than perform 
the labour. In the case of more modern building projects, it would become a necessity 
as money would be required to buy materials. It is also interesting that it is engagement 
with the cash economy that enables a Chagga person to essentially buy their way out of 
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work, and that it is through material goods that a fine for non-attendance is required. 
However, the practice of Kazi ya Jumatatu is seen as being in decline since the end of the 
institution of chieftaincy. 
 
The necessity of this communal Kazi ya Jumatatu emerges from the needs of maintaining 
Kilimanjaro’s complex furrow system of irrigation. As Alison Grove (1993: 442-445) 
describes it, one day a week set aside for communal work, which mainly consisted of the 
repair and maintenance of furrows. However, it is clear that the practise has been in 
decline, and does not exist at all in many parts of Kilimanjaro. Matthew Bender (2007: 
31) agrees that there has been a decline since the 1960s in the obligation for communal 
labour, a development he puts down to the demise of the chiefs. While my fieldwork 
supports Bender’s finding of a decline in the obligatory communal work, Bender’s 
assertion that the cause of this was the decline of the chiefs needs further unpacking: 
after all, it was the position of furrow chairman, rather than chiefs, that controlled the 
maintenance of furrows. 
 
Much of the reason for the decline in furrows may lie with issues surrounding the 
controls the chiefs had over the production, distribution and sale of mbege, the banana 
beer that is popular in Kilimanjaro. It was chiefs that had control over the sale of mbege. 
As a result, it is understood today that the chiefs control over mbege resulted in a far 
more tightly controlled availability of alcohol than there is today. This was particularly 
true surrounding Kazi ya Jumatatu, with the mbege shops closing early the day before 
and remaining close throughout the work. (Fieldnotes, 19/12/2005, 12/4/2006, 
6/7/2007). This control over the production and sale of alcoholic drinks was an aspect 
of life on Kilimanjaro that was sadly missed, even by those informants of mine who 
drank heavily themselves. It was considered that there was a moral decline since the 
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liberalisation of this trade after the chiefs were abolished. A different slant on the role of 
alcohol in communal work is provided by Moore (1986: 187). She argues that much of 
the reason for the decline in this work was that, in the colonial period, “work parties 
ended in beer parties”; in the austere atmosphere of socialism it was not possible for 
party or state officials to offer the same incentives. It is interesting how Moore and my 
informants both put a very different spin on the same issues surrounding alcohol and 
communal work, and an explanation for the decline in Kazi ya Jumatatu. Moore places 
an emphasis on the availability of alcohol in the past; my present-day informants 
emphasise the restrictions. The two are not mutually exclusive, yet give a very different 
impression of the moral qualities of the past. My explanation is that this discrepancy is a 
product of the period in which Moore and my research was conducted. Moore is 
writing, as she describes it, in an austere socialist time-period, whereas during my 
research the liberalised economic and political spheres led for a more permissive 
environment. For Moore’s informants, with their minds firmly on austerity, the past was 
a time when alcohol and celebration were more freely available. For my informants, the 
issues surrounding alcohol in the present were very much in their minds, so their 
understandings of the past became a place in which more control was exercised.  
 
The moral economy is a useful concept when considering the Chagga elite. In the 
sections that follow, I use the concept to explore the issues surrounding elite migration 
and the continued links that migrants maintain with Kilimanjaro. 
 
Elite Migration and Returning to Kilimanjaro 
 
As illustrated by the cases in Chapter 4, the opportunities away from Kilimanjaro for 
the Chagga elite are great. Migration from Kilimanjaro, important for Chagga people of 
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all social backgrounds (see Setel 1999) became particularly important for many people 
of elite status. Opportunities in the state sector, as well as with international 
organisations, provided far more opportunities for advancement than the mountainside 
itself. Elevation to the levels described in Chapter 4 were simply not possible confined 
to the kihamba belt. 
 
Nevertheless, the kihamba provides a continual draw for the Chagga elite. Philip was an 
elite Chagga in his fifties, running a successful business in Dar es Salaam. I met up with 
him in Marangu, on his kihamba, where he had constructed a fine home and garden. As 
the sun set, he speculated aloud as to whether it would be possible for him to live in 
Marangu while still continuing his business interests. He wondered whether, with 
modern communication technologies, it would be possible to conduct most of his 
business from his home in Marangu. The transport links to Kilimanjaro are relatively 
good for rural Tanzania, and it would be possible for him to fly from Moshi airstrip to 
Dar es Salaam in a matter of hours. Philip realised that this dream was not really 
possible if he was to keep a close watch over his business interests in the city. He would 
not have the opportunity to live in Kilimanjaro until retirement (Fieldnotes, 
28/12/2005).  
 
Retirement in Kilimanjaro is one of the key goals stated by many of Chagga ethnicity. 
This is perhaps a consequence of the impact of working in the public sector. Working 
in a position that came with a house, from teachers to high-ranking party officials, the 
necessity of building a house for retirement becomes clear. This is, of course, an issue 
not limited to people of Chagga ethnicity. There are, however, issues specifically related 
to Chagga people that shall be discussed in the following sections. I shall now discuss 
how the elites made their presence felt even while away from Kilimanjaro. One feature 
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of the examples I shall discuss is that they are rife with the possibilities of tension 
between elite and non-elite populations. Yet direct conflicts are absent. In terms of 
establishing the relationships between elite and non-elite members of society, I do not 
claim to give a full account of the relations or struggle between the two. As most of my 
informants were of elite status themselves, I approached the situations from very much a 
top-down perspective. This was mitigated to an extent by extended periods of fieldwork 
in Machame, where through living in the area more relationships with non-elites 
developed. In addition, I had close relationships with non-elite families stemming from 
my long-standing connection with the region. Following Pietilä’s (2007) work on gossip 
in Kilimanjaro, the gossip about elites often eventually reaches elite ears. These factors 
mitigate somewhat the elite focus of my research. 
  
Housing in “The Beverly Hills of Tanzania” 
 
Walking through the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro, there are some strikingly large houses 
surrounded by fine gardens. Kilimanjaro is known for the size and quality of the houses. 
One Dar es Salaam-based young Chagga woman described Kilimanjaro as “the Beverly 
Hills of Tanzania” because of the high quality and size of the homes built by the 
wealthy in that area (Fieldnotes, 10/8/2005). While the traditional style of Chagga 
housing had some variation across Kilimanjaro, they mainly consisted of a conical 
beehive shape. The largest houses could reach 25 feet in diameter. The houses across 
Kilimanjaro were thickly thatched with banana leaves (Dundas 1924: 255-258). This 
style of housing has seen a decline over the 20th century. By the 1970s, the traditional 
style of housing was still present, although “used principally by ‘old mothers’ who 
greatly prefer them” (Moore 1977a: 3). This older generation has passed, as this style of 
housing is almost non-existent in contemporary Kilimanjaro. From the end of the 19th 
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century, starting with the chief’s houses, rectangular houses with mud and wattle walls 
began to be built (ibid.: 3). By the 1970s, wealthy men build cinderblock houses with 
cement floors and metal roofs (Moore 1977a: 3). Since then, the metal roof has become 
almost ubiquitous, with the 2000/01 Household Budget Survey revealing that 85% of 
the houses in Kilimanjaro Region had roofs made from “modern materials”, amongst 
the highest in Tanzania (National Bureau of Statistics 2002a: 23).  
 
In terms of the traditional beehive Chagga house, during the course of my fieldwork I 
did not come across any of the structures currently inhabited as homes, and I only saw a 
handful across the mountain in museums and as cultural tourism exhibits in Mamba and 
Marangu. It seems that the “old mothers” that Moore reports as being the last 
inhabitants of such houses have passed. Indeed, I was sometimes pointed towards a new 
structure, or yard, and told that the now-deceased grandmother of the residence had 
lived in a traditional-style house on the property, standing alongside the modern style of 
the dwelling of the other inhabitants of the kihamba. When the grandmother had died 
they had removed the traditional house54  (Fieldnotes, 23/5/2006). The traditional 
Chagga house was not simply a dwelling, it was also a key symbol of the importance of 
cooperative work and community. This is an element emphasised by early 
anthropologists to Kilimanjaro. House building was a cooperative endeavour within the 
kinship group, and it was required for cousins to help with either the construction of a 
new house or the repairing of a house before the rains. Boys and men gathered material 
from the forest to construct the beams and rafters, while women and girls gathered the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  It is not practical, outside of a museum context, to keep a traditional house as a 
memento in the kihamba. In 1999, while I was a teacher at Moshi Technical School, 
my English colleague conducted an undergraduate research project on the traditional 
Chagga house. He paid some men from Masama to construct a house in our garden at 
the school. He discovered the hard way that, unless a thatched house is kept regularly 
smoked through the use of a cooking fire, the insect life in the thatch makes the house 
uninhabitable. 
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material to thatch the house. The mutual obligation of the building of the house was 
helped by the feasting and beer-drinking that marked the house’s completion (Raum 
1967 [1940]: 210). There was a phrased used by people who were regretting their own 
selfish behaviour towards their kinsmen, “The posts of my house are hitting me”, as he 
felt his very house had turned against him. “His house, everywhere the symbol of a 
man’s safety and independence, is not after all his own; it is built with the consent, help, 
and blessing of his kinsmen, and important house-building ceremonies testify to this 
interdependence” (Steiner 1954: 368). Today, the situation is very different, 
particularly with regard to elite housing. While the poor may receive some help with 
the construction of the homes, as mentioned in the discussion of Kazi ya Jumatatu 
above, there is no reciprocity in the construction of elite houses. Materials, and labour, 
are bought. There is a clear shift in this respect from the communal building of homes 
in the past. 
 
Elite houses in the kihamba belt are of remarkable size and quality. While I am aware of 
only one house in the kihamba belt that is more than one story tall – the home of the 
family of Reginald Mengi, the business and media tycoon – the single-story houses of 
the elite were still of impressive size55 . A common feature was the number of bedrooms: 
often, there was one master bedroom and an additional bedroom for each of the family’s 
offspring. On occasion, each of the bedrooms had en suite bathroom facilities 
(Fieldnotes, 14/6/2007). However, many of these bedrooms were empty for most of the 
time. As I have discussed, opportunities took the Chagga elite away from Kilimanjaro 
for much of the year. By the time retirement approached, the children would be grown 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  I heard it told that the Protea Aishi Machame hotel, owned by the 2005 CHADEMA 
Presidential candidate Freeman Mbowe and built on his ancestral kihamba, was 
originally constructed as his family home and later turned into a hotel (3/7/2007). I did 
not find confirmation for this story. 
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and be married, have kihamba of their own, or be away from Kilimanjaro. It was a 
striking feature that houses of such scale be built, with rooms for grown children, when 
the owner knew that most of the rooms would be empty for much of the year. The 
reason for this was given by one informant. A widow, her three children were all living 
in the USA, where she had lived with her late husband for many years. She and her 
husband had built a house in Kilimanjaro with rooms for each of her offspring, even 
though each of them was full-grown, married and living abroad. She was, however, 
completely clear as to the reason that a house of this scale was necessary: it was so that 
all of her family could be together at Christmas (Fieldnotes, 30/6/2006). The Chagga 
return visit to Christmas, as detailed below, was one of the key motivating factors for 
the construction of houses on the scale in which they were built. Some of the more 
extravagant constructions were built with other occasions in mind; one home-owner 
had built an extra wing of his house with three extra bedrooms to accommodate guests 
for his son’s wedding (Fieldnotes, 23/12/2005). But it was the Christmas visit that was 
the motivation for providing a bedroom for each family member, even those absent. 
 
Size was not the only criteria for the construction of houses; the quality and 
craftsmanship of the construction also seemed to be of value and importance. Materials 
that were imported from outside of the region, plus the use of craftsmen from beyond 
Kilimanjaro itself, were proudly displayed (for example, fieldnotes 12/5/2006). Amy 
Stambach notes that the secondary education of girls in General Housecraft led to 
similarities and orderliness to interior design between one home and the next 
(Stambach 2000: 51-52). In looking at these houses, I often looked to see if I could see 
any sign in their architecture or design that harked back to earlier norms of Chagga 
house design. The traditional Chagga house was of a distinctive design, and I looked to 
see if any of the aspects of designs of modern Chagga houses provided a reference or 
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reflection on these earlier designs. I found it difficult to find anything that harked back 
to traditional designs or construction techniques. The possible exception is some of the 
designs of hotels such as the round and thatched Capricorn Hotel in Marangu, although 
these were not homes. 
 
The contradiction at the heart of the housing situation in Kilimanjaro is that many of 
the large houses are empty for much of the year. In order to raise the cash to construct 
the property, work away from the mountainside. This means that, while the smaller 
houses of non-elite members of Chagga society may often be small and over-crowded, 
the larger elite housing is left empty. These are themes that are discussed below, and 
also pertain to the growing land shortage of Kilimanjaro. However, it should not be 
thought that this means that the elite housing on Kilimanjaro is of the nature of empty 
mansions that were little more than follies, designed to show the cosmopolitan 
sophistication of the owner. This was far from the case. The interior of these houses 
clearly indicated that these were homes, places to be lived in. They are places filled with 
ornaments and keepsakes, as well as treasured family photographs on the walls. Another 
interesting point was that the houses often had separate offices, designed for use of the 
Chagga elite to do work, and to complete their correspondence during retirement. 
Some had private libraries. These were houses designed to be a place in which to live 
and work. 
 
As well as the houses themselves, there is also a strong tendency for the elites to 
surround their homes with large, often walled, gardens. There is a long connection 
made by European visitors between the landscape of Kilimanjaro and English gardens. 
Harry Johnston described one natural lawn as “only awaiting tennis to be perfect” 
(Johnston 1885: 154). The climate of Kilimanjaro is conducive to producing European-
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style lawns and gardens. Yet they do require maintenance and upkeep. For example, 
Robert, a Dar es Salaam-based businessman, has a large kihamba on which he had built 
a large home and was developing a garden. He employs a full-time gardener to maintain 
the lawn. Robert also employs a specialist gardener from Dar es Salaam “from time to 
time” who had a more specialised knowledge in he maintenance of the lawn and taking 
care of the flowerbeds. Roberts speaks in pride of his imported English grasses that he 
used for his lawn (Fieldnotes, 27/12/2005). The European character of these gardens 
was, in Robert’s case at least, deliberate. 
 
While the large homes and gardens take up space in the kihamba, I found that it was 
never the case that they completely replaced the growing of plants such as bananas and 
masale. In some cases, the area of the kihamba devoted to crops was in a separate space, 
separated from the garden by a wall. Robert, on the other hand, had chosen to grow a 
select few banana plants scattered across his lawn. "We made the decision to grow a few 
bananas, well and scientifically." Nevertheless, one feature that seems to be growing 
more common on Kilimanjaro is the walls and gates that are being built around the 
borders of the kihamba plot. Joseph was considering building a wall and gate around his 
house, but was concerned that this would attract thieves who would assume that he had 
valuables inside his house (Fieldnotes, 20/08/2007). The presence of these walls 
surrounding properties radically alters the appearance of the landscape. In those parts of 
Kilimanjaro where walls are most common, the appearance is closer to that of a 
wealthier suburb of Dar es Salaam. The fact that other people’s kihamba are no longer 
accessible has some impact on the customs and traditions in Kilimanjaro. For example, 
there was an old tradition that any person passing a kihamba in which ripe bananas had 
been left on the plant was permitted to eat the fruit (Von Clemm 1964: 115). This is 
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presumably made impossible by the presence of a wall. Yet I argue that in a key respect 
the introduction of these walls is not as radical a shift as it may appear. 
 
While the introduction of fences and walls to surround a kihamba may appear to be a 
new feature, I argue that it does not necessarily change the spatial relationship between 
the plots of Chagga persons. Vihamba had definite and fixed boundaries between 
them56 . The boundaries between vihamba continue to be marked by masale (dracaena) 
plants. As discussed in the literature, this plant is of large significance to Chagga people. 
It was used to mark the graves of ancestors (Dundas 1924: 192-193). It was known as 
the “plant of peace and pardon” (Wimmelbücker 2002: 53). Emissaries between rival 
chiefdoms, even in the case of all-out war, would not be killed if carrying masale (Kileo 
2005: 34). It would be carried when a Chagga person was admitting guilt. For example 
if he had wronged another and was presenting a goat or cow to another in recompense, 
he would arrange a wreath of masale around the animal’s neck (Steiner 1954: 367). 
When Edwin Mtei and his fellow Makerere students were forced to apologise to the 
Paramount Chief for a perceived insult, the were made to carry a bundle of masale leaves 
(Mtei 2009: 37-38). It also plays an important role in divination (Myhre 2006). Masale 
is also used to mark the borders of individual kihamba plots. The masale provided a 
“supernaturally protected legal right” to that land (Moore 1986: 81-82). Indeed, on the 
Chagga flag pictured in Chapter 3, a masale plant is depicted as surrounding Kibo, coffee 
and the bananas.  
 
The use of masale as a plant delineating the borders of a kihamba is almost ubiquitous 
for vihamba today. I noted in my research that even those people who have put up a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  In the 19th century, there were occasionally stone walls built around Chagga 
compounds to protect families, crops and livestock from wild animals (Wimmelbücker 
2002: 253). 
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fence surrounding their vihamba still often have a row of these plants to mark the edges 
of their property. As Myhre argues, the masale plants are intertwined with the concepts 
of neighbourliness and boundary, entwining social, spatial and affective proximity. 
“Dracaena as a means of separation is hence as integral to dwelling as the objects that 
transcend these boundaries” (Myhre 2006: 324). It seems to me that with such a 
concept of a spatial boundary between vihamba, the construction of a wall around the 
border does fit into much of the existing social order. I argue that the presence of the 
masale in addition to a fence or wall is not only a matter of ensuring a supernatural as 
well as physical protection for the kihamba. With the significance of the masale with 
regard to ensuring neighbourliness and proximity as well as division, the presence of the 
plant mitigates the potential lack of trust apparent in the construction of a fence. Again, 
the moral economy continues to be a powerful force on Kilimanjaro, even for the elite. 
 
For the Western researcher, the housing situation on Kilimanjaro draws into sharp 
contrast the social divisions in the kihamba belt. Large houses of the elite stand empty, 
while their neighbours and kinsmen are crowded into far simpler, smaller dwellings. 
Gardens cover significant areas of elite vihamba in the context of severe land shortages. 
For the outsider researcher such as myself, this draws into relief the type of social 
divisions highlighted by Howard and Millard (1997). Given that my research was into 
elite members of the community, it is difficult for me to give a full account of the role of 
non-elite responses to elite housing. Nevertheless, there did emerge reasons to think 
that the conflict between the elites and non-elites is an issue that is less of a cause of 
social conflict than it might have been thought. 
 
The construction of a house in Kilimanjaro is an imperative, and a key part of the moral 
economy. Commenting on the elite houses, William described how it was “ritually” 
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important to build a fine home on the kihamba. It has been described as relating back 
to the period of chieftaincy. A woman described it thus: “A man was supposed to 
provide a good house for his family. If he didn’t, the chief would ask him why not” 
(Fieldnotes, 15/6/2007). Compare this to the comments made by early twentieth 
century anthropologists of Kilimanjaro, where the community element of house-
building was emphasised. In contemporary Kilimanjaro, the emphasis is put on the need 
for a good house. Therefore, in the views of these informants, the construction of elite 
houses is the meeting of this cultural requirements. I would add to this my observation 
that the houses of elites still meet meets many of the facets of kihamba production. As I 
observed, the elite kihamba might have large houses and gardens, yet they also still 
contained bananas, masale, and often livestock. In these important respects, despite the 
gardens, the homes of the elites are recognisably on a working kihamba. 
 
There still remains the potential social problem of the competition between Chagga 
people over the size of their houses. One non-elite example was a friend of mine in 
Moshi, a secondary-school teacher called Mark who was nearing retirement during my 
fieldwork. Financially, over the time that I knew him he was often not in a strong 
position. He had children relatively late, and they were just entering secondary school 
as he neared retirement. To further add to his responsibilities, a relative of his in Dar es 
Salaam passed away, leaving him also responsible for two additional sets of school fees. 
He spent most of his spare time and money in the five years prior to retirement working 
on a house on his kihamba in Uru. The house was clearly important to Mark, as it was 
necessary for him to have a place to live with his young family. Yet he also felt the need 
to build a home that compared well with his neighbours; he expressed the need to 
“build a house at least as good as my brother’s” (Fieldnotes, 3/1/2006). His brother, 
working as a petty trader, probably had a similar level of income as Mark. In terms of a 
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person he was aiming to be competitive with, Mark had reasonable expectations. He 
was not looking to be in competition with the neighbouring elite houses, an 
unreasonable expectation on his salary. Rather, he had obtainable goals. I met Mark 
again in early 2011, after he had retired and his house had been completed. He was 
living in the house he had built, and very satisfied with its size and quality. 
 
From the elite perspective, some elites are not naive to the social issues surrounding 
housing. The problem with regard to competition over house size was expressed to me 
by a woman, Sylvia, who was Chagga herself had retired to the large house on her 
husband’s kihamba. She told me that she recognised the danger the danger that 
competition between people over house sizes would have for Kilimanjaro. Her concern, 
however, was not about the competition between elite and non-elite members of 
society, but rather a concern about young people who suddenly had received a 
substantial income at a young age through trade and business. She was “trying to 
explain to them that they did not have to build such large houses”, and how it was 
unnecessary for young men barely in their twenties to sink all their wealth into the 
construction of such large houses (3/8/2007). This did indicate that there is elite 
awareness of the issues surrounding large houses, and how this uses up valuable kihamba 
land. However, it is a concern that raises more issues about intra-elite conflict than 
illustrating a broader social concern. As discussed in more detail in the second section of 
this chapter, the older, educated elite – of which Sylvia was a member – have many 
concerns about the younger elite generation. Sylvia’s concerns are not only a 
recognition of the problems raised by the large houses of Kilimanjaro, but also are 
connected to a desire to prevent the younger elite generation from gaining the prestige 
of larger houses. This connects to themes of the changing role of education, discussed 
below. 
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Burial in Kilimanjaro 
 
Many members of the Chagga elite have complex backgrounds. An example is the son of 
Sam Ntiro, the late Simbo Ntiro. While his father was born in Machame, his mother 
was from Uganda. He was born in Kampala, and educated in the UK while his father 
worked there as High Commissioner after independence. After being educated in the 
UK, his son Simbo lived in Kenya for many years, and married a Kenyan. While he later 
moved to Tanzania and lived in Dar es Salaam, he rarely had the opportunity to visit 
Kilimanjaro. The time abroad affected his language: while Simbo was fluent in Swahili, 
he spoke it with a noticeable English accent. As such, Simbo has a complex background, 
with a multiplicity of potential identities with which he could identify himself. Yet 
Simbo’s own identity was proudly Tanzanian, and proudly Chagga. I asked, why are you 
Chagga? His reply was, “I will be buried in Kilimanjaro”. (Fieldnotes, 16/8/2005) 
 
Historically, there has been a variety of rituals and traditions associated with burials and 
funerals in Kilimanjaro. There existed a tradition of exhuming the body a year or 
eighteen months after death, with the skull being kept in the deceased’s kihamba. It was 
this ceremony that marked the deceased’s having entered the ancestral group (Dundas 
1924: 190-195). Given the numbers of Chagga people who have migrated from 
Kilimanjaro, unsurprisingly many deaths occur away from the mountain. If a person has 
to be buried away from Kilimanjaro, there are certain rituals that become necessary. 
According to William, if a Chagga person is buried in a “foreign land” – i.e., away from 
Kilimanjaro – “their spirit will haunt you, and cause misfortune”. This can be countered 
by taking some of the earth from the grave where the person was buried, and returning 
this to their kihamba back on Kilimanjaro. William had done this with his uncle’s 
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daughter, who had died suddenly and whose body was not able to be returned to 
Kilimanjaro for burial (Fieldnotes 28/7/2005). Others are vehement, however, that the 
desire to be buried on their vihamba is not connected in any way to beliefs connected to 
ancestors. Mama Itosi, for example, strongly disagreed that the practices were anything 
to do with ancestor worship. “It has nothing to do with superstition. It is just the 
feeling that home is Kilimanjaro” (Fieldnotes, 15/6/2007) 
 
The importance for Chagga people of being buried in their kihamba is well covered in 
the literature. Charles Dundas wrote in the 1920s that the kihamba  
is first and foremost the family graveyard… [I]t is not to be 
wondered that the Chagga speaks and thinks of his grove as 
home, a place of intimate and sacred associations which he 
cannot be indifferent to. I make no doubt that it is this which 
in a large measure makes the Chagga more attached to his 
home and country than is usual among Africans. (Dundas 1924: 
194-195)  
 
Päivi Hasu (1999: 452) describes how burial in their kihamba is the essential element of 
Chagga identity. “The Chagga are those who die and become buried in the banana 
garden”. Even those richer members of the community for whom the kihamba may be of 
little economic significance consider it a necessity to be buried in the kihamba (ibid.: 
452-453). Chagga people are far from unique in this characteristic. The Haya ethnic 
group, from north-western Tanzania, who are similar in some respects to Chagga, have 
similar practices. Brad Weiss argues that, no matter how far a person may have travelled 
during his or her lifetime, being buried on the appropriate farm provided an “occasion 
for the recentring of persons and objects as the dead are returned to the land, and these 
central lands are re-identified with those who inherit from the deceased” (Weiss 1993: 
29). As well as this spatial recentring, Weiss argues, burial also provides a form of 
temporal focality. It creates obligations for the descendents of the deceased, while at the 
same time allowing the deceased to realise their own authority over their descendents. 
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“The near and the distant, the past and the future are continually cycled through the 
focal site [of the burial site]… The grave is an objectification of these processes of 
continuity and identification” (ibid.: 29).  
 
Given that elites are relatively small in number, I did not have the opportunity to 
attend many funerals of elites. Unfortunately, I was in the UK during the time of the 
2007 funerals of Thomas Marealle, the Paramount Chief, and instead had to follow the 
funerals via news reports and interviews after the case. I did get the opportunity to 
attend numerous non-elite funerals, and the I shall discuss the elite involvement in these 
funerals below. However, first I shall discuss some of the issues involved with the one 
elite funeral that I did have the opportunity to attend.  
 
In 2009, I attended the funeral of Joseph, an elite Chagga man in his forties who I had 
known since the beginning of my fieldwork. Living in Dar es Salaam, he was a very 
strong networker, and as a consequence had many friends from all over of not just 
Tanzania but internationally. As a result, many of the events surrounding his death were 
well-attended not just by Chagga kin but also a variety of people from around the 
world. People began to gather at grounds of his rented flat in Dar es Salaam in the 
evenings following his death. The separate clusters of people in this wake, held over 
several nights, revealed something of the fracturing inherent in the life: the fellow elites 
– Chagga and non-Chagga – were in one area, while the mostly non-elite kinsmen had 
almost a separate gathering in another part of the compound. Those Chagga elite who 
were kin operated across both groups. There are, however, important ways in which the 
spheres interacted, for example the cash contributions made by people of all 
backgrounds were pooled.  
	   191	  
A memorial service was held at the Anglican cathedral in Dar es Salaam, before the body 
was taken to Machame for the burial service. A coach was hired for the taking of the 
body and mourners to Moshi and then Machame. This coach was paid for by the 
contributions, although most of the elite travelled instead by private vehicle, or even 
flew to Moshi airstrip. Thus, most of the people taking the coach were not of elite 
status. Indeed, the coach stopped on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam for many of the 
mourners to buy sleeping mats, as well as charcoal as fuel can be scarce on Kilimanjaro. 
It was clear that there were many opportunities for tensions between elites and non-
elites with these transport arrangements. While a contribution had to be made to travel 
on the coach, this contribution could be small or, through slight of hand, non-existent. 
With the bus fare to Moshi from Dar es Salaam starting at around 8,000/= Tanzanian 
schillings at this time, it can still be a saving to attend funerals. This leads to the 
possibility of kin using the transport to Machame not for the purpose of attending the 
funeral but rather for reason of getting a subsidised trip to Kilimanjaro. It was perhaps 
as a result of this fear that the decision had been made to hire the coach only from Dar 
es Salaam to Machame, and not for the return journey. Those making the return 
journey would have to make their own arrangements. Nevertheless, it was still a 
subsidised trip for the non-elites.  
 
Joseph had a very international and cosmopolitan collection of friends. This did led me 
to wonder, as I travelled up to Machame, what the nature of the burial ceremony itself 
would be like. The most striking issue about the burial ceremony was the strong 
similarities between this ceremony and the non-elite burials I had attended. For the 
time that we were in Machame, the process of the burial was very similar to the non-
elite burials that I had witnessed. As was usual, there was a large crowd from local 
mourners coming to the funeral. A Christian religious service was held, on this occasion 
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outside of the house of Joseph, although sometimes the religious services are held in a 
nearby church. Hymns, in the Machame dialect, were sung. Then, following a viewing 
of the body, the coffin was closed and carried to where the hole had been dug in the 
kihamba, alongside the grave of Joseph’s father. The coffin was placed in the ground and 
quickly buried, then the officiator called various categories of people to lay flowers on 
the grave. In a nod to the international presence of mourners, these categories were 
spoken in English as well as Swahili. 
 
The funeral arrangements in Machame did not seem to me to be much different from 
those of a non-elite. The burial was conducted in the same fashion as it would be for 
the non-elite. This was an interesting observation, as Joseph was a man who was proud 
of his cosmopolitan achievements. He had been buried, as he wished, in his kihamba, 
according to Chagga custom. The funeral was clearly not considered the proper 
occasion to flaunt the cosmopolitan achievements of the deceased. Neither is it, as I 
shall discuss below, a time that the wealth of the mourners is to be displayed 
ostentatiously.  
 
Elite involvement in funerals extends beyond the funeral of elites themselves, but also to 
elite attendance at the funerals of non-elites. How many funerals an elite might attend 
seems to depend on their proximity to Kilimanjaro. For the elites living in the kihamba 
belt, attendance at funerals was almost compulsory. The crowds of local residents that 
would attend every burial was a notable feature of life in the kihamba belt. This 
attendance was not only for religious or spiritual reasons, but also social. I visited an 
informant in Rombo, who had been landless himself but had recently bought a kihamba 
from a distant kinsman who had died childless. This seemed to be rare, but it was in 
fitting with Chagga tradition. To be sure of the role of his new kihamba, I asked where 
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he would be buried; he confirmed that he would be buried on his newly bought land. As 
my informant moving to a different part of Rombo from where he grew up, he was 
making a strong effort to be sure of fitting in with the resident population. One of the 
ways in which he did this was by making sure that he attended every local funeral, and 
made sure that he was seen at the occasions (Fieldnotes, 13/2/2006). By making the 
necessary appearance at events such as funerals, he was making sure that he was 
accepted by the community of which he had just become a member. 
 
 For elites not living in the kihamba belt, attendance at funerals seems to depend upon 
the distance from the place the funeral was taking place. In Moshi, many a time an 
interview was cancelled because an informant had to attend funeral. For those living in 
Dar es Salaam, visits to funerals were less common. Elite travel to funerals, for those in 
Moshi or Dar es Salaam, was often by chauffeur-driven car, or from Dar es Salaam a 
flight to Moshi airstrip was an option. Thus, elite attendance at funerals, while possibly 
not of high expense for the elites, was a relatively expensive occasion compared to the 
remainder of the Chagga population. It was more the time pressures than the cost of 
travel that limited elite attendance. 
 
It is the case that elites make use of their access to the cash economy to attend funerals, 
yet overt displays of wealth during a funeral itself is not always fitting to the right and 
proper behaviour of a funeral. I attended the burial of an elderly woman in June 2007, 
who I had known since my earliest visits to Tanzania. Her funeral was held in Old 
Moshi. While I could not describe her own status as elite, she had educated children 
who had achieved positions in state and business positions. One of her sons was a judge. 
On the day of the burial, a church service was held in her local church in Old Moshi, 
and then there was a ten-minute walk to her kihamba where the burial was to take 
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place. Her son, who had been chauffeur-driven to the funeral in a new Land Cruiser, 
was driven this short distance from the church to the burial place. This action was the 
subject, after the burial was complete, of many rumours and discussions amongst the 
mourners, expressing the belief that this was an ostentatious show of wealth that was 
improper at the time of his mother’s funeral (Fieldnotes, 7/6/2007). 
 
In the case of this incident, as I was not staying for an extended period of time in that 
area I was not aware of the full context of the situation. It was, however, memorable as 
it contrasted with my experiences witnessing other funerals in communities where I had 
been resident. When living in Machame, for instance, it was a common sight to see that 
elite members of the community arrived at non-elite funerals in expensive vehicles, 
sometimes with their own drivers. It was not uncommon to see the narrow roads almost 
blocked by the presence of such vehicles. It must have been obvious to the non-elites 
how the elites had arrived at the funerals. Yet I never heard any non-elites criticise elites 
for this fact, or comment that the elites had performed an ostentatious display of wealth 
by driving to the funeral, even when I was living in the community and was therefore in 
a position to hear of complaints. Because of this, the criticisms of the judge’s behaviour 
during his mother’s funeral were memorable. It was apparently acceptable to be driven 
to a funeral, yet to do so during the funeral is inappropriate. It is clear that proper 
behaviour during the funeral presents a balance in what behaviours are considered 
appropriate and inappropriate. 
 
A similar story about the sensitivities surrounding funerals is described by Pietilä. Pietilä 
(2007: 155-159) examined the gossip surrounding the burial of the father of a 
prosperous entrepreneur: the son was criticised for making the funeral too much of a 
show of his own personal wealth, from the holding of the funeral ceremony in the 
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largest nearby church, to the grave itself being lined with stones. This is another 
example of the sensitivities involved surrounding funerals, similar to the ones 
surrounding cars that I observed. This sets the Chagga as distinct from some other 
groups. For example, Gable (2006: 390) describes funerals in Guinea-Bissau in which 
returning migrants from urban areas “transform the space of the funeral ceremony into a 
theatre of cosmopolitan accomplishments”. The Chagga experience is different, in that 
the cosmopolitan achievements are kept at arms-length from the funeral space. This 
does not mean, of course, that the rural area is devoid of reminders of the achievements 
of the cash economy – the large houses of the Chagga elite serve as a permanent 
reminder. 
 
 While part of the moral economy, and an arena in which overt displays of the 
cosmopolitan achievements of the elites are frowned upon, funerals have still been 
subject to social change. There have clearly been changes over the 160 years that 
European scholars have been studying the customs of Kilimanjaro. One of the notable 
features of Chagga burial customs was that, after a year of burial, the body was exhumed 
with the skull being kept in a clay jar on the kihamba57 (Raum 1967 [1940]: 380). This 
was a practise that was known about amongst contemporary Chagga, but not something 
that people practised. Similarly, I never saw any skulls in vihamba. I did notice that, in a 
handful of  vihamba, grave markers had been placed to mark the site of burials of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57  The presence of these skulls in the kihamba grove is not mentioned by many of the 
earliest accounts of the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro (Johnston 1886; Meyer 1891). It 
was only with those authors who had spent an extended time on Kilimanjaro, such as 
Bruno Gutmann (see Moore 1986: 81-82) and Charles Dundas (1924), that the written 
accounts emerged of the practice of exhumation. One possible reason for this was the 
fear of theft of the skulls by Europeans. The section on “Ethnology” in an 1871 British 
admiralty guide to scientific enquiry advises that a collection of skulls be procured and 
returned to Britain to aid in the study of skull shape (Herschel 1871: 235-236). This 
fear may have been realised; after the public hanging of Mangi Meli, the chief of Old 
Moshi, by the German authorities in 1899, there are reports that the head was taken to 
Germany, prompting calls in 2005 for its repatriation (Tagseth 2010: 18). 
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ancestors many generations past. These markers were not marked by crosses, I was told, 
because the ancestor had not converted to Christianity (Fieldnotes, 6/7/2006). The 
original deaths of these individuals may have dated back to the time that exhumation 
had occurred.  
 
There has also apparently been more recent change to funerals compared to research 
conducted even a few decades ago. Today, they are increasingly understood as closer to 
one-day affairs. As described by Charles Dundas, funerals used to last through four or 
five days of various ceremonies (Dundas 1924: 184). More recently, during the funeral 
that Pietilä researched as being too much of a show of the achievements of the son, 
funerals were marked over the course of several days. Rather than holding a feast only 
on the day following the burial, as was required by custom, the son was criticised for 
providing food and drink on the day of the burial itself. This was deemed to be 
inappropriate by the deceased’s neighbours, making the funeral occasion seem too much 
like a feast (Pietilä 2007: 158). However, during my own research, it was not unusual 
for food and drink to be provided on the day of the funeral itself. The food served 
would include pilau, as well as banana-based dishes and usually chicken. As far as I 
could tell, this was not considered unusual or in poor taste. This may in part have been 
due to the nature of the funerals I attended. With a large migrant population, the 
difficulty of travelling to Kilimanjaro for a long period made longer events marking 
funerals ineffective. For people living and working even in nearby Moshi, a long trip to 
the funeral may have been problematic. This change in the funeral customs may be a 
consequence of a feature noted by Mercer, Page and Evans, that of the pressure of the 
diaspora to modernise burial and funeral customs (Mercer, Page et al. 2008: 157-178). 
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 Christmas in Kilimanjaro 
 
The other occasion that the Chagga are known for returning to Kilimanjaro is at 
Christmastime. Of course, it is hardly unusual  for people from a variety of backgrounds 
to make a visit to a place they consider home during the Christmas period. 
Nevertheless, this is a feature of Chagga identity for which Chagga people are well-
known; the visits are mentioned in some of the academic literature (see, for example, 
Omari 1987: 73; Setel 1996: 1171; Hasu 2009). The Christmas return visits are 
commented upon regularly by both Chagga and non-Chagga people in Tanzania. It is 
sometimes referred jokingly as a “pilgrimage” or even “Haj” (11/12/2005). There is a 
broad understanding that the Chagga are unusual for their desire to return back to 
Kilimanjaro for Christmas. “At Christmas time, the buses to the North will be full”, as 
one respondent put it (Fieldnotes, 28/7/2005). The emphasis that is placed on the 
Christmas visit in the popular discourse in Tanzania is a reflection of the broad 
understanding of Chagga people placing an emphasis on Kilimanjaro and of returning 
there. 
 
There is an understanding amongst Chagga people that the Christmas visit is of 
traditional importance. The Christmas visit, I was told, was traditionally a time when a 
migrant would return to Kilimanjaro to receive the blessings of their parents for a 
successful and prosperous year ahead. The parents would spit in the faces of their 
offspring to give them their blessing (9/8/2005). Spitting was a traditional sign of 
blessing in Kilimanjaro, for example in the past used as a blessing for the household by a 
man at the start of a new day (Lema 1999: 50). I never personally witnessed any 
spitting, but the significance of returning annually remains. 
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Christmas is seen as an opportunity for urban-based Chagga elites to return to 
Kilimanjaro with their children to instil in them moral values. In one instance, I was 
sitting with a group of Chagga elites in Dar es Salaam;  George was describing the visit 
he had made with his teenage son to Kilimanjaro over the course of several months over 
the previous Christmas. At the beginning of December, George did not seem to mind 
that his son had been out late, presumably drinking. However, on one occasion, it was 
the time to do some furrow maintenance as part of Kazi ya Jumatatu. The son, still in 
bed, asked his father, can we not just pay someone to do the work for us? George told 
the group that he explained to his son that this was not the point, and that he should 
learn to do work (Fieldnotes, 1/6/2007). This story told in Dar es Salaam tells of the 
moral lessons George was trying to teach his son during a Christmas visit. However, a 
point did occur to me, that I was unable to raise in the context of an elite group. 
According to the norms of Kazi ya Jumatatu, it was acceptable for those with resources 
to pay rather than perform work. George’s moral lesson to his son about the value of 
work was not a direct reflection of a traditional Chagga culture but rather his attempt 
to teach his own moral lessons. 
 
While the ideal of the Christmas visit may be a time to teach the younger generation 
about the proper moral behaviour of the kihamba belt, in practise the experience of the 
young was often different. It was not uncommon to see teenagers walking around the 
roads of the kihamba belt at Christmastime, missing the comforts of their urban 
lifestyle. The direct clash between an urban-based youth and the older generation in 
Kilimanjaro was evident in some non-elite interactions. On one occasion, I was visiting 
Uru in the company of a non-elite informant. We visited his mother’s house, a small, 
smoke-filled mud-and-wattle house that she shared, according to Chagga tradition, with 
her two cows. She talked to her son about the visit of a niece of his, a young woman 
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who had been sent to visit her. She was complaining at length about the girl’s 
behaviour. She had been spending a lot of her time in local bars, and while alcohol or 
sexual misconduct was not mentioned, she complained that the girl “only cares about 
television… I don’t want to see her again!” (Fieldnotes, 22/4/2006). In terms of elite 
people bringing their children and teenagers to Kilimanjaro for Christmas, I never heard 
any conflicts as vehemently expressed. One possibility for this is that, for the elite, 
Kilimanjaro contains many of the same facilities as Dar es Salaam. There would be no 
need to have conflicts over the television, for example, when the elite homes were 
equipped with many of the necessary amenities. In fact, many young urbanites seemed 
to do well over their Christmas trip (Fieldnotes, January 2006).  
 
Christmas is an occasion that is looked forward to in Kilimanjaro. Spending time in 
Machame, there was clear sense of pride amongst the non-elite population that, come 
Christmas, well-known and influential national figures would be spending time in their 
neighbourhood. Visiting a church in the area, a non-elite expressed pride in the 
achievments of her neighbours: “at Christmas, Reginald Mengi will be sitting there”, she 
said, pointing at a pew (Fieldnotes, 3/10/2006). Thus, Christmas is a time when the 
successful children of Kilimanjaro, for whom their relatives are proud, return to the 
mountainside. It is again, I argue, displaying an interplay of cosmopolitanism and 
localism. It was said that the returning migrants took with them the necessary goods for 
the Christmas celebrations (Fieldnotes 10/1/2006). Principally, this means beer 
(whether mbege or bottled beers) and meat. The returning migrants for the Christmas 
celebrations were not physically bringing back beer and meat; rather, more often than 
not, they were returning with cash to buy these items locally. I argue that for it to be 
said that the migrants are returning with these goods, rather than the money to buy 
them, is placing the act of returning within the sphere of the moral economy rather than 
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the cash one. The interplay of the two spheres is interesting here. It is the achievements 
within the cash economy of the city that enable the returning migrant to purchase the 
goods necessary for Christmas to be celebrated in a suitable, traditional style. Yet it is 
not described in this manner, but is rather described in terms of the moral economy.  
 
As the examples of housing, burial and Christmas illustrate, there are strong and 
important linkages between the elite people of Kilimanjaro. It is in Kilimanjaro that 
there are interesting interplays between the cash and the moral economies. These serve 
to emphasise the importance of Kilimanjaro and the kihamba to Chagga ethnicity. I 
shall now move on to the second half of this chapter, which discusses some of the new 
challenges facing the heart of the Chagga moral economy – Kilimanjaro itself. 
 
Liberalisation in Tanzania  
 
There are a number of new challenges facing Kilimanjaro that are of great concern to 
elites. In the second section of this chapter, I shall discuss the issues connected to land 
shortages, the declining coffee price, and the changing role of education, before 
concluding by discussing one of the ways these issues are addressed by elites through 
local NGOs. Many of these issues are understood as emerging from the process of 
liberalisation of Tanzania’s economy, which I shall now discuss. 
 
By the 1980s, the economy of Tanzania was in a worsening position. Tanzania had 
previously maintained a balance of receiving a large amount of Western aid, on the one 
hand, while maintaining a radical position with regard to the liberation struggles in 
Southern Africa that often undermined the Western position (Biermann and Wagao 
1986: 98). The country’s GDP was shrinking, the government was in permanent deficit 
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and the low levels of exports resulted in a worsening balance of trade (Svendsen 1986: 
71-72). The macroeconomic problems translated into economic hardship for many of 
the citizens of Tanzania58 . The lack of availability of basic goods, by the mid-1980s, had 
become extreme. Basic consumer goods, such as sugar, soap, paraffin and cooking oil, 
were in short supply (Bevan, Collier et al. 1989: 49-51). As an example of the 
difficulties, I present the case of William’s wedding. William, originally from Old 
Moshi, was working as a university lecturer at a provincial university at the time I 
interviewed him in 2005. He got married on the 18th December 1982 in Old Moshi, 
but at the time he was working as a secondary-school teacher in Mbeya, South-West 
Tanzania. At this time William describes the country as “literally under embargo” 
because of the impossibility of importing goods. As the only clothes available were nylon 
clothes from China, William had to go to some lengths to provide clothing that he saw 
as suitable for him and his wife. For his suit, William had a brother in Canada who 
posted him the suit, although he was only able to receive it through a special permit 
from the Regional Commissioner for Mbeya. For his shirt, as the country had no cotton 
clothing available, William went to a Roman Catholic priest and received one that had 
been donated from Europe. His shoes he bought from an Italian living in Morogoro. 
His wife’s dress originated from Russia, brought over by a teacher friend who was 
visiting Russia on holiday. William was clearly a well-connected individual, who had to 
take advantage of his networks in order to receive the clothing he deemed suitable for 
his wedding. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  As with other aspects of the economic history of Tanzania, the impact was not 
uniform. For instance, when the lack of foreign exchange lead to restrictions on the 
amount of cooking oil imported into the country, this resulted in an economic boom 
for the coconut oil producing parts of Mafia Island (Caplan 2007: 684). 
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William also had to go to great lengths to provide for the wedding feast. He had to 
travel to Arusha to buy beer and soft drinks for the wedding. Unlike the drinks available 
in contemporary Tanzania, there were no fizzy soft drinks because of the limitation on 
the import of carbon dioxide, so he had to make do with flat ChemiCola. As he needed 
ten crates, this presented a difficulty as he would be stopped at one of the many 
roadblocks, and transporting such an amount would create difficulties. Therefore, 
William travelled to Arusha with a pastor, who could explain to the police that these 
supplies were needed for a wedding. In order to get ten crates of beer, he had to make 
use of a contact he had working in the brewery in order to get the necessary permit. He 
was also able to get hold of a couple of bottles of Russian vodka, a rare treat at a time 
when there was little in the way of bottled hard spirits. Most of the rest of the supplies 
William purchased in Mbeya. He bought rice, millet, sorghum, batteries, salt, sugar, 
and matches. With the rationing in place, he bought the goods in Mbeya, rather than 
Kilimanjaro, as he was known to the regional authorities in Mbeya. However, he also 
required a permit to move the goods between Mbeya and Kilimanjaro regions. In order 
to get some of these permits, he made use of his contacts with former students. 
 
It took a lot of contacts for William to have a wedding in a fashion that he considered 
suitable. He reported to me that the guests described it as a great wedding. But 
William’s own assessment was that it was “horrible”, because of the shortages of the 
basic goods needed. These were “very difficult times”. Moving goods around Tanzania 
was extraordinarily difficult. In this, he blames the state. William has a strong case for 
doing so. From 1981, the party and the state both began to scapegoat the economic 
malaise on the corrupt practices of “economic saboteurs”, urging a crackdown on black 
marketeers and smugglers (Bryceson 1993: 74-75). However, engagement with the 
black market became almost ubiquitous in Tanzania, particularly in those areas close to 
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borders59 . Tanzanians who got the opportunity to travel abroad were often given lists of 
consumer items to purchase for friends and relatives (Mtei 2009: 163-165). For Chagga 
people, with their long-standing engagement with the market economy, the shortages 
and privations were keenly felt. 
 
Pressures developed within the cabinet and from experts within Tanzania that the 
country had no choice but to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank for assistance, and to liberalise the economy  (Holtom 2005: 560-563). 
For example, Edwin Mtei, a Chagga and Minister of Finance and Planning, was forced 
out of his job in 1979 for, according to his autobiography, advocating further 
negotiations with a visiting IMF team (Mtei 2009: 149-157). Relations between the 
International Monetary Fund and Nyerere were “replete with disaccord and vitriol” 
(Stein 1992: 59). While Nyerere did introduce some limited reforms in the 1984 
budgets, it was becoming increasingly clear that the country would need more wide-
spread reform and help from the International Financial Institutions (Holtom 2005: 
562). 
 
Julius Nyerere voluntarily left the presidency in 1985. Nyerere’s political influence did 
not end with his leaving office. He remained the chair of CCM, and was very much the 
party king-maker until his death in 1999 (ARD 2003: 10). He was influential in the 
establishment of multiparty democracy. Nyerere was replaced as President by Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi, formerly the president of Zanzibar (Nyang'oro 2004: 5). Mwinyi was, 
and still is, referred to as Bwana Ruksa. The Swahili word ruksa refers to permissiveness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  A survey in 1993 revealed that 94% of households in border areas in Tanzania 
engaged in the black market, as opposed to 66% in the interior (Bevan, Collier et al. 
1989: 53). This indicates that cross-border smuggling played an important role in the 
black market. 
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or “do your own thing” (Hyden 1999: 143). This can refer to his weakness as a leader 
(Kjaer 2004: 400), where he showed inexperience and coercion from a variety of 
directions (Holtom 2005: 556). The term also refers to the laissez-faire direction that 
the country took under Mwinyi’s leadership. While it did ultimately alleviate some of 
Tanzania’s immediate economic problems, this shift in economic policy is often 
understood in the literature as occurring in a reckless, almost lawless fashion that 
resulted in a large increase in corruption (Hyden 1999: 143; Heilman and Ndumbaro 
2002; ARD 2003: 3).  
 
In the African context, the introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies is frequently 
understood as undermining social cohesion, resulting in increased ethnic, regional and 
religious tensions. J. ’Bayo Adekanye argues that in many African states, the rolling back 
of the state that SAP policies brought led to “a marked retreat away from the state and 
behind the psycho-socially protective shield of ethnic and religious identities and 
conflicts” (Adekanye 1995: 365). While Adekanye argues that the ethnically diverse 
ethnic composition of Tanzania has mediated many of these factors, Paul Kaiser (1996) 
develops Adekanye’s argument to conclude that social unity in Tanzania has “demised”. 
As shall be developed in the next chapter, reports of the demise of social unity have 
been exaggerated. Nevertheless, liberalisation has brought great social change to 
Tanzania. An issue that has been identified is that the liberalisation of the economy left 
much of the population unprepared: “the majority African community, bound by 
ujamaa leadership code restrictions, was less prepared for a privatization process that 
required a familiarity with the assumptions of a competitive, potentially lucrative, 
private sector environment” (Kaiser 2001: 96). Kaiser argues that this was to the benefit 
of members of the Asian business community. Another group in a position to take 
advantage of the new opportunities were the Chagga elite, who had experience working 
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in more capitalist communities abroad, or in parastatals within Tanzania. More broadly 
than the elite, “the era of liberalization was largely accepted among the Chagga with 
celebration as a time of freedom regained for material and political pursuits” (Pietilä 
2007: 4).  
  
Land shortages and vihamba 
 
Kilimanjaro, or more specifically the kihamba, remains a desirable place for most 
Chagga: a place to visit for Christmas, a place to retire to, a place to be buried. Yet 
there is also a strong sense that Kilimanjaro is facing a crisis. This is of great moral 
concern; as one informant said, “A lot of important people in Chagga [pre-
independence] history have died recently. This is because of the collapse in the coffee 
price… they used to have big farms, and so had lots of food, and there was little tension 
within society. But this has changed” (Fieldnotes, 28/7/2005). The problems facing 
Kilimanjaro are not only economic, they tie closely to the social and moral environment 
as well. 
  
The key question in Kilimanjaro is the availability of kihamba land. The kihamba belt is 
one of the most densely populated rural areas of Tanzania. Kilimanjaro Region has a 
population density of 151 people per square kilometre, one of the highest in Tanzania 
(Mbonile 2006: 119). The kihamba belt has been described by Moore as a “rururb”, a 
rural area with an urban-like population density (Moore 1986: 110). The population of 
Kilimanjaro Region has increased with time, growing from just over a quarter of a 
million people in 1948, to over half a million by 1967, and over 1.3 million by the time 
of the 2002 census (Mbonile 2006: 118). The amount of kihamba land available is 
limited by altitude and climate. The plains are unsuitable for the production of bananas 
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and coffee; the forests on the higher slopes are protected not only as part of the colonial 
inventions of the National Park and forest reserve (Misana 2006: 237) but also through 
sacred ritual (Clack 2009: 334). As a result, there is a limited amount of land suitable 
for kihamba production. 
 
Concern about the population has a long history. The idea that Kilimanjaro was in 
some sense full is a common one amongst European colonialists, and even earlier. As 
early as 1884, when Harry Johnston was staying in the chiefdom of Chief Rindi and 
growing particularly tired of “being in the power of and subjected to the capricious 
interference of an African tyrant”, Johnston revealed that he could not simply move to 
an uninhabited area of the mountain as “there is no habitable part of Kilimanjaro without 
ownership” (emphasis in original) (Johnston [1884], cited in Oliver 1957: 62). It is not 
altogether clear whether Johnston is talking about individual ownership or whether he 
is referring to the fact that all of the mountain is under the influence of one chief or 
another. Entering into the colonial period, there was a constant concern about the 
availability of land in the kihamba belt. While the German colonialists initially believed 
that there was sufficient land for European settlement and farming, by 1907 they had 
decided not to alienate any further land from this area (Iliffe 1979: 144-145). The 
British colonialists were very concerned about population growth and land shortages, as 
the Provincial commissioner commented in 1937: “there will be few instances where we 
can allow alienation [of land in Kilimanjaro], owing to the extreme congestion of the 
Chagga tribe in the lands they now occupy” (Hallier 1937: 5). By 1952, land was 
becoming scarce, making it increasingly difficult for places for new vihamba to be found 
(Munger 1952: 181-182). Land, and the return of land alienated by the Germans, 
became one of the key political issues surrounding the creation of the Paramount Chief, 
as outlined in Chapter 3. By the 1960s, the mountainside was considered so crowded 
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that one commentator concluded that it was necessary for Chagga to leave Kilimanjaro, 
“This they must do if they are to maintain a minimal standard of living in the future” 
(Lindsey 1965: 97). By the 1980s, even the rich “know that there is not enough land for 
their own sons” (Moore 1986: 308). Concern that the Chagga people lack land has run 
through the generations. 
 
Despite the fact that concerns over the availability of kihamba land have a long 
historical precedence, there is an increasing understanding that the mountain faces a 
looming crisis. “It falls on our generation”, said a successful insurance seller named 
Samuel, currently living in Moshi town (Fieldnotes, 22/03/2006). Samuel’s father had 
one daughter and five sons, including Samuel, from his first wife, and he later remarried 
and had another three sons and one daughter. His father had a “large [kihamba] plot”, 
that would allow his father’s sons to inherit “at least a small plot, enough to build a 
house”. As opposed to the traditional norms of land inheritance, in which only the 
eldest and youngest sons were obliged to be provided for, Samuel’s father wanted to 
provide for all of his sons. This was through a sense of fairness, and a belief that all of his 
sons should be treated equally. Samuel’s father went to some lengths to ensure that he 
had enough kihamba land for all of his sons:  
When my father was given his land, only part of it was growing 
bananas and coffee, the rest was growing maize. So, when my 
father began having a family, he saw that it was important to 
have a kihamba for each of his sons, land that grew bananas and 
coffee. So he expanded the amount of his land in which he grew 
bananas and coffee, so that his children would have a kihamba 
with bananas and coffee to inherit. 
 
So it is possible to extend the land available for vihamba, but only to a certain extent. In 
previous decades, the land on the kihamba belt not used for homegardens – such as 
grazing areas, sweet potato fields, and masale groves set aside for burials and sacrifices – 
have gradually been converted into vihamba (Soini 2005b: 313).  
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While Samuel was able to inherit a kihamba suitable for the construction of a house and 
some farming, he had deep concerns about whether he would be able to provide enough 
land for his children. At the time that I interviewed him, he had a four-year old son and 
an infant daughter, and was expecting to have more children in the future. In a further 
move away from norms of land inheritance, Samuel also told me that he would want his 
daughter as well as his son to inherit a kihamba. As his daughter was only an infant, 
whether this will actually occur, and how this would sit with other members of the 
lineage, remains to be seen. In any event, the problems with land shortages, as Samuel 
sees them, “falls on [Samuel’s] generation”. 
 
Samuel’s case is far from unique; concern is widespread about the shortage of available 
land. It also illustrates how the holdings of land-rich Chagga of the past soon dilute into 
minimal holdings for their descendants today. Another example is David, from Uru. 
David works as a teacher, and while this is an educated and respected profession, he is 
far from a wealthy man. His father, however, had a large amount of kihamba land. 
Because he had a lot of land, as David tells the story, his father decided to take a second 
wife in addition to his first. This was not so unusual in the past, as land-rich men would 
occasionally take a second, or more, wives, if they felt that they had enough land to 
provide each with a suitable kihamba (Wimmelbücker 2002: 175-177). However, 
polygamy was strongly discouraged by the Christian churches. When David’s father 
converted to Christianity, probably in the 1940s or very early fifties, he was strongly 
encouraged to move away from polygymy. Therefore David’s father’s first wife became 
his one and only wife, and his second wife was left only with a small kihamba, too small 
for her children to inherit (Fieldnotes, 22/3/2006). As the kihamba sizes decrease, land-
rich peasants were increasingly in a less advantageous position. Particularly in the cases 
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of those who chose, like David’s father, to have large families, with the land pressures in 
Kilimanjaro the reproduction of the land-rich peasants became problematic. 
  
The question arises: how can Kilimanjaro be facing a severe land shortage and crisis for 
almost a century? Stanley Kessi (23/3/2005) made to me the argument that the land 
problems highlighted in the archival sources were different to the current crisis faced by 
the Chagga land shortages. He argued that the colonial sources were referring to the 
fact that Kilimanjaro had no land left in the kihamba belt that was not settled, whereas 
today’s issue had become that individual kihamba sizes had declined to the point that 
they were no longer viable to farm. However, as far back as 1948, kihamba sizes, not 
just the availability of unsettled land, were a concern to the colonial authorities (Iliffe 
1979: 347-348). There is plenty of concern in the extensive livelihoods literature on 
Kilimanjaro that the kihamba belt faces genuine difficulties with declining plot sizes 
(see, for example, Soini 2005a; Soini 2005b; Devenne, Chapuis et al. 2006). Eija Soini’s 
survey finds average kihamba sizes of under 0.6 hectares, and concludes, “Farms have 
been subdivided to the point that under present management most of them are too 
small to sustain a family. Some of the plots have just enough space for a house and 
cannot function as farms any more” (Soini 2005a: 165). It is clear that there are genuine 
and pressing problems facing families attempting to make a living from farming in 
Kilimanjaro. 
 
Yet there is also a large nostalgic element to the understandings of Chagga elite towards 
the past generations. There is an understanding of the past in which land and cattle 
were plentiful. The kihamba system remains one of the most powerful aspects of the 
moral economy of Kilimanjaro. Kihamba land cannot be freely bought and sold. The 
ideal remains to keep it within the lineage. As such, kihamba ownership would ideally 
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be placed firmly in the realm of the moral economy, away from the cash economy. 
While this may act as an ideal, it is one that is not always reached. In practice, cash 
wealth plays a large role in kihamba inheritance. Many of those wealthier in cash terms 
seemed to have larger kihamba plots, or even multiple vihamba. This creates an irony in 
that those with access to the most land are those with access to other sources of 
income, and as such economically need the land least. 
 
Similarly to the pressure on land, another important aspect of the moral economy that 
is understood as facing a decline is that of cattle. As discussed above, cattle slaughtering 
ceremonies remain a key aspect of lineage life. While meat is available from butchers’ 
shops, there is a decline in the number of cows owned by Chagga people and suitable 
for lineage feasting. In traditional houses, cattle were kept inside the owner’s house 
(Dundas 1924: 266-269). Even in the 1920s, there was a lack of available grazing in the 
kihamba belt (ibid.: 266). Collecting fodder from the lower slopes was a considerable 
labour, most usually performed by women (Wimmelbücker 2002: 56-57). These 
themes of cattle ownership extend to today. Cattle are kept in stalls, with zero grazing. 
As with the housing for humans, the quality of these stalls can vary greatly. The 
availability of suitable fodder is an issue that certainly continues. As an example below 
illustrates, the shortage of available fodder continues to be of relevance. 
 
There is a perceived decline in the numbers of cattle kept in Kilimanjaro over the 
decades. For example, Tom, just turned 30, had a father from Masama but had spent 
most of his life in Morogoro and Moshi town. He remembers fondly of how, as a child, 
he would visit his paternal grandfather in Masama. Tom tells of how his grandfather had 
many cattle: “When we were visiting, my grandfather would ask us to ‘pick a cow’, and 
he would slaughter it. It was only because we were visiting, not because it was 
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Christmas or a wedding” (Fieldnotes, 29/3/2007). There is an understanding that times 
have changed, and that the past was a time when resources such as cattle were 
abundant. Like land, cattle plays a key role in the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. No 
amount of inputs from the cash economy can replace those resources. There are also 





A key aspect of the kihamba system is coffee production. Note how David, above, used 
the phrase “coffee and bananas” as synonymous with kihamba. Coffee has historically 
been a hugely important cash crop for Chagga people. It not only led to the 
development of capitalism in Kilimanjaro, and the Chagga “cultural commitment” to 
the market (Moore 1986: 129), it also shaped the politics and development schemes of 
past decades. “Politics used to be about coffee” (Fieldnotes, 28/12/05). In 1993, the 
coffee market was liberalised in Tanzania, with private buyers being allowed for the first 
time (Ponte 2004). Thus, the KNCU no longer had the monopoly it had previously 
enjoyed as either a Chagga-run or state-run organ. While this has resulted in growers 
receiving a higher percentage of the export price of the coffee crop, there is evidence 
that it has not increased yields and has possibly led to a decrease in quality (Ponte 
2004: 619; Itika 2005: 48-49). Stefano Ponte argues that the end of national ownership 
of key assets and markets such as coffee “undermines the legitimacy of the state and of 
public regulation in Africa” (Ponte 2004: 632-633). The problem with this argument is 
that national ownership of the KNCU was considered within Kilimanjaro to be 
disastrous. National ownership itself was problematic and did little to help the state’s 
legitimacy in Kilimanjaro at least. 
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Despite the historical importance, there was a common refrain during my fieldwork 
present on Kilimanjaro: there is no money any more in coffee. The common comments 
were that, while a Chagga may have had many coffee trees, “I am planning to uproot 
them because they do not make money these days” (for example, Fieldnotes 
28/7/2005). Inputs, it was argued, have grown too expensive, while the price was 
consistently low. It was suggested that Chagga people were searching for a new cash 
crop; many were thinking of starting to grow vanilla. This provided potentially a better 
income, yet was difficult and expensive to start to grow (Fieldnotes, 30/6/2007).  
 
While the overall quality of coffee may have declined following liberalisation, there has 
been a growth in elite gourmet coffees. For example, the Association of Kilimanjaro 
Speciality Coffee Growers (AKSCG) was formed in 2002, representing an aim to 
produce higher quality speciality coffees, which can reach prices 65% higher at auction 
than lower-quality coffees (Linton 2008: 241). There is a potential for coffee from 
Kilimanjaro in this market, in large part due to the hold that the mountain continues to 
have on the Western imagination. I have examined the coffee range available from one 
provider, Cafedirect (2008), and found that their most expensive range is their gourmet 
organic Fair Trade range. The coffees in this range are all named after the landscapes 
from which the coffee originated, all evocative and exotic: Mount Elgon, Cloud Forest – 
“the misty highlands surrounding the ancient Mayan city of Palenque” and of course 
Mount Kilimanjaro, “the rich volcanic soils of Mount Kilimanjaro”. It is my 
understanding that just as the mountains and highlands attracted the European 
explorers in previous centuries, now it attracts the European shopper in a supermarket. 
Caroline Wright makes the observation that the advertising campaign of Cafédirect did 
not focus upon the human labour involved in coffee production, but rather “the 
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suggestion is that geography and weather do most of the work” (Wright 2004: 668). 
The production of such coffees has been criticised as being dominated by the wealthier 
farmers, rather than the poorer members of the community (BBC 2005). 
 
Despite the constant concern about the coffee price, however, the numbers of people 
who have actually stopped growing coffee are small. Even though many people were 
talking of stopping growing coffee, few have done so. An exception was Joseph. Earning 
a good wage from his employment, Joseph also had a large kihamba, over 13 acres. As 
the only son of his father, he inherited the entirety of his landholdings. Joseph grew the 
usual crops in his kihamba: bananas, vegetables and masale. Up until a few years ago, he 
also grew coffee. However, he realised that the coffee was not profitable. Instead of 
replacing the coffee with another conventional cash crop for international export, 
Joseph started to grow grass to sell to local farmers for fodder for their cattle. He told 
me that he made more money selling fodder to his neighbours than he could from 
producing coffee (Fieldnotes 30/8/2006). 
 
The very fact that Chagga people are talking about uprooting their coffee trees tells us 
something about the role of coffee in the moral economy. It raises the issue of how 
coffee has been appropriated by Chagga people. Jigal Beez (2003) examines the far more 
recent introduction of rice cultivation through a Japanese irrigation project. Beez argues 
that, while rice production has been accepted economically by those involved in the 
project, it has not been appropriated in the culinary or ritual spheres. While rice-based 
dishes are not uncommon, for example the eating of pilau at celebrations and festive 
occasions, rice from Mbeya is far preferred by Chagga people to the rice from 
Kilimanjaro. Similarly, rice has yet to be appropriated in the ritual sphere; it is not used 
for brewing, nor is it suitable for offerings to ancestors. A similar argument could be 
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made for coffee. The willingness of Chagga farmers to even consider uprooting their 
trees as they were no longer profitable indicates that coffee remains firmly in the 
economic sphere and the cash economy. Coffee does not have a ritual role in 
Kilimanjaro. It is by no means necessarily the case that a cash-crop does not enter the 
ritual realm; in Buhaya, for example, coffee beans are considered suitable for sacrifice 
(Carlson 1990: 303-304). In Kilimanjaro, coffee has never taken on that role. For a 
crop that has been grown since the beginning of the twentieth century, and is 
recognised for having such a strong developmental role, it is remarkable that it is not of 
ritual importance. Beez speculates that, in a few generations, it is possble that “the 
ancestors will expect a feast of pilau.” (Beez 2003: 6). Given the slow rate of 
appropriation of coffee, I would suggest that this will not be the case. 
 
The Changing Role of Education 
 
Since the colonial period, it was education that gave the Chagga elite their great 
advantage. There were fears expressed during my fieldwork, however, that this is 
changing. The concern about education in Kilimanjaro extends to the changing role of 
schools in the region itself, particularly private schools. During the period of ujamaa 
socialism and Education for Self Reliance, there were restrictions on the opening of 
private schools in Tanzania. However, through a variety of methods outlined by Samoff 
(1987), in Kilimanjaro there was a huge growth in the number of private schools60 . By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  As an important aspect of ESR was political education, which was absent from the 
private schools, then there was theoretically a political gulf between students in the 
public and private sector. However, in practical terms, the political education in 
Tanzania has been analysed by various sources as being weak. This is in terms of the 
content and teaching of formal siasa (politics) classes (Cooksey 1986: 191); self-reliant 
activities such as school farms (ibid.: 191); and attempts to introduce less authoritarian 
and hierarchical teaching methods (Harber 1988: 200). Given these weaknesses in the 
political education, it is difficult to conclude that there would necessarily be a large 
political difference between students who had been to public and private schools. 
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the mid-1970s, Kilimanjaro had more private than government secondary schools. 42% 
of all the private secondary schools in the country, and a quarter of all secondary 
schools, were in Kilimanjaro (ibid.: 341). Even after the end of ESR, Kilimanjaro has 
maintained a tradition of non-governmental secondary education. The region still has 
the largest number of both public and private secondary schools in the country, with 74 
non-governmental and 57 governmental secondary schools (Chediel, Sekwao et al. 
2000: 18). Indeed, seminaries remain a popular choice for parents, as seminaries 
retained their independence throughout the socialist period and were never 
nationalised. 
 
There is a concern, however, that the schools of Kilimanjaro are not being used to 
educate local children. “Nowadays, many parents elsewhere in the country send their 
children to school in Kilimanjaro. So, the education sector will be another economic 
base for Kilimanjaro – it will provide employment and housing. Parents want to send 
their children to Kilimanjaro because the climate is attractive for education” 
(Emmanuel, Fieldnotes, 15/1/2006). The landscape of Kilimanjaro is thus here 
described as a key aspect of the desirability of non-Chagga families to send their 
children to be educated there. Other informants were far more worried by this 
development. Edward, a retired teacher, said: “the belief that Chagga are well-educated 
is not always the case – Kilimanjaro has many schools but they are three-quarters full of 
non-Chagga from other regions. Schools are set up for income generation purposes, to 
address the problems of the decline in the coffee price” (Fieldnotes, 16/8/2005). 
Edward sees a concern that the brightest of the Chagga youth are not seeking formal 
education, but are rather pursuing the opportunities in the private sector. 
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Edward is concerned that private schools are nowadays being run for entrepreneurial 
reasons rather than for the benefit of local children. However, it was the case during 
ESR that private schools had to ensure that 25% of their intake was from outside of the 
region in which they were situated (Samoff 1987: 345). Furthermore, Emmanuel argues 
that having members of other ethnic groups studying in Kilimanjaro is a positive 
development for the promotion of good relations between Chagga and other ethnic 
groups in Tanzania. He calls for an increased effort to promote people from other 
regions to come to Kilimanjaro to study, particularly in the elite colleges present in the 
region including the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC) and the College of 





I shall now discuss one of the elite responses to the perceived problems faced by 
Kilimanjaro, the establishment of local NGOs. One of the features of Tanzanian 
politics that has received attention in the recent literature is that of the post-
liberalisation emergence of local NGOs since the mid-1980s and their role in national 
politics (Kiondo 1995; Kelsall 2000; Mercer, Page et al. 2008). These processes are 
outlined by Gibbon: 
As the middle class has ceased to be able to reproduce itself 
economically through the state, so its members have been 
obliged to mobilize resources (private and public) from ethnic, 
sub-ethnic and clan sources. For the middle classes remaining 
‘at home’ this means a closer economic relation to those in the 
[urban] diaspora, while for those in the diaspora it implies an 
increased dependence on certain resources from home. The 
consequence is that the middle class ceases to be reproduced as 
a socio-economic category on the national plane, but becomes 
vertically fragmented through a process of ‘ balkanisation’. 
(Gibbon, cited in Kelsall 2000: 549-550) 
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Local development trusts, and the development levies they charge, are understood 
within this body of literature of being the new source of elite power in Tanzania. 
 
However, viewing these developments from the Chagga perspective, I would argue that 
there is less new in these organisations than the literature would suggest. The historical 
role of the coffee cooperative, the KNCU, has many similarities with the newer 
organisations elsewhere in Tanzania. Local development levies have an antecedent in 
the coffee cess charged to all coffee farmers in Kilimanjaro by the KNCU. The coffee 
cess was the tax charged on coffee sales. It was this tax that filled the treasury of the 
Chagga Council in the 1950s, and paid for the schools, roads and dispensaries across the 
mountainside (Moore 1986: 129). The use of a coffee cess to fund development 
projects continued after the abolition of the Chagga Council; a coffee tax was collected 
at the village-level in the 1970s (ibid.: 127), and was used to fund nongovernmental 
school projects in the 1980s (Samoff 1987: 343). Nevertheless, the scale of the 
development projects of the 1950s was far greater. The cosmopolitan achievements of 
this era, such as the KNCU Coffee Tree Hotel in Moshi, stand as concrete reminders of 
this. The Chagga Council and the KNCU were the most developed examples of such 
ethnic organisations in colonial Tanzania, and as outlined previously in this thesis stood 
as examples to other ethnic groups in the country. It is the case that Kilimanjaro has a 
history that differs from much of the rest of Tanzania in respect of having a long history 
of a locally-funded developmental organisation on this scale. 
 
Nevertheless, there are many NGOs that have sprung in Kilimanjaro following 
liberalisation. The KNCU is in nowhere near the position it was in the 1950s, having 
lost its monopoly following the liberalisation of the coffee trade. There are 
developmental organisations at all levels in Kilimanjaro. In Marangu, an example of this 
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was started by Mama Itosi. Upon returning to Tanzania, “Things were so bad that I 
couldn’t go back to teaching. I opted to come and live back in Marangu.” Rather than 
entering private business, she became a farmer, as she put it, and also became involved 
in church and women’s groups. She and her husband were also involved in the 
establishment of an opposition party, CHADEMA. As such, while not entering the 
business sector, Mama Itosi did take advantage of the new political spaces that opened 
up with the liberalisation of the political and economic spheres in Tanzania. Arriving 
back in 1984 gave the returning migrants a head start in establishing themselves 
following liberalisation in Tanzania. By the mid-90s, Mama Itosi had become involved 
in voluntary work with church and women’s groups. In particular, she became chair of 
the Marangu Community Development Association. This was an organisation 
established in the mid-1990s “to steer development”. Mama Itosi describes this time: 
“Everything had more or less collapsed. So this association worked hard on the 
environment, through projects like tree nurseries, supported through donor support 
from the US and Germany”. They also run clean water projects, support student 
through high schools and help Church-run nursery schools. 
 
One of the Development Association’s projects is producing energy-efficient clay ovens. 
The availability of firewood is an issue in the kihamba belt. The ovens that the 
Association were promoting were made out of clay. Mount Kilimanjaro lacks clay. This 
is an issue that has a very long historical background, as some of the earliest trade with 
people beyond the mountainside was trading with nearby areas for clay (Moore 1977a: 
7). For the clay ovens in Marangu, the clay has to be brought in from Mwanga, in the 
neighbouring Pare Mountains. 
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Other such organisations exist across Kilimanjaro, operating at different levels. As 
depicted in the literature, members of the Chagga elite have a strong involvement with 
these organisations. Reginald Mengi, one of Tanzania’s most notable businessmen from 
Machame, has had involvement in a number of these organisations. Mengi made large 
contributions to the Hai Education Trust Fund, an organisation that provides 
equipment, and renovates schools in Hai district (Kiondo 1995: 131). Mengi has also 
had heavy involvement with the Kilimanjaro Region Development Fund (KDF). This 
organisation is a regional body, concerning itself with development in the Kilimanjaro 
Region. Other prominent Chagga involved in the organisation included Basil Mramba 
and Thomas Marealle (Haonga 2005b). Addressing a meeting of the KDF, Mengi urged 
people from Kilimanjaro to use their entrepreneurial mindset to accelerate economic 
development in Kilimanjaro Region: “We have reached a level where some of us have 
nothing impressive to show at our places of birth, in terms of sustained education 
excellence and utilisation of natural resources” (Mengi, cited in Haonga 2005a). As 
such, these types of organisations operate on a variety of levels. They operate below the 
district level, such as the Marangu Development Association, at district level, and at 
regional level. However, none of the organisations are co-extensive with the Chagga 
ethnic group. They are either concerned with areas smaller than the Chagga area, or in 
the case of the KDF a broader area. This agrees with the findings of Mercer, Page and 
Evans, whose descriptions of hometown organisations in Tanzania as not being entirely 
delineated by ethnic group (Mercer, Page et al. 2008: 233). 
 
The relationship between ethnicity and such organisations is also a question that has to 
be raised. Kelsall (2000: 550) describes the involvement of what he describes as “ethnic 
‘trust funds’” in Meru. In the case of Kilimanjaro, however, the link between ethnicity 
and these organisations is by no means clear. As far as I could tell, there are none that 
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are co-extensive with Chagga ethnicity. The possibility occurred to me that the KDF 
was secretly a Chagga organisation, promoting Chagga interests. This was denied by 
individuals involved in the KDF, who emphasised that members of other ethnicities 
from Kilimanjaro Region were involved in the organisation (Fieldnotes, 23/8/2005). 
Non-Chagga from Kilimanjaro Region were involved in senior roles in the organisation, 
for example former Prime Minister Cleopa Msuya (Haonga 2005a). Kelsall’s fears of 
ethnic trust funds being the basis of a new emergence of ethnic conflict within Tanzania 
seem to be not the case in Kilimanjaro. This is possibly a consequence of the social 
position that the Chagga elite play in Tanzania: for a group that has remained in an 
economically powerful position, and operates across the nation, an association with the 
taboo subject of tribalism is not in their interests. For other ethnic groups, particularly 
those in a weaker position, the dynamics may very well be different. 
 
Within the literature on these organisations, the involvement of elite individuals in 
establishing, running and funding district development NGOs is treated with suspicion. 
Kelsall (2000: 550) describes ethnically-based trust funds as “dominated by local elites 
with links to nationally influential kin and in some cases foreign donors. They are 
sources of money, influence, and politicking.” Similarly, Kiondo (1995: 166-167) 
expresses caution that the elite involvement in such organisations mean that they are 
purely a source of patronage. Elite involvement, it would seem, becomes equated with 
elites seeking only to develop and maintain their own powerbases. This presentation is 
similar to that criticised by Werbner of elites portrayed in a universally pessimistic light. 
 
That is not to say that the role of elites in development projects should not be 
problematised. Such projects are not the focus of this thesis. There is an issue to be 
raised, for example, when international NGOs’ conceptions of empowerment serve 
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mainly to empower an elite rather than the broader population (Kelsall and Mercer 
2003: 302-303). Another potential concern is that, with Tanzanian elites beginning to 
focus on their home areas, this would disproportionately benefit Kilimanjaro in 
comparison to other parts of Tanzania. These types of concerns are genuine issues 
surrounding elite involvement in local NGOs. However, attempts to address these 
concerns is not well served by taking as the starting point the assumption that elites are 




This chapter illustrated how Kilimanjaro itself is of great importance to people of 
Chagga ethnicity. Elite tend to spend a large amount of their time away from 
Kilimanjaro, yet maintain their links through the building of houses, attending funerals, 
and for Christmas visits. The moral economy of Kilimanjaro plays a very important role 
for the Chagga elites. Because of this, the perceived crises in Kilimanjaro over land, 
cattle and coffee strike at the heart of Chagga understandings of themselves. While 
liberalisation brought new economic opportunities, and opportunities in the field of 
local NGOs, it also brought with it new problems. There is a fear amongst some that 
the younger generation are not seeking the education that was the passport for the older 
generation to their elite status. 
 
In terms of how local elite powerbases may have changed, it is necessary to examine the 
political liberalisation of Tanzania. That is the subject of the next chapter. Through an 
examination of the 2005 General Election in Tanzania, it sheds light on the role of 
ethnicity in contemporary Tanzania. While ethnicity does play a role in electoral 
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politics, the next chapter argues that the literature on Tanzanian politics that 
emphasised the collapse of national unity do not give an accurate account.
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Following the liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a liberalisation 
of Tanzanian politics. In 1992, in a top-down democratisation process, opposition 
political parties were legalised61 . However, CCM62 , the successor party to TANU, 
which has run Tanzania since independence, remains the dominant party. Tanzania has 
now had four multiparty general elections: 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Victory in the 
presidential elections for CCM has never been in serious doubt. Nevertheless, an 
examination of electoral politics provides an insight into the role of ethnicity in 
contemporary Tanzania. 
 
With the introduction of multipartyism in Tanzania, the establishing of parties based 
along ethnic, religious or regional lines was prohibited. CCM was already a party with 
broad national appeal, and it is not only the legal prohibition that prevents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  This was a reintroduction of multiparty democracy. Before the introduction of a one-
party state in 1964, opposition parties were in existence but largely ineffectual 
compared to the dominant power of TANU (Brennan 2005). The parties of the post-
1992 reintroduction of multiparty democracy do not seem to have any direct links with 
those of the pre-1964 system. 
62  In 1977, the sole mainland party TANU merged with its Zanzibari counterpart, the 
Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – The Party of the 
Revolution. The constitution of the new party marked a change in direction for the 
party. It was no longer to be a mass membership party, but rather closer to a vanguard, 
adhering to an already constructed socialist ideology (Whitehead 2009: 270) 
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formation of new ethnically-based political parties. There are also demographic 
concerns, but most important is the great value placed upon national unity. This is a 
discourse that CCM has been able to utilise in its own campaigns. Tanzanian politics 
stand distinct from some other countries in the region. In Kenya, for instance, Gabrielle 
Lynch (2006: 61) argues that politics is seen by Kenyans themselves and outsiders alike 
as “view[ed]… through an ethnic lens”, even when this distorts other possible 
dimensions of politics. In Tanzania, where the role of ethnicity is very different, it is also 
too easy to present a candidate’s loss or victory as purely a result of ethnic factors. 
Ethnicity matters, but not in stark black and white terms. 
 
This chapter seeks to examine the role of ethnicity in contemporary Tanzania through 
an examination of the Presidential aspirations of two Chagga candidates: Augustine 
Mrema in the 1995 election, and Freeman Mbowe in the 2005 elections. Mrema from 
Vunjo, Kilimanjaro, a CCM minister until he left the party to join the opposition party 
NCCR-Mageuzi months before the election, was a popular candidate with the working 
classes and youth both within and outside of Kilimanjaro. Nationally, he was by far the 
most popular opposition candidate, and arguably came close to causing an upset until 
Nyerere entered the campaign trail to secure victory for CCM’s candidate, Benjamin 
Mkapa. The second candidate who is a focus of this chapter is Freeman Mbowe in the 
2005 election, from Machame in Kilimanjaro. Unlike Mrema, Mbowe did not emerge 
out of CCM but was a successful businessman. The party he represented, Chama cha 
Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party of Democracy and Development), CHADEMA, is in 
many ways a product of elite Chagga retirees. Despite a strong campaign, Mbowe’s 
performance in the election was a disappointment to CHADEMA. The study of these 
two candidates provides an interesting framework for examining the role of ethnicity in 
Tanzanian elections. Even though they did not present themselves as such, both were 
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understood to an extent to be a “Chagga candidate”. Yet, while Mrema drew his main 
support base from a disenchanted underclass, Mbowe drew much from a more elite, 
retiree background; in short, the Chagga elite that have been discussed in this thesis. 
 
Social Unity in Tanzania 
 
From the 1990s, a series of academic articles has argued that the strains of economic 
liberalisation have put strains on Tanzania’s lauded national unity (Hartmann 1991; 
Kaiser 1996; Campbell 1999; Kelsall 2000). Paul Kaiser (1996) writes of the “demise” 
of social unity in Tanzania, a word also used by John Campbell (Campbell 1999: 106): 
In a climate of political and economic liberalisation, 
Tanzanians are increasingly confronting one another in social, 
economic and political arenas on unequal terms, the perception 
of which feeds into increasing efforts, especially by the elite, to 
organise on the basis of ideas about ethnicity and religion to 
secure or preserve advantage. 
 
 Kelsall (2000: 550) argues that struggles over resources in Tanzania increasingly 
resulted in the mobilisation of popular forces that “are commonly couched in an ethnic 
and religious idiom”. Some of these authors present analyses of the political situation 
which are not in-depth. Kaiser (1996: 234-235), for instance, argues that ethnic 
differences are coming to the fore in Tanzanian politics, and cites as his main evidence 
for this the performance of Mrema in the 1995 campaign outside of Kilimanjaro. I argue 
that this analysis is somewhat simplistic, as shall be seen. 
 
The concern is that the strains of economic liberalisation will lead multiparty 
democracy to be expressed along lines of ethnic, religious or other division. For 
example, the Tanzanian journalist Godfrey Mwakikagile (2004: 31) argues that 
multiparty democracies in Africa essentially establish themselves along ethnic lines. Even 
in Tanzania, where all parties stand on a national platform, the very fact that they 
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garner most of their support from their home regions indicates they are ethnic in 
character. Citing the broad range of ethnically-based parties, Mwakikagile (2004: 33) 
concludes that multiparty democracy “really means multiparty tribalism”. However, I 
argue that ethnicity did not suddenly appear as an electoral issue in 1992 with the 
introduction of multipartyism. There is evidence that it had a role to play during 
Tanzania’s one-party elections. Tanzania has had thirty years of single-party 
competitive elections, in which ethnicity would sometimes play a role. For example, 
Nsilo Swai’s election in Arusha in 1965, as detailed in Chapter Four, had elements of 
religion and ethnicity playing a role in that campaign. Similarly, Chagga people have 
always valued having people of Chagga ethnicity in the powerful positions that had 
control over their lives. The people of Vunjo valued having a Minister for Education, 
Solomon Eliufoo, as their MP (Mramba 1967: 118).  
 
Nevertheless, there were indeed some concerning developments in Tanzania during the 
early 1990s that added to the picture that social unity was under threat. Campbell 
(1999: 111) draws attention to the case of Reverend Christopher Mtikila, a non-
Chagga firebrand preacher and politician. Throughout 1993 and 1994, Mtikila made a 
series of sermons in which he accused the Asian community of dominating the economy 
at the expense of the indigenous Africans (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002: 6). In an 
opinion poll in the early 1990s, he was the most popular politician in the country after 
Nyerere (Kaiser 1996: 233). Mtikila remains active in Tanzanian politics, but is a much 
reduced figure. His Democratic Party was finally allowed registration in 2002, enabling 
Mtikila to stand for the presidency in the 2005 elections. However, far from bringing 
the issues of indigenisation to the fore as argued by Ronald Aminzade (2003: 61-62), I 
note that Mtikila and the DP made hardly any impact during the 2005 polls, and he 
received less than 0.3% of the vote. Also in the early 1990s, there was a series of 
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incidents that raised the tensions between Christians and Muslims, including the 1994 
destruction of pork butcheries in Dar es Salaam (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 695). 
Nevertheless, as this chapter will illustrate, I argue that peace and stability are still 
strongly valued in Tanzania. 
 
The Nyalali Commission and the Introduction of Multipartyism 
 
The liberalisation of the political system, and the move to multiparty democracy in 
Tanzania, was the very model of a top-down process. The key force in the move to 
multiparty democracy was Julius Nyerere, the architect of Tanzania’s one-party state. 
Stepping down as President in 1985, Nyerere had remained chair of CCM and 
remained very influential in the transition to multiparty democracy and the first election 
itself. Some authors point to the collapse of the one-party regimes in Eastern Europe, 
and that this led Nyerere to argue that a transition to multiparty democracy would be 
inevitable (Hyden 1999; Prokopenko 2005). However, if we reflect on the character of 
Nyerere, it is problematic to put too much weight on Western influence. Consider 
Nyerere’s record: from supporting Southern African liberation movements to rejecting 
IMF conditionalities, Nyerere was not a leader who followed the diktats of Western 
governments unless he also believed it to be right. While the changing international 
environment may have figured in Nyerere’s reckoning, I argue that the main motive of 
Nyerere was to revitalise CCM. 
 
By the early 1990s, the liberalisation of Tanzania’s economy had put strains on the 
ruling party. Corruption was seen as rampant in the ruling party, and CCM had been 
nicknamed in parts of the country as “Chukua Chako Mapema” – Pocket what is at your 
disposal quickly (Snyder 2008: 290). Dean McHenry argues that Nyerere called for 
multiparty democracy as a way of revitalising CCM. Nyerere described the party in 
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1987 as “going to sleep”. McHenry argues that, as in 1962 when Nyerere resigned as 
leader to reinvent the link between the party and the broader population, so the move 
to multiparty democracy was a move to “reawaken” CCM. Engagement with the party 
was slipping, with falling attendance at local cell and branch meetings, a failure to pay 
membership dues, and a failure to elect local party leaders in many branches (McHenry 
1994: 55-56). So, “the transition to democracy is the result primarily of the persuasive 
powers of Julius Nyerere and of the gradual institutionalization of new values within the 
ruling elite” (Hyden 1999: 154). 
 
In 1991, President Mwinyi appointed a commission under Chief Justice Francis Nyalali 
to investigate the possibility of moving from a single-party system to multipartyism.  In 
the broad-ranging consultation, the Nyalali Commission found that 77% of Tanzanians 
wanted to retain the single-party system (Chaligha, Mattes et al. 2002: 5). Nevertheless, 
the Commission recommended that Tanzania move away from a one-party state. The 
Commission recognised that, despite the fact that so many of the population called for 
the retention of the single-party system, there was still widespread dissatisfaction with 
the political scene in the country. Despite their support for a one-party system, 
respondents demanded changes in the political and economic policies, and 
accountability of  CCM (Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo 2003: 122). There was the 
concern that, given the problems that CCM was perceived as having caused, to have 
many parties along the line of CCM would only cause greater misery – “if one CCM has 
brought us such misery, many CCMs will finish us off” (Snyder 2008: 290).  
 
The recommendation of the Commission that Tanzania move away from the one-party 
system was not subject to public or parliamentary debate. Rather, a delegates 
conference of CCM accepted the report without discussion in February 1992 (Baregu 
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2000: 63). CCM retained the initiative, and thus was able to shape the democratisation 
process. While the party followed the Commission’s recommendations in introducing 
multiparty democracy, other changes recommended by the Commission were not 
implemented. For example, the Commission recommended that forty repressive and 
unconstitutional laws be amended or repealed63 . CCM, however, did not do so, and the 
laws remained in place (Tripp 2000: 198). For example, the Preventive Detention Act, 
first put on the books in colonial times to combat the nationalist movement, remained 
law despite the recommendations of the Commission (Hyden 1999: 145).  
 
One of the key issues, I argue, that emerged from the democratisation process in 
Tanzania was that CCM had access to far more resources than the other parties. The 
Nyalali Commission recommended that CCM divest itself of high-value assets, such as 
prime real-estate and sports stadiums (ARD 2003: 30). This recommendation was not 
followed, and CCM retained possession of all its assets. This has translated into a 
significant income for CCM. This is possibly an advantage that was exasperated by one 
recommendation of the Nyalali Commission that was implemented: the restructuring of 
CCM. CCM had previously had a large bureaucracy, but as the role of the party 
changed to one primarily concerned with contesting elections then the bureaucracy was 
stripped down at the national, Regional and District offices (Msekwa 1995: 6). This 
not only saved funds in itself (Mmuya 1998: 46-47), it also has apparently has freed up 
a large amount of office space for private use. In Moshi town, for instance, CCM is a 
major landlord for office space. This wealth leads to concerns amongst opposition 
parties. A member of CHADEMA in Marangu described to me the problems with 
CCM’s wealth, concluding “that money can be used to bribe people”, as well as other 
dirty tricks such as the secret funding of opposition parties and candidates in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Most of the 40 laws applied only to Zanzibar (Nyalali 1995: 16). 
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create discord within the opposition (Fieldnotes, 17/4/2007). Even if such illegal 
practices are discounted, I argue that CCM’s enormous funds contribute to the lack of 
a level playing field in Tanzania’s politics. 
 
One of the key aspects, and perhaps the most successful, of the transition to 
multipartyism was the banning of parties along racial, religious or ethnic lines. Article 
20(2) of the revised constitution states: 
it shall not be lawful for any political entity to be registered 
which according to its constitution or policy – 
a) aims at promoting or furthering the interests of: 
i) any religious faith or group; 
ii) any tribal group, place of origin, race or 
gender; 
iii) only a particular area within any part of the 
United Republic  
 
(United Republic of Tanzania 1998) 
 
Independent presidential or parliamentary candidates are banned (Makulilo and 
Raphael 2010: 7). It falls to the Registrar of Political Parties, appointed by the 
president, to govern whether political parties meet the requirements for registration. 
 There is a requirement under the Political Parties Act of 1992 that in order to be 
registered, parties must obtain 200 signatures from voters from at least 10 of Tanzania’s 
26 regions. At least 2 of those regions must be from Zanzibar, at least one from Unguja 
and at least one from Pemba (Moroff 2010b: 9). While the Registrar has the power to 
refuse to register a party for the reason that it was based on ethnicity, region or religion, 
in practice the Registrar seems to prefer to use inadequate signatures as the reason for 
not registering a party. For example, in 1992 the Reverend Mtikila’s unregistered 
Democratic Party was causing religious and racial tensions to rise in Dar es Salaam. 
Registration for the DP was refused. Rather than not registering the party for reason of 
religious or discriminatory policies of the party, the Registrar instead denied registration 
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on the basis that the party had not received enough signatures from Zanzibar (Moroff 
2010a: 754). This was a less controversial means of denying the party registration than 
doing so over the DP’s issues with the Union. It is argued by Hoffman and Robinson 
that the requirements for party registration have served as an impediment to the 
registering of new parties (Hoffman and Robinson 2009: 129-130). Certainly, over fifty 
parties have attempted to register yet failed to meet the registration requirements 
(Moroff 2010a: 755). Yet it is not at all clear, as Hoffman and Robinson argue, that this 
presents a major hindrance to democracy in Tanzania; if a party is unable to muster the 
resources to gather the necessary signatures nationally, by fair means or foul, then it 
seems to me that they also lack the capability to fight elections competitively. 
 
While the constitutional and legal rules prohibit the formation of ethnically-based 
parties, there are other arguably more important reasons why ethnically-based parties 
have not been formed in Tanzania. The first is a simple question of demographics. With 
the broad ethnic diversity in Tanzania, it does not make electoral sense for a 
presidential candidate to push their ethnic affiliation as a source of votes.  Yet, as with 
what Susan Geiger described as the “lacks and absences” theory of Tanzanian 
nationalism, there are more important issues occurring. There is a great value placed on 
Tanzania’s national unity. Tribalism is taboo. Tanzania’s national unity is very much 
valued, as is illustrated in the way that CCM is able to mobilise these forces to their 
own advantage. 
 
Elections in Tanzania have been analysed as being far more based on the personalities of 
the candidates, than on the policies or ideological positions of the parties (Hyden 1999: 
149; Baregu 2000: 71; Whitehead 2000: 6; Mørck 2006: 6). There are a number of 
reasons why this is the case. In the historic context, Tanzania under one-party rule had 
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competitive elections between prospective parliamentary candidates, each standing on 
the TANU/CCM platform. Thus, for the previous thirty years prior to multiparty rule 
and five general elections, I argue that the choice on offer had been essentially a choice 
based on the personalities of the candidates. Added to this is a weakness in opposition 
parties (Baregu 2000). While many political parties sprang up after the introduction of 
multipartyism, most had similar ideological positions, being broadly social democratic 
and capitalist in outlook (Whitehead 2000: 9). Few proved to be effective organisations 
and most lacked a coherent ideological or political platform. This was in part due to the 
weakness in civil society in Tanzania. There was no popular movement for multiparty 
democracy that could be translated into a political party. Civil society has been analysed 
in the literature as an important component in the democratisation of African states, 
including, but not limited to, the formation of new political parties (Habeson 1994). In 
neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Kenya, it was the trade union movement 
and other civil society groups that formed the basis for opposition parties (Kelsall 2003: 
59-60). The weakness of civil society in Tanzania has limited the opportunities for 
parties to emerge along similar lines. Furthermore, the state of political parties since the 
liberalisation of the political system has led civil society organisations actively to avoid 
involvement or engagement with them. In the late 1990s, women’s, human rights and 
lawyers’ organisations met to discuss the possibility of constitutional reform. “One of 
their main concerns was to keep the initiative and leadership of constitutional reform 
out of the hands of the political parties, which they felt had no interest in genuine 
reform and were interested only in manipulating the process for their own self-serving 
interests” (Tripp 2000: 199). 
 
Political parties are thus largely based upon dominant personalities, rather than popular 
movements or ideological positions. Many parties emerged out of elites, often older or 
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retired professional elites with previous experience in the state. The Chagga example, 
through the formation of CHADEMA, will be discussed further below. But, while 
CHADEMA arguably became the most successful example, there are other non-Chagga 
cases. NCCR-Mageuzi was originally founded by Mabere Marando, a former 
government security agent and civil rights lawyer, and the Union for Multiparty 
Democracy (UMD) was founded by former Minister of Justice Chief Said Fundikira 
(Whitehead 2000: 7). As the clashes within parties illustrate, to have organisations 
based upon large personalities is not a recipe for stable or constructive opposition 
politics. Furthermore, a focus on personality risks ethnicity becoming an active political 
issue. 
 
The 1995 General Election – The Candidacy of Augustine Mrema 
 
The first multiparty general election in mainland Tanzania was in October 1995. The 
CCM candidate for the presidency was Benjamin Mkapa, from Masasi in southern 
Tanzania (Mwakikagile 2004: 306). It was Nyerere’s influence that propelled Mkapa 
into the CCM nomination. Mkapa follows CCM’s pattern of selecting presidential 
candidates from the smaller of Tanzania’s ethnic groups. He was a former journalist64 , 
but a quiet man and “relatively unknown internally” within CCM (Maliyamkono 1995: 
34). In the first round of the CCM selection criteria, in the lead was a young and 
ambitious Jakaya Kikwete. However, the relatively-unknown Mkapa received a strong 
boost when Nyerere made a speech that made it clear that he was Nyerere’s preferred 
candidate (Maliyamkono 1995: 32). Mkapa was portrayed as a “Mr Clean” candidate, 
distanced from the corruption of the Mwinyi administration (ibid.: 34). This proved to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  While Mkapa would later become known for his role in the continuing liberalisation 
of Tanzania’s economy, during his time as editor of the internal TANU newspaper he 
was known as “Comrade” Ben Mkapa (Tordoff and Mazrui 1972: 437). 
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be an important factor in the election campaign as corruption became a key campaign 
issue. Mkapa is married to Anna, a Chagga from Kilimanjaro.  
 
Augustine Lyatonga Mrema is from Vunjo in Kilimanjaro. Mrema was originally a 
political education tutor, and a Bulgarian-trained security officer (Mapalala and 
Machumu 2005: 16). As a member of CCM, in 1985 he stood for parliament in Moshi 
Rural, but, in a precursor to his later long legal problems as an opposition politician, 
fought a long legal battle which saw him taking his seat in 1989 (ibid.: 16). Winning the 
seat in the 1990 election, he was appointed Minister for Home Affairs in President 
Mwinyi’s cabinet. Particularly in this post, he took a hands-on approach. A notable 
example was the resolving of a 1992-3 conflict within the church in Meru over the 
establishment of rival dioceses which had resulted in violence in which five people had 
died (Omari 1999). Mrema was sent to negotiate a peaceful compromise, which he 
successfully managed. As a result, he was made Deputy Prime Minister (Moore 1996: 
595). In another example of his popular touch and hands-on approach, as a response to 
civil servants spending time away from their desks on personal business during office 
hours, Mrema ordered the chairs of government officials be confiscated if they failed to 
report for duty by 7:30am (Molony 2005: 5). Yet another example was when he 
personally lead policy officers to arrest a Detective Sergeant of the police force at a bar 
for selling beer for 260 shillings instead of the official price of 199 shillings ("The 
Mrema Phenomenon"  1991: 4). As the result of such actions, Mrema is regularly 
described in the literature as a populist (Sandbrook 1996: 77; Baregu 2000: 72; Kaiser 
2001: 96). He became known as “Tanzania’s Robin Hood” ("The Mrema 
Phenomenon"  1991: 2). 
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Mrema pursued a populist anti-corruption message while in office. In early 1995, the 
Mwinyi government was accused of failing to take any significant steps against the well-
connected company Mohamed Enterprises that had been accused of distributing food 
unfit for human consumption. Mrema promised that the company would be punished, 
but as a result of his efforts he was demoted to Minister of Youth and Culture. Mrema 
accused the Mwinyi government of high-level corruption, resulting in his expulsion from 
the Cabinet (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002: 6). Mrema left CCM and, in election year, 
sought an opposition party to join. 
 
The series of events leading to Mrema’s leaving CCM naturally gives rise to the 
question as to whether leading figures in CCM deliberately provoked him to leave the 
party to become an opposition politician. I argue that there are a number of reasons 
why this could be the case. First of all, the broad popularity of Mrema would have made 
him a strong contender for being CCM’s presidential candidate, even though he tended 
to alienate those working closely with him. Secondly, in order to make multipartyism 
seem to be effective, having a strong opposition candidate could reflect well on CCM 
and the entire process. Thirdly, having such a strong opposition candidate who emerged 
from within CCM helped to shift the tone of the election towards CCM’s agenda. 
Before Mrema left CCM, the most popular opposition politician in the country was the 
Reverend Mtikila. Mtikila was a dangerous figure, for both racial harmony and the 
union between Zanzibar and the mainland. Mrema, on the other hand, was 
ideologically close to CCM, and was even quoted as saying that he thought the policies 
of CCM were superb; it was only the quality of some of the leaders with whom he 
disagreed (Whitehead 2000: 9). However, if Mrema had been deliberately forced from 
within CCM to enter opposition politics, I argue that it was a strategy of CCM that 
came close to backfiring on the party in the 1995 elections. 
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Following his leaving of CCM, six months prior to the 1995 general election, Mrema 
sought an opposition party to join. He approached CHADEMA, at that time chaired 
by the former minister of finance, Edwin Mtei. The account presented by Mtei (2009: 
202-203) is that Mrema insisted on being both presidential candidate and chairman of 
the party. While CHADEMA were willing to allow Mrema to be their presidential 
candidate, he instead became chairman and presidential candidate for the oppostion 
party NCCR-Mageuzi (National Convention for Constitution and Reform). As with 
most opposition parties in Tanzania, the formation of NCCR-Mageuzi in 1992 had 
centred around a notable personality: in this case, Mabere Marando, a former 
government security agent and civil rights lawyer from Mara Region (Whitehead 2000: 
7). Marando stepped aside as chair to allow Mrema to become both the chairman and 
the presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi. After securing the candidacy for NCCR-
Mageuzi, Mrema sought to gather support from other opposition parties who would 
back him for president. Negotiations with the Civic United Front (CUF), a party with 
its main base of support in Pemba, Zanzibar, foundered over the failure to agree on a 
suitable running-mate for Mrema, with NCCR-Mageuzi insisting that the vice-
presidential candidate come from within their ranks (Hoffman and Robinson 2009: 
127-128). CHADEMA itself was suffering from religious and ethnic divisions within its 
own executive committee, and was unable to agree upon their presidential candidate for 
the 1995 polls (Mmuya 1998: 96). CHADEMA thus chose to back Mrema for the 
presidency. The CHADEMA chairman Mtei, who does not mention the CHADEMA 
infighting in his autobiography, describes how he believed that there was a deal between 
CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi. This deal was supposed to mean that NCCR-
Mageuzi and CHADEMA were not to field rival parliamentary candidates. However, 
this alleged deal was soon broken, with NCCR-Mageuzi fielding candidates against 
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CHADEMA candidates. Edwin Mtei himself was standing in Arusha Urban 
constituency, the seat that had been held by another Chagga, Nsilo Swai, in the 1960s. 
Much to Mtei’s annoyance, NCCR-Mageuzi fielded Makongoro Nyerere, the son of 
Julius Nyerere, against him (Mtei 2009: 202-205). Mtei described the deal done for 
CHADEMA to support Mrema as “one of my major errors in life” (ibid.: 204). This 
gives some picture of the divisive nature of Mrema’s character.  
 
Mrema’s presence changed the fortunes of NCCR-Mageuzi. Comparing the local 
elections of 1994, before Mrema had joined the party, with the 1995 general election 
results, Mrema’s presence can be seen to increase the party’s share of the vote 
(Whitehead 2000: 8). The party received a lot of support from university lecturers and 
students (Maliyamkono 1995: 25-26). Much of the support for Mrema, however, came 
from an underclass of poor people known as the walalahoi (Mmuya 1998: 38-39; Temu 
and Due 2000: 707). Walalahoi literally translates as “those who sleep exhausted” 
(Molony 2005: xix), and can refer to the working class but is more commonly used to 
refer to a dissatisfied under class. This is a group that had been mobilised by Reverend 
Mtikila, who in his rhetoric portrayed himself as standing on the side of the walalahoi 
against wealthy Asian business interests (Campbell 1999: 111; Nyang'oro 2004: 48). 
 
With Mrema’s popular touch, these were the supporters that began to offer large 
crowds for Mrema at his rallies. Mtei, unsurprisingly, was dismissive of the support from 
this group. “The campaign turned into a farce. Mrema was attracting such large crowds 
of unregistered unemployed youngsters, pushing his motor vehicle and women spreading 
their khanga for him to walk on, that he thought he was already in State House” (Mtei 
2009: 203). Mrema got his biggest crowds in his home of Kilimanjaro, but he was also 
popular in urban areas elsewhere in the country such as Mbeya, Shinyanga and Dar es 
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Salaam. It has been argued that this support had a large ethnic component, drawing 
support from the large Chagga populations found in these urban centres (Omari 1997b: 
63-65; Kaiser 2001: 96-97). Omari (1997b: 64) argues that Chagga traders operating in 
urban areas became the backbone of Mrema’s campaign, for example through daladala 
owners providing free transport to NCCR-Mageuzi rallies. Kaiser (2001: 96-97) 
describes how parts of Dar es Salaam with large Chagga populations developed a very 
different look from the rest of the city, as the green flags of CCM were replaced by 
NCCR-Mageuzi colours. Kaiser (2001: 96-97) argues that, while Mrema did not 
overtly use ethnicity in his campaign, he was understood as a “Chagga candidate”. 
Mrema was not the only candidate that was strongly identified with a particular ethnic 
group. John Momose Cheyo, a prominent businessman from the Bariadi district in 
Shinyanga, became very much associated with his Sukuma ethnicity. He stood as a 
candidate for the UDP party (Whitehead 2000: 7), largely a one-man show 
(Maliyamkono 1995: 26). In Moroff’s statistical analysis, this was a party that received 
very regionalised support in Cheyo’s home area (Moroff 2010a: 760). 
 
Mrema did not present a policy platform or ideological position radically different from 
CCM. I would argue that this was difficult for him as he had only joined the opposition 
party months before. Indeed, at a panel debate featuring all the candidates on 
September 18th 1995 at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, Dar es Salaam, Mrema was seen to 
depart from his prepared policy notes and to fail to talk about his party’s policies, 
instead speaking on the evils of corruption within CCM (Omari 1997a: 82-86). This 
built on his strong anti-corruption credentials as an anti-corruption campaigner when a 
minister. Mrema also used the rhetoric of the indigenisation debate, arguing that the 
government was favouring rich, foreign businessmen in contrast to the indigenous 
majority in Tanzania. This discourse was largely anti-Asian in character (Aminzade 
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2003: 54-55). In this sense, he took over much of Mtikila’s rhetoric. Given that it was 
the government’s links with an Asian-owned business that had led him to leave CCM, 
Mrema was able to link corruption to the anti-Asian sentiment at that time. However, 
as the campaign progressed, and Mrema’s great popular support became apparent to 
him, he began to make increasingly outlandish statements as he was campaigning. By 
the end of the campaign, he was claiming that within three weeks of taking office, 
President Mwinyi would be in the high security prison at Ukonga (Mtei 2009: 203). 
 
As Mrema was touring Mara Region during the campaign, he made a courtesy visit to 
Julius Nyerere at his home of Butiama. The meeting was not smooth; Nyerere was 
quoted afterwards as saying that he would not allow the country to be “thrown to the 
dogs” ("Election Guide"  1995: 10; Mtei 2009: 203). Nyerere clearly saw Mrema as a 
candidate unfit to hold the presidency. Mtei blames Mrema for unleashing Nyerere to 
support CCM (Mtei 2009: 203-204). Nyerere’s involvement with the campaign was 
not without controversy, as some believed that it was not appropriate for the father of 
the nation to support a particular candidate (Richey and Ponte 1996: 82). 
Nevertheless, Nyerere made a forceful radio broadcast just before the election, in which 
he stated that the opposition candidates were unsuitable, mentioning Mrema by name, 
and that Mkapa was the only candidate suitable to be president ("Why Didn't the 
Opposition Do Better?"  1996: 16).  
 
This intervention by Nyerere was not simply an endorsement by the most popular 
politician in the country, I argue it was also tied closely to CCM’s message that they 
were the party of peace and unity, and that other parties would bring discord and even 
civil war to Tanzania. This message that CCM is the only party of peace, unity and the 
nation is a message that has been pushed in each of the multiparty election campaigns. 
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The comparison is drawn by CCM of the war and ethnic conflict in neighbouring 
countries, compared to the peace in Tanzania. Opposition parties are accused of 
playing on religious or ethnic cleavages. In the 1995 campaign, CCM widely used film 
footage of the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 10). 
Footage of the Rwandan genocide was also shown on the Mengi-owned national 
television channel ITV (TEMCO 2006: 101). Similar footage was shown on a local 
Morogoro-based television channel on the run-up to the 2000 election (ibid.: 101). It 
seems to be a powerful message: “the wider public still identifies CCM with national 
unity and opposition parties with dissension” (ARD 2003: 3). The use of such rhetoric 
by CCM is not without critics. A 1996 court case found that key members of the ruling 
party were being disingenuous in stating that, if opposition candidates were elected, it 
would bring civil war to Tanzania (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 9-10). Nevertheless, it 
remains a continued and powerful aspect of CCM’s campaign rhetoric in each 
multiparty general election. 
 
The polls were held on the mainland on 29th October 1995. However, the polls were 
characterised in many areas by chaotic organisation, particularly in urban centres. Dar 
es Salaam suffered particularly from a shortage of materials, and the decision was made 
the day after the election to re-run the polls in Dar es Salaam only. Support for Mrema 
was visibly high in many parts of Dar es Salaam, with the NCCR-Mageuzi colours 
visible while CCM had little influence (Omari 1997b: 63-65; Kaiser 2001: 96-97). 
While opposition parties cried foul, the polls were re-run in Dar es Salaam 
constituencies on the 19th November. Turn-out was low, at only 42%, in a poll 
characterised by “apathy, confusion and disillusionment” (Richey and Ponte 1996: 85-
86).  
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Table 1: 1995 Presidential election results 
(Source:(Reeves and Klein 1995)) 
 
The results of the 1995 Presidential polls are given in Table 1. As can be seen, Mrema 
performed far more strongly in Kilimanjaro than he did nationally. The results are even 
clearer when the constituency results are considered: in his home constituency of 
Vunjo, he received over 90% of votes cast. In terms of MPs elected, NCCR-Mageuzi 
won 16 seats nationally, and CHADEMA won three (Richey and Ponte 1996: 86).  
 
The strength of the numbers in Kilimanjaro has led commentators to argue that 
NCCR-Maguezi was only successful because of the ethnicity of Augustine Mrema. 
Omari argues that it was simply the ethnicity of  Mrema that gave NCCR-Mageuzi 
success in both the presidential and parliamentary elections in the Kilimanjaro Region, 
and further it was ethnicity that meant the party did less well in areas such as Shinyanga 
(Omari 1997b: 64-65). Such an analysis has been argued against by Moroff’s statistical 
analysis of the support bases of political parties in East Africa. Moroff (2010a) finds that 
NCCR-Mageuzi’s support, while not as national in character as CCM’s, is still amongst 
the widest for an opposition party in East Africa. Cheyo’s UDP, on the other hand, has 
a narrow base of support in his Cheyo’s home region. A statistical analysis of where 
parties in East Africa drew their support reveals that NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995 and 
CHADEMA in each multiparty election did not draw their support solely from one part 
of the country. Compared to the UDP, as well as most opposition parties in 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Party National vote share 
(%)  
Kilimanjaro Region 
vote share (%) 
J.M. Cheyo UDP 3.97 0.43 
I.H. Lipumba CUF 6.43 1.63 
B.W. Mkapa CCM 61.82 20.40 
A.L. Mrema NCCR-Mageuzi 27.77 77.54 
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neighbouring Kenya and Uganda, these parties did not draw support from Kilimanjaro 
alone (Moroff 2010a). 
 
After the 1995 elections 
 
Months after the 1995 election, I argue that a by-election result served to show the 
weaknesses in the argument that Mrema’s relative successes in the 1995 polls were 
purely ethnically-based. In 1996, Mrema stood as a parliamentary candidate in a by-
election in Temeke constituency, Dar es Salaam. Temeke is an area that has been 
characterised as ethnically largely Wadengerko, and mostly Muslim (Whitehead 2009: 
253). If ethnicity were the key deciding factor in Tanzanian elections, this would not 
seem to be fertile territory for a Chagga candidate such as Mrema. As was noted by 
political commentators before the by-election, 
Few observers believe he [Mrema] can win. He is a Chagga 
fighting an election a long way from his power base in Moshi 
and standing against a local man… He is a Christian in a 
predominantly Muslim constituency and has had difficult 
relations in the past when Muslim fundamentalists started 
attacking pork butchers’ shops and he had to bring the full 
force of the law down against them. ("Politics - Mkapa, 
Mrema, Amour, Hamad"  1996: 6) 
 
Nevertheless, Mrema won the constituency with a landslide (Aminzade 2003: 54), 
albeit through maintaining close relations with a local Sheikh (Whitehead 2000: 10-
11). Chagga candidates have since won seats in Dar es Salaam; in 2000, a Chagga, Rita 
Mlaki won Kawe constituency for CCM (Mmuya 2005: 37-38). 
 
A tourist guide to Kilimanjaro, published in conjunction with the state-run Tanzania 
National Parks (TANAPA), contained a section describing some of the history of the 
Chagga people of Kilimanjaro. Concerning recent political developments, they observe: 
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From independence in 1961, up to Tanzania’s first multi-party 
elections in 1995, there had always been a Chagga in the 
government cabinet. That year the Chagga voted 
overwhelmingly along regional lines and against the ruling party 
candidates. The end result was that there was no Chagga face in 
the new cabinet… In the 1960s, a writer had noted that 
modern Chagga political actions cannot be understood without 
knowledge of the past. True. But, as the Chagga learned as a 
result of their 1995 vote, and jokes apart, looking back is not 
the best way forward. (Martin c.2000: 32) 
 
This quote indicates the feeling that Chagga people had been punished following their 
support for opposition candidates in the 1995 polls. There was a shortage of CCM MPs 
of Chagga ethnicity; veteran Chagga ministers such as Basil Mramba had lost his Rombo 
seat in the election. Added to the growing perceived difficulties in the kihamba belt 
described in the previous chapter, this was a difficult period for Kilimanjaro. CCM had 
more successful results in Kilimanjaro in 2000 and 2005. Particularly in 2005, CCM 
was able to mobilise this dissatisfaction to their own advantage. 
 
After his 1996 by-election success, Mrema’s star began to fade. The party Mrema had 
joined in 1995, NCCR-Mageuzi, soon descended into infighting. This has been 
characterised by Aminzade as a fight between the populism of Mrema and an 
“intellectual wing” of the founder and secretary general, Mabere Marando (Aminzade 
2003: 55). However, the divide as described by Mmuya had an ethnic dimension. The 
party was divided into three camps, each self-describing in ethnic terms: the Musoma 
grouping surrounding the founder, Mabere Marando, from the East of Lake Victoria, 
the Haya group, from the west of the lake, and a Chagga grouping, which of course 
included Mrema himself (Mmuya 1998: 85-86). Given that the party was dominated by 
strong personalities, each of whom had their own local powerbases and sources of funds, 
it is perhaps not surprising that groupings took on these characteristics. The party 
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infighting worsened, and resulted in violence at a May 1997 meeting of NCCR-Mageuzi 
(Tripp 2000: 199). 
 
Mrema left NCCR-Mageuzi in 1999. Allegations of theft from party coffers followed 
him to his new party (Hoffman and Robinson 2009: 127), the small Tanzania Labour 
Party (TLP), a party without a single MP. Mrema’s strong showing in the 1995 
elections, and the subsequent victory in the Temeke by-election, was the highpoint of 
his electoral success. By the 2000 polls, as shown in Table 2, his showing nationally was 
down to under 8%. His support in Kilimanjaro Region remained stronger than in the 
nation as a whole, yet even in Kilimanjaro he came in second place to CCM’s Mkapa. 
 
Table 2: 2000 Presidential election results 
(Source: Whitehead (2009)) 
 
The role of ethnicity in Mrema’s political career has been easy to generalise and over-
simplify. From pure demographics, however, it is clear that Mrema was not only a 
Chagga candidate; he received nearly 30% of the vote nationally in 1995, not possible if 
he was appealing only to a Chagga constituency. I argue that his Temeke bye-election 
victory is a clear indicator that his Chagga ethnicity was not a barrier to being elected as 
a Chagga candidate in non-Chagga areas. Mrema presented himself as a man of the 
walalahoi. Nevertheless, I do conclude that it does appear that ethnicity did have a role 
to play in Mrema’s relative success in 1995 and 1996. It seems that – uniquely in 
Tanzania’s multiparty elections – an important element in Mrema’s campaign was that 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Party National vote share 
(%)  
Kilimanjaro Region 
vote share (%) 
Benjamin Mkapa CCM 71.74 48.88 
A.L. Mrema TLP 7.80 41.30 
I.H. Lipumba CUF 16.26 8.76 
John Cheyo UDP 4.20 1.06 
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the Chagga migrant community was mobilised to support Mrema as a candidate. This 
seems to have been primarily working-class Chagga, working all over Tanzania and 
willing to campaign for Mrema. At the same time, for the more intellectual elements 
both within his own party and beyond, Mrema began to be seen as something of an 
embarrassment. Indeed, despite polling over 90% in some constituencies of Kilimanjaro 
in 1995, I found it difficult to find members of the Chagga elite who look on him 
fondly. However, there was a political force in CHADEMA that was far closer to the 
views of the Chagga elite, as it emerged out of the retired Chagga elite. First, however, I 
shall examine CCM’s choice of presidential candidate. 
 
The 2005 General Election – Jakaya Kikwete and CCM 
 
Prior to the 2005 polls, a newspaper commentator observed, “campaigns in Tanzania 
are characterised by two features: easy to be predicted and quite dull” (Muga 2005: 17). 
CCM’s victory in 2005 was never really in doubt. Their candidate was Jakaya Kikwete, 
from near Bagamoyo, on the coast of Tanzania. In 1995, when only in his forties, 
Kikwete had stood in the internal CCM selection process for choosing the CCM 
presidential candidate, coming first after the first round of voting (Maliyamkono 1995: 
34). However, with Mkapa being Nyerere’s choice as a candidate, Kikwete waited a 
decade before trying again, serving as Mkapa’s Foreign Minister for the length of his 
administration, giving Kikwete valuable foreign experience. 
 
CCM’s choice of candidate naturally received attention, as it was a near-certainty that 
the CCM candidate would win the election. Looking at some of the discussions 
surrounding their choice can, I argue, give an insight into the ethnic and religious 
discussions that go on in Tanzania. In the run-up to the selection of the candidate, the 
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“big tribe” discourse came into play. On one Internet messageboard, the following was 
posted as CCM considered its choice [transcribed as-is]: 
for the benefit of the country in terms of peace and stabiliy, and 
fairness to us, those of smaller tribes. We should NEVER elect 
a Chaga, Mhaya or Mnyakyusa, a Sukuma or a Nyamwezi as 
president of Tanzania; at least not yet. you will see what will 
happen if one of them is elected, how his or her people will be 
boasting, saying “You see? We told you we are in control! We 
are better! We are more intelligent! We are more populous! 
We are BIG!” Keep them out of Ikulu65… have nothing against 
them simply because I come from a small tribe. I am against 
chaos and civil strafe that may ensure if one of them enters 
Ikulu. That is why I am against having one of them as president 
of Tanzania…So, also for their own safety, please, please, keep 
the Chaga out of Ikulu; keep the Nyakyusa out of Ikulu; keep 
the Haya out of Ikulu, also keep the Sukuma and Nyamwezi 
out of Ikulu, until other tribes feel secure enough or believe 
that they can really trust them. Many of us do trust them as 
individuals like anybody else. They are fellow Tanzanians. But 
as tribes, I don’t think so. They have too much influence in the 
country. So to neutralize the pernicious influence, keep them 
out of State House… The future of our country is at stake. 
(Ndugu 2004) 
 
Similar concerns over the “big tribe” discourse came up during the campaign. In the 
run-up to the 2005 polls, I asked George, a government employee in Kilimanjaro, about 
whether people would not vote for Freeman Mbowe because of his Chagga ethnicity. 
George said that people campaigning in the country would say that it was not desirable 
to have a president from “one of the big tribes” (Fieldnotes, 22/10/2005). By “big 
tribe”, he explained, he was not referring only to Chagga but also Haya, and Nyakyusa. 
George, a Chagga himself, did not think that this was a particularly serious issue, it “is 
just something people say when campaigning”. I later discovered that George was a 
strong supporter of CCM, which is possibly why he was downplaying the importance of 
the discourse, as it may have favoured his preferred candidate. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  Ikulu refers to the State House. 
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Note the three ethnic groups George used when describing what he considered a “big 
tribe”: Chagga, Nyakyusa and Haya. From a demographic standpoint, these are not the 
largest groups in terms of population in Tanzania. Nyakyusa and Haya have, in many 
respects, a similar history to Chagga in that they were all groups that received the 
advantages offered by the colonial state. These were the very three groups that Nyerere, 
in his 1968 radio broadcast, warned against discriminating against because of the 
educational advantages of colonialism (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 75). These issues have 
retained their relevance, despite the passage of nearly forty years of nation-building. 
 
I found in my research that religion was a concern that arose over CCM’s choice of 
presidential candidate. The constitution of Tanzania states that, if the president comes 
from the mainland then the vice-president must come from Zanzibar, and vice-versa. So 
far, the only Zanzibari president has been Nyerere’s hand-picked successor, Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi. Both Nyerere and Mkapa were Christian. This requirement of the constitution 
developed into an issue over religion in the 2005 polls. Kikwete, CCM’s presidential 
candidate, was from the mainland, and a Muslim. Given that Zanzibar is almost 
completely Muslim, this inevitably meant that Kikwete’s running mate was also 
Muslim. I found that this raised a concern in Kilimanjaro during the campaign that for 
the first time Tanzania looked likely to have both a Muslim president and vice-
president (Fieldnotes, 25/10/2005). Ultimately, this did not seem to be a major factor, 
probably due to Kikwete’s personal appeal and that he was recognised as a moderate 
Muslim.  
 
Nevertheless, I argue that this concern illustrates how religion, ethnicity and 
regionalism interact in Tanzania. If the belief is expressed that the presidential and vice-
presidential candidates should be of different religions, this is not only making a point 
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that pertains to religion. Given that a Zanzibari candidate will almost inevitably be 
Muslim, if the candidates are to be of different religions then it follows that the 
mainland candidate must be Christian. As such, this would prohibit a candidate for 
president or vice-president who came from the mainland areas that are majority 
Muslim. So, in stating that having a mainland Muslim as presidential candidate is 
problematic, then this brings in interlinked issues of religion and region. 
 
It is my understanding that, since the move to multiparty democracy, CCM has become 
a more potent election-fighting machine. Their slogan for the 2005 polls was “Ari Mpya, 
Nguvu Mpya, Kasi Mpya” – new determination, new strength, new speed. A clear theme 
of renewal ran through their campaign. This was helped by the perceived youth of 
Kikwete. While Kikwete was 55 years old at the time of the 2005 polls, older than 
Mbowe, he was very much perceived as a youthful candidate. His perceived good looks 
added to his youthful appeal (Kelsall 2007: 527). It seems to me that, in the context of 
a nation in which elders are usually respected as leaders, it was interesting to note the 
relative youth of both Kikwete and Mbowe, and furthermore that this youthfulness 
seemed to be broadly understood as a benefit for both candidates. It was an aid to the 
CCM campaign with their message of change. The need, and ability, of CCM to 
reinvigorate itself is a theme that has run through its history; from Nyerere’s resignation 
as Prime Minister in 1961 through to the introduction of multiparty democracy CCM 
is a party that has sought regularly to reinvent itself.  
 
Particular attention was given by CCM towards winning over Kilimanjaro to their 
party. Kilimanjaro had proven itself to be an opposition stronghold (ibid.: 526), not 
only voting for opposition candidates but also providing a source of opposition leaders. 
The tactic deployed by CCM was described to me by a senior regional party figure as 
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explaining that people were “better off with us” (Fieldnotes, 5/7/2006). This drew upon 
perceived difficulties following the 1995 election, where much support was given by 
Kilimanjaro to opposition candidates. CCM’s campaign also involved making use of 
CCM’s resources. I was visiting a secondary school outside of Moshi in the run-up to 
the election. Five days before the election was due to be held, the school was provided 
with a satellite dish, reportedly worth 240,000 shillings. Reportedly, several other 
schools in the area had received dishes as well. No great secret was made of the fact that 
this was a gift from CCM. The party was perhaps targeting the school because one of 
the teachers was standing for a seat on the council as a CHADEMA candidate, and 
teachers unions were threatening to support CHADEMA at the election. Many of the 
senior teachers at the school were CCM supporters, although the leadership mostly 
kept their allegiance hidden from view (Fieldnotes, 27/10/2005). 
 
Another tactic used by CCM was to get the endorsement of local leaders. Despite no 
longer having any official position in Tanzania, local ethnic and tribal leaders offered 
their support for Kikwete at large public rallies. In many respects, this harks back to the 
inauguration of Nyerere, where he was anointed as leader by Chief Mazengo of the 
Ugogo Federation, and Petro Itosi Marealle as the Chagga leader (Feierman 1990: 229; 
Maddox 2005: 86). It seems that these ceremonies across the country received much 
newspaper coverage, but there was little controversy that these old figures from the past 
were anointing their new leader. The only incident occurred in Mwanza. As Kikwete 
was being installed as a Sukuma chief by a Roman Catholic priest in front of a crowd of 
45,000, a traditional healer took offence at the political use of this ethnic ritual. The 
healer attempted to prevent the ceremony from taking place and manhandled Kikwete, 
but was prevented from causing any damage by security guards (Kelsall 2007: 527).  
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The Chagga leader who gave his blessing to Kikwete was Thomas Marealle, the former 
Paramount Chief. This was one of Thomas Marealle’s last public acts before his death 
in 2007. In the context of the election campaign, this was a case of another piece of 
carefully-orchestrated political theatre. However, placed in the context of T. Marealle’s 
history, I argue that it takes on a further dimension. In terms of his recent political 
history, T. Marealle had not been a supporter of Mkapa. Rather, T. Marealle had 
offered his support in Tanzania’s previous elections to Mrema. Some believed that this 
was because of personal animosity between T. Marealle and the family of Mkapa’s 
Chagga wife. As such, there was perceived animosity between T. Marealle and Mkapa’s 
wife’s family that stemmed from the political clashes of the late colonial period. In this 
light, it is possible to attempt to explain the political support of T. Marealle through 
the old political struggle between Marangu and Machame: T. Marealle gave his support 
to Mrema because he is from his own area of Marangu, whereas Mbowe’s origins from 
Machame made him less suitable. Such an approach was denied by a family member of 
T. Marealle: “The Mangi Mkuu was never in the opposition. He supported Mrema to 
make CCM correct itself and work for the people. The Mangi Mkuu never became a 
member of an opposition party. And he supported Kikwete” (Fieldnotes, 12/4/2007).  
 
In terms of garnering votes for Kikwete, it was probably not particularly significant. It 
was not an occasion that was widely talked about during the campaign. Nevertheless, I 
argue that the anointing of Kikwete marks a significant moment in T. Marealle’s 
political rehabilitation. It marked his acceptance of CCM. After a lifetime’s journey, 
including time away from Tanzania, T. Marealle was willing symbolically to pass on the 
mantle of leadership to Kikwete. Historically an opponent of TANU, T. Marealle was 
here granting his blessing to one of Nyerere’s successors. It also marks the acceptance of 
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T. Marealle by CCM and the state. He was no longer a figure burdened by his colonial 
history. As his funeral in 2007 would illustrate, he was now a national hero. 
 
The 2005 General Election - Freeman Mbowe and CHADEMA 
 
Opposition parties failed to gather behind a unity candidate for the 2005 Presidential 
polls. As such, a mammoth field of ten candidates stood. Most, however, failed to make 
a significant impact on either the campaign or the final results. Those parties which did 
not receive state funding, including Revered Mtikila’s Democratic Party and Tanzania’s 
first woman presidential candidate, Anna Senkoro, could not afford to hold rallies 
(Kelsall 2007: 526). The broad field did not significantly divide the opposition vote; 
only three candidates received over 1% of the vote: Kikwete of CCM, Mbowe of 
CHADEMA, and Professor Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba of CUF.  
 
By 2005, Mrema was no longer a potent political force. He received far less attention 
than Kikwete or CHADEMA’s candidate during the campaign, either from the national 
media or in the discourse. He received most of his press coverage at the start of his 
campaign. A change in the rules required all presidential candidates to have at least a 
University degree. The picture of him in his graduation robes was his most notable 
appearance in the campaign. He did not seem to have a developed policy platform, but 
did have a broadly populist anti-privatisation message (Mapalala and Machumu 2005: 
16-17). However, as the campaign progressed, the attention of the media swung away 
form Mrema. This is perhaps an indication of the successes of CHADEMA’s 
campaigning. 
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The opposition party that made the most impact on the campaign trail was 
CHADEMA. This party was first registered as a political party in January 1993 (Richey 
and Ponte 1996: 81). There is an extent to which CHADEMA has been understood as 
a Chagga party. Sally Falk Moore, examining the politics of Kilimanjaro in 1993, writes 
of CHADEMA: 
For the Chagga people on Kilimanjaro, it was not the 
declarations of virtuous intention [in the CHADEMA Basic 
Principles and Objectives] but what they knew about the 
leadership that gave the party its identity. The construction of 
the organisation was in Chagga hands… I was told by several 
people on the mountain that, formal universalism  of 
membership aside, CHADEMA was really a Chagga party 
(Moore 1996: 589) 
 
CHADEMA has been perceived to be a party that is based along class and ethnic lines, 
seen as representing middle-class Chagga (Baregu 2000: 72). The ideological position of 
the party was broadly along the pro-business neoliberal economic lines, a “globalised 
post-socialist political rhetoric” as Moore (1996: 589) describes it. 
 
Retirees played an important role in the party. “Closely interviewed, the CHADEMA 
leadership acknowledges that among its most relied upon members and supporters are 
the retired personnel from the public service” (Mmuya 1998: 39). Amongst these 
retirees, key figures were of Chagga ethnicity. These were people who followed 
trajectories similar to those discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, who had spent time 
abroad but then retired to Kilimanjaro. That is not to say that all Chagga elite retirees 
entered into opposition politics. The widow of Nsilo Swai, for example, became the 
Kilimanjaro regional chair of CCM. Nevertheless, Chagga retirees became key members 
of opposition parties, particularly CHADEMA. An example is Edwin Mtei, the former 
finance minister who left Nyerere’s government in the 1970s when his monetarist views 
clashed sharply with Nyerere’s socialism. According to his autobiography, discussions 
	   253	  
over the formation of CHADEMA began in the elite Legion Club in Dar es Salaam, 
with Colonel Marealle playing an important role in the formation of the party (Mtei 
2009: 195). In his detailed analysis of the internal structures of political parties in 
Tanzania, Max Mmuya describes the organisation of CHADEMA as similar to that of a 
business, organised through an Executive Committee rather than through grass-roots 
activists. “CHADEMA has shown a strong business orientation [more] than a political 
one which shows itself not only in its ideology but also in its organisation” (Mmuya 
1998: 58-59). While senior members of the party were indeed of Chagga ethnicity, the 
upper echelons were by no means entirely Chagga. The Secretary General until 2004, 
for example, was Bob Makani, a Sukuma banker (Maliyamkono 1995: 25). 
 
While CHADEMA was in no way an exclusively Chagga exercise, I argue that in many 
respects it was far more a party of the Chagga elite than Mrema’s brash populism. 
Instrumental in its founding were the members of the Chagga elite who left Tanzania 
during socialism. As described in Chapter 4, many of the returning migrants took 
advantage of the liberalisation of the economy to start new businesses. Some took 
advantage of the liberalisation of politics to start a new party, CHADEMA. The 
structures of the party reflected the business orientation of these retirees. As such, 
particularly in contrast with Mrema’s populism, CHADEMA was initially rather staid. 
They did not put forward their own presidential candidate until the 2005 election. 
 
Freeman Mbowe was the CHADEMA presidential candidate for the 2005 polls. 
Mbowe is a businessman from Machame, Kilimanjaro. Unlike Mrema and many of the 
other opposition figures, Mbowe was not previously a high-ranking member of CCM. 
He was most likely a party member in the past, as one elderly informant described, 
“everyone was back then” (Fieldnotes 27/10/05), yet he never stood for public office as 
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a CCM candidate. While leaving him open to charges of inexperience, this complete 
break with the past seemed to be considered an advantage in Kilimanjaro.  Mbowe is a 
well-known businessman in Tanzania. He owns several high-profile businesses in 
Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam, including the luxury Protea hotel in Machame, and 
Club Bilicanas nightclub in Dar es Salaam. The hotel in Machame is built upon his 
ancestral kihamba. Mbowe’s father, the late Alfayo Mbowe Aikael, was also a prominent 
businessman. He is understood in Kilimanjaro to have been a being a very wealthy man. 
He was, according to one informant, “one of the few Tanzanians who managed to 
become rich before independence” (Fieldnotes, 27/10/05). This wealth he used to 
support Nyerere and TANU. The background and links between Mbowe, his father and 
the independence struggle led to Mbowe receiving support in Kilimanjaro. While the 
business interests of Mbowe and his father reflect the capitalist interests of Chagga 
people, Mbowe also had a strong and clear link back to the independence struggle. One 
informant went as far as to say, “CHADEMA is popular because of Mbowe’s father… 
Mbowe is using Nyerere’s philosophy to gain support” (Fieldnotes, 19/11/2005). 
Through linking himself back to Nyerere, this was an attempt to counteract CCM’s 
place as the heir to Nyerere. It is not altogether clear to what extent detailed knowledge 
of Mbowe’s family history extended beyond Kilimanjaro and people of Chagga 
ethnicity, yet his was certainly a very well known family amongst the Chagga people of 
Kilimanjaro. 
 
In the 1965 general election, Freeman Mbowe’s father, Alfayo Mbowe stood against 
Solomon Eliufoo in their home constituency of Hai. Solomon Eliufoo, leading anti-
paramountcy campaigner and briefly President of the Chagga Council before its 
abolition, was a minister in Nyerere’s cabinet, and won the seat easily (Mramba 1967: 
124). There are many stories concerning Alfayo Mbowe’s activities during the socialist 
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period in Tanzania. His political links with Nyerere, having funded the party in its 
formative stages, put him in good stead for his later business interests. He was 
reportedly permitted, despite the import restrictions on the country at the time, to 
import a Rolls Royce car into Tanzania (Fieldnotes, 2/12/2005). Another story 
concerns his involvement with a land deal in Dar es Salaam. Alfayo Mbowe, like his son, 
was involved in the hotel business. He was known in Kilimanjaro for acquiring the 
previously European-owned Kilimanjaro Hotel in Moshi (Mramba 1967: 118). In the 
early 1970s, amongst his properties was the Splendid Hotel, which stood on Samora 
Avenue in Dar es Salaam. According to my informant, he owned this property in 
conjunction with a cabinet minister66 . “[Alfayo] Mbowe had supported Mwalimu 
financially during the independence struggle, and so was an influential person.” At this 
time, the East African Community was looking to build a telecommunications 
headquarters for Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. The site of the Splendid Hotel was 
deemed suitable. The individual in charge of looking for a suitable property, himself of 
Chagga ethnicity, went to the Registrar of Buildings at the Ministry of Lands. The 
Registrar agreed that this would be a suitable position, and sent notice to President 
Nyerere. Nyerere, not realising the ownership of the land, revoked Mbowe’s ownership. 
When Nyerere discovered that the hotel had belonged to Mbowe and the minister, he 
realised his mistake. He decreed that they be given another hotel, in Dar es Salaam. 
This tale showed the political influence of Alfayo Mbowe in the face of the sometimes 
arbitrary powers the state exercised in this period. Having told me this story, however, 
and as I asked further about issues surrounding Chagga ethnicity, the informant realised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  For a government minister to be involved in a business such as this was presumably a 
violation of the post-Arusha Declaration Leadership Code, which prohibited people of 
middle or senior rank in the party or government from capitalist activities such as 
renting out property, earning more than one salary and being the directors of a company 
(Aminzade 2003: 48). 
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that it also contained another message: all of the actors in the tale, with the exception 
of Nyerere, were of Chagga ethnicity. 
 
Mbowe, while an intelligent man who has a great deal of respect from academics and 
intellectuals, lacks the mass appeal of Mrema when addressing rallies. The CHADEMA 
party hired a helicopter for the length of the campaign to move Mbowe around between 
campaign stops67  (Bawazir 2005). The use of a helicopter was criticised by CCM as an 
expensive gimmick, particularly in light of CHADEMA’s campaign promise to dispose 
of the new presidential jet, and that people were only attending his rallies to see the 
helicopter (Mjema 2005). The helicopter received a remarkable amount of attention in 
the media. It also served to frame the debate over CHADEMA. For those sympathetic 
to CHADEMA, it was an effective campaign tool that drew attention to Mbowe’s 
policies (Fieldnotes, 27/10/2005).  
 
CCM again used the tactic, effective in previous polls, of appealing to national unity 
and accusing their opponents of spreading division. At a campaign rally in Mvumi, 
Kikwete talked of the ethnic conflict in Burundi. He accused the opposition party 
leaders, “who are all out to divide this nation along tribal, religious or racial lines” 
(Kikwete, cited in Mwita 2005: 1). Particular criticism was directed to a particular 
policy of CHADEMA, the proposal to introduce provincial administrations with strong 
control over local resources. It appears that this policy was designed to tap into popular 
feeling that resources in Tanzania, particularly mineral wealth, were not going to local 
people. This policy was described in one opinion piece in the press as being in danger of 
“plunging this country into tribalism, something that no peace loving Tanzania would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  To draw the contrast between the funds accessed by various opposition parties, it was 
reported that the Reverend Mtikila arrived at DP rallies in Kangera Region, alone, on a 
motorbike (Byabato 2005: 4). 
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want to see rearing its ugly head… a very fertile material for instability and outright civil 
wars” (Joseph 2005: 7). Criticism along similar lines also came from CCM. The CCM 
minister Basil Mramba, campaigning in his home constituency of Rombo, Kilimanjaro, 
said: “CHADEMA should stop misleading people by advocating outdated policies that 
would cause disunity. We need our nation to stand stronger and united forever… 
.Tanzania eliminated tribal and racial lines of division. Those preaching disunity today 
have no room in the leadership of this country” (Mbowe, cited in Kitomary 2005: 4). 
Note that this was a speech on unity given by a Chagga politician to a Chagga audience. 
It seems to me that the unity discourse employed by CCM, even though directed at 
candidates who happen to be of Chagga ethnicity, is not essentially anti-Chagga in 
content. Talk of national unity is not coded anti-Chagga sentiment. 
 
Campaigning officially began on the 21st August 2005, with polling day originally 
scheduled for 30th October. However, on the 26th October, the CHADEMA vice-
presidential candidate, Jumbe Rajab Jumbe, died suddenly (EISA 2006: vii). While the 
Zanzibari poll went ahead as planned, the decision was made to delay the poll on the 
mainland until the 14th December 2005, to give CHADEMA time to properly select a 
new vice-presidential candidate. Opposition parties, including CHADEMA, objected to 
this extension, as it would add considerable cost to their campaigns. In the immediate 
aftermath of Jumbe’s death, conspiracy theories were flying around about the true 
nature of his death, and possible CCM involvement. These rumours faded, however, 
when it became clear that Jumbe had died from a medical condition in hospital 
(Fieldnotes 27/10/2005 – 30/10/2005). Nevertheless, I argue that it was visibly the case 
that CCM benefited the most from the delayed polls, as they were the only party to 
prepare and distribute new election materials, and produce new poster designs. 
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The financial resources available to CCM, which dwarfed all other parties, were put to 
good use in paying for these new materials. There were also allegations that the money 
of CCM was used for the rigging of the election. It should be noted that the reports of 
election observers and monitors, both local and international, found the polling to be 
broadly free and fair (EISA 2006; Nyang'oro 2006: 3). The Tanzanian Election 
Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) found the elections on the mainland to be “clean, 
free and fair” ("Elections - the Aftermath"  2006: 15). Nevertheless, there was a belief 
amongst some CHADEMA supporters that widespread vote-stealing had taken place. I 
spoke to a high-ranking CHADEMA activist in Marangu. She clearly believed that 
many votes were stolen. She said of Mbowe, “Most of his votes were stolen. Vote 
rigging is rampant… Voting here is a nightmare. Mbowe had many votes stolen.” She 
developed in detail the mechanisms by which election counts were rigged. With the 
polls closing at 4pm, and no vote counting takes place until after nightfall – frequently, 
in halls with no electric lighting – it became very easy to swop ballot papers. She was 
also suspicious about those in charge of aiding illiterate voters, as these were selected by 
CCM. Opposition parties had observers at the count, but she believes that these were 
easily bought by CCM. “It is lopsided towards CCM. No opposition party will win in 
the next 1 or 2 elections” (Fieldnotes, 17/4/2007). In the reports of election observers, 
however, the counting of votes was specifically stated to have occurred according to the 
laws and regulations ("Elections - the Aftermath"  2006: 15; EISA 2006: 30-31). 
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Table 3: 2005 Presidential election results 
(Source: nec.or.tz) 
 
Given the strengths of the campaigning, Mbowe and CHADEMA had a disappointing 
showing. Nationally, Mbowe achieved less than 6% of the vote. It came as a surprise to 
see Mbowe poll so poorly after his strong campaign. More strikingly, the parliamentary 
results for Kilimanjaro showed few victories for CHADEMA or other opposition 
candidates: with the exception of Moshi Urban constituency, won by CHADEMA, 
CCM received a clean sweep of Kilimanjaro. I argue that this was a remarkable 
achievement for CCM, and shows the success of their strategy. Kikwete was a popular 
candidate. As a CCM supporter said during the campaign, “Mbowe is popular. He puts 
his policies across well… If anyone other than Kikwete was standing against him, CCM 
could be in trouble!” (Fieldnotes, 22/10/2005).  
 
The 1995 and 2005 results can be juxtaposed. A crude analysis sees a Chagga candidate 
in 1995 easily winning over Kilimanjaro and coming surprisingly close to becoming 
President, while the Chagga candidate in 2005 struggled both locally and nationally. 
Such an analysis does not take into account the huge visibility and popular support that 
Mrema had even before he left CCM, and how much more effective CCM has become 
at fighting elections. Nevertheless, there is a conclusion to be drawn that, following 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Party National vote 
share (%)  
Kilimanjaro Region 
vote share (%) 
J.M. Kikwete CCM 80.28 72.42 
F.A. Mbowe CHADEMA 5.88 20.61 
I.H. Lipumba CUF 11.68 1.98 
M.C. Mtikila DP 0.27 0.19 
L.K. Shayo MAKINI 0.15 0.20 
E.S. Mvungi NCCR-Mageuzi 0.49 0.40 
E.J. Makaidi NLD 0.19 0.15 
A.C. Senkoro PPT-MAENDELEO 0.17 0.40 
P.H. Kyara SAU 0.14 0.15 
A.L. Mrema TLP 0.75 3.49 
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Mrema’s 1995 successes in Kilimanjaro, the Chagga electorate have moved closer to the 
mainstream in Tanzania. During my fieldwork, the result of the 2005 election came as a 
surprise, and my initial conclusion was that CCM’s hegemony was now complete. 
However, subsequent events proved my initial conclusion to be incomplete. 
 
After the 2005 election 
 
While they had a strong showing in the 2005 polls, dissatisfaction with Kikwete and the 
new CCM regime soon set in. There was a growing dissatisfaction that livelihoods were 
not improving, and that there were few opportunities to determine the direction of 
Tanzania (Snyder 2008: 302). More notably, Kikwete’s regime was rocked by a number 
of massive corruption cases. His Prime Minister and close political ally, Edward 
Lowassa, was forced to resign over his involvement with a power generation scandal 
(Policy Forum 2009: 20). Basil Mramba, at the time MP for Rombo and a veteran 
CCM minister, was charged with offences relating to a 65 billion shilling gold auditing 
fraud (Rosina 2009). This corruption differed from that of previous regimes in that it 
was linked to political corruption: “For the first time in Tanzanian history, grand 
corruption was linked to election finance” (Policy Forum 2009: 4).  
 
CHADEMA had some internal disputes in the 2005-2010 parliament, although not as 
large in scale as any of the disputes in which Mrema had been involved. One of 
CHADEMA’s few MPs, the young and ambitious non-Chagga Zitto Kabwe, apparently 
made a move to unseat Freeman Mbowe to become party chairman. He was, however, 
dissuaded from doing so by senior party officials including Edwin Mtei ("Rift in Ccm 
Now in the Open"  2010: 7-8). Nevertheless, CHADEMA did not implode as NCCR-
Mageuzi had done a decade before, and it remains an effective political party. 
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The 2010 polls were marked by former presidential candidates standing instead as 
parliamentary candidates. Augustine Mrema chose not to run again for the presidency, 
instead standing and winning as an MP in his home constituency of Vunjo. Now in his 
late sixties, and rumoured to be in ill health, he is most likely looking to end his 
political career on a high and to secure himself some income. Freeman Mbowe also 
chose not to contest the presidency again, but stood as MP in his home constituency of 
Hai. The presidential candidate for CHADEMA was not of Chagga ethnicity, but 
rather the party’s MP for Karatu, Dr. Willibrod Slaa. A CHADEMA MP for the last 
fifteen years, Slaa made an impact in the previous parliament by publishing a “list of 
shame” of corrupt politicians, with names including Mkapa, Lowassa and  Mramba 
(Policy Forum 2009: 92). There were reports that Slaa, knowing that the task of 
beating Kikwete was almost impossible and that standing for the presidency would 
mean he would lose his safe parliamentary seat, demanded that CHADEMA pay him 
the equivalent salary of what he would have earned as an MP over five years ("October 
2010 - Election Guide"  2010: 8). Mbowe remains chairman of CHADEMA. 
 
Not surprisingly, corruption was again a major theme of opposition party campaigns in 
the 2010 elections (TEMCO 2011: 57). Kikwete again portrayed CCM as the party of 
peace and unity on the campaign trail (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 10). A few issues 
pertaining to national unity did emerge during the campaign. An Islamic newspaper, An 
Nuur, ran a headline saying, “Maaskofu wataleta Rwanda na Slaa wao – Bishops will 
cause another genocide with their Slaa” (TEMCO 2011: 84). In a separate incident, a 
CCM District Secretary claimed at a rally in Moshi town that CHADEMA had a poster 
in preparation alleging that, if there was a CHADEMA council in Moshi, all non-
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Chagga people would be expelled from the municipality. No such poster was ever 
displayed (ibid.: 55).  
 
Kikwete won the election, as was expected, but with a much reduced majority, 
nationally down from 80% in 2005 to 61% in 2010. Whereas CCM had dominated all 
of Kilimanjaro outside of Moshi town in the 2005 parliamentary polls, by 2010 the 
opposition had made a comeback.  
Table 4: 2010 Presidential election results 
(Source: nec.or.tz) 
 
Chagga Engagement in Politics 
 
Walking to the home of a friend in Uru on a Saturday morning, I noted the following in 
my fieldnotes: 
Walking up from where the bus stops, we [me and my 
informant] walk with another mzee who is also walking up to 
his house… a bit further up, after we had passed the local 
CCM office. I ask if opposition parties were popular in Uru. 
He said that they didn’t have time for politics, they were too 
busy farming and making money! On the coast, he says, they 
have time for that kind of thing, but in Uru they were too busy. 
They weren’t concerned with politics, only economics! 
(Fieldnotes, 22/4/2006). 
 
The assertion that Chagga were not interested in politics was one which I heard 
repeatedly in Kilimanjaro. In the light of the content of this thesis, this seems a curious 
statement. Historically, Chagga were involved in an intense political wrangling over the 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Party National vote share 
(%)  
Kilimanjaro Region 
vote share (%) 
P.M. Kuga APPT-Maendeleo 1.12 0.88 
J.M. Kikwete CCM 61.17 59.11 
W.P. Slaa CHADEMA 26.34 36.81 
I.H. Lipumba CUF 8.06 0.49 
H.S. Rungwe NCCR-Mageuzi 0.31 0.14 
M.B. Mgaywa TLP 0.20 0.80 
Y.N.D. Dovutwa UPDP 0.15 0.08 
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establishment, and rejection, of the Paramount Chief. Indeed, the British saw the area 
as “the most politically advanced section of African population of the Territory” 
(Colonial Office 1949b). Neither could the post-independence or socialist periods be 
described as free of Chagga engagement with politics; as has been shown they continued 
to play a key role in the state in almost the highest of political offices. Come 
multipartyism, political parties were formed on the mountainside, and Chagga 
presidential candidates have played an important role. Party politics in Kilimanjaro has 
been active, as this chapter illustrates. 
 
How, then, can one explain the view that Chagga people are not interested in politics, 
when there is clearly much Chagga involvement with Tanzanian politics? One possible 
reason is that the experience of Mrema’s candidacy in 1995 had resulted in a bloody 
nose for Kilimanjaro, and as such Chagga people are nervous about getting involved in 
politics again. However, I argue that the answer lies throughout Kilimanjaro’s political 
history. The economic affairs of Chagga identity, highlighted by the mzee quoted above, 
are considered central. As the trajectories discussed in this thesis show, it has often 
served Chagga interests best to avoid too much engagement in the political system. 
International migration is perhaps the ultimate expression of this. For despite the 
assertion that Chagga are not good at politics, for the Chagga elite this has been shown 
to be untrue; yet sometimes the most successful strategy is not to play at all. 
Expressions of Chagga ethnicity within the nation are not considered appropriate in 
terms of the strong nationalist tendencies in Tanzania. 
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This thesis examined the trajectories of elite members of the Chagga ethnic group, from 
the mid-19th century through to the present. The study of these people has given new 
insights and nuances into theories of ethnicity, and particularly the role played by elites 
in the imagining of ethnic groups. It also gives a fresh look at the role of ethnicity in 
postcolonial Tanzanian politics, through the macroeconomic and political changes from 
socialism, through to political and economic liberalisation. 
 
The Chagga ethnic group is a particularly interesting group to study with regard to 
theories of ethnicity. While Kilimanjaro receives a great deal of attention from 
academics from many disciplines, few have attempted to examine the breadth of the 
group and reflected upon how this affects theories of ethnicity. Chagga are often 
considered, most notably by themselves, as not a homogenous ethnic group. My 
attention was regularly drawn by informants to the divisions within Chagga. The most 
notable of these is the linguistic variation, and the mutually unintelligible dialects found 
on the mountainside. This throws up some fascinating features – for example, in order 
to maintain a unified view of Chagga people, ethnohistories have to be presented in a 
language that is not a Chagga vernacular. Sharing a common language is often cited as a 
feature of ethnic groups. The Chagga example shows that a common language is not 
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essential; yet, the lack of such a language causes much angst for the members of the 
group. This thesis, however, has attempted to portray Chagga as a group that does exist, 
particularly through their connection to Kilimanjaro and the kihamba. 
 
 In many theories of ethnicity, elites frequently have a key role to play in the 
formulation and imagination of ethnic identities. Yet the elites are not well served in the 
literature, and are usually portrayed as instrumental manipulators of ethnicity for their 
own ends. This raises theoretical difficulties, and it leaves the theories of ethnicity open 
to the critique that they are reduced to a purely instrumental model of ethnicity. This 
presents a difficulty: purely instrumental approaches have the weakness that they fail to 
adequately explain the emotional appeal of ethnicity. A more nuanced approach to our 
understanding of elites, however, removes this criticism. 
 
The thesis offered new perspectives on theories of ethnicity in a number of different 
areas. The thesis began with an examination of Chagga ethnogenesis. The examination 
of the texts of European explorers, missionaries and colonial officials gave a fresh 
perspective on issues surrounding the creation of a Chagga ethnicity. The first point to 
make about ethnogenesis is that, while the name “Chagga” came from outside, there 
was still Chagga elite agency in the formulation of a Chagga group. This is important 
because it addresses some of the concerns that arise from the work of Terrence Ranger 
(1983): that he ignores both precolonial African identities and downplays the role of 
African agency. Thus, my work addresses some of the weaknesses of this approach, by 
giving attention to a broader timeframe than that of Indirect Rule. The second point is 
that my work illustrates the value of taking the longue-durée of the history of an ethnic 
group. Many of the issues that are relevant in postcolonial Tanzania have their roots in 
the precolonial period. The ideas of the explorers and missionaries, particularly 
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pertaining to the landscape of Kilimanjaro, shaped how the Chagga ethnic group were 
seen by the colonial officials. This gave the Chagga ethnic group advantages in fields 
such as education, and Chagga elites were in a position to take full advantage of these 
opportunities. 
 
 The thesis argues that elites have an important role to play. However, the next nuance 
of ethnicity the thesis highlights is the limitations of elite power in influencing ethnicity. 
The clearest example of this is in Chapter 3 of the thesis, which examines the role of 
two elite-authored Chagga ethnohistories. While both books are part of the project of 
Chagga unity, the absences from both texts only serve to highlight the disunities. Both 
works, for example, gloss over the intra-Chagga wars and conflicts of previous decades. 
This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it highlights the point made by Thomas 
Spear (2003: 26), “intellectuals need historical raw materials to construct their stories if 
their reinterpretations are to ring true”. Elites cannot simply make up the history of 
their own ethnic groups out of their imagination. The second, related point is that the 
intellectuals in question in Chapter 3 do not attempt to tell what they would understand 
as untruths to strengthen their case. While it is clear that elites present the facts and 
historical narrative in such a way as to strengthen their own unity agenda, the elites are 
also attempting to give an account without too many inaccuracies. It is difficult to 
conclude that these elites are the manipulative, scheming figures portrayed in parts of 
the literature. 
 
The thesis goes on to examine the role of ethnicity in ostensibly detribalised Tanzanian 
society. The ethnic groups that received much of the benefits of colonialism such as 
education and employment, including the Chagga, remained in a powerful and 
influential position. This is far from an unusual feature of African postcolonies, and is 
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true in much of the rest of the continent. An examination of the Tanzania case is thus 
informative as Tanzania is widely considered a success story in avoiding ethnic conflict. 
The thesis examines the way that the Chagga elite were able to get around restrictions 
designed to equalise development across Tanzania. This also provides a more general 
insight into the role of ethnicity in postcolonial African states. It is not enough to 
assume that it is a natural feature of African states that those in a powerful position 
remain in such a role in the face of great political and economic changes. Rather, it took 
agency, work and, on occasion cunning, on the part of the Chagga people. They did this 
at times against the wishes of the state, falling between the gaps between conflicting 
policy aims of the state, and sometimes with its connivance. Ultimately, however, they 
made use of the advantages that the Chagga ethnic group inherited from the colonial 
era: the educational advantages, plus the migration of the Chagga ethnic group across 
Tanzania. Thus, there is an extent that the attempts at detribalising Tanzania, and 
equalising development across the nation, was a failure. Nevertheless, as I argue in 
subsequent chapters, the strong value placed on national unity prevails in contemporary 
Tanzania.  
 
It is my contention throughout the thesis that central to any understanding of Chagga 
there must be place: Kilimanjaro and the kihamba. I do not draw from this a generalised 
conclusion that a homeland is the essential feature of a definition of ethnicity. Far from 
it: I argue that the Chagga connection to Kilimanjaro is widely considered to be 
stronger than those of other groups in Tanzania. This leads to the important factor of 
elite engagement with the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. I argue that the Chagga elite 
have to be seen as very much part of this moral economy. This adds another nuance to 
our understanding of the role of elites in ethnicity: elites are not isolated from the 
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broader moral economy of their communities, and neither are they just using the moral 
economy to reach their own political and economic gains. 
  
Finally, the thesis concludes with an examination of the role of ethnicity in multiparty 
elections in Tanzania. While commentators at the start of Tanzania’s transition to 
multiparty democracy highlighted the risks to social unity, I argue that their concerns 
were premature. Tanzania has maintained its much-valued national unity. At the same 
time, I argue that ethnicity continues to have saliency and relevance in contemporary 
Tanzania. In the literature on the nation in Africa, there is much praise for Tanzania’s 
successes in nation-building. For example, Edward Miguel (2004) uses the “natural 
experiment” of the different policies of Kenya and Tanzania to compare the two sides of 
the border with regard to the two nation’s policies of dealing with ethnic claims on the 
state; Tanzania comes out as the superior case. This thesis seeks to probe more closely 
the way that ethnic differences were dealt with in postcolonial Tanzania. The problem 
with much of the existing literature is that it falls into what Susan Geiger (1997: 8-9) 
refers to as the “lacks and absences” approach, in which agency is denied to the people 
of Tanzania. A recent example is Elliot Green’s (2011) analysis of the role of 
demographics in explaining Tanzania’s stability; these works have their value, but do 
not present a complete picture because they fail to take into account the agency of the 
actors involved. The other difficulty with the literature on Tanzania’s stability is that it 
tends to present a simplistic dualism between the “stable” and the “unstable”. During 
multiparty election campaigns in Tanzania, CCM has been known to show images of 
the genocide in Rwanda to illustrate the dangers Tanzania faces; clearly, a simplistic 
presentation of the situation. The literature on Tanzania’s stability are, however, in 
danger of presenting the same simplistic dualism. In this respect, this thesis presents a 
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more nuanced presentation of ethnicity that recognises its role while at the same time 
understanding that its existence does not necessary plunge a state into conflict. 
 
Thus, this thesis makes a contribution to how elites and ethnicity are understood in the 
Tanzanian context. Elites are powerful and influential figures, but not all-powerful in 
their ability, or desire, to shape ethnicities. They are not the tyrants that they are often 
portrayed as in the literature, but are part of the moral economy of the communities of 
which they are part. Finally, the thesis presents an analysis of the role of ethnicity in 
postcolonial Tanzania. Despite the fact that the relationship between Kilimanjaro and 
the state has not always been smooth, Chagga elites also contributed greatly to the 
Tanzania nation-building project. Tanzanian nationalism, however, did not destroy a 
Chagga identity. Rather, ethnicity continues to have a role and salience in the 
Tanzanian nation. 
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Apart from the archival and published sources, the fieldwork that made up this thesis 
was informed by a wide range of formal and informal discussions, based in Dar es 
Salaam, Moshi and various parts of rural Kilimanjaro. Below are listed the primary 
subjects for interviews beyond the more informal discussions. Informants were all of 
Chagga ethnicity; the part of Kilimanjaro that they originate from is give in brackets 
after their name. The location of the interview is also given. The subjects of interviews 
were wide-ranging and varied, although usually consisted of a discussion of the 
informants personal history and background, and their experiences as elites over the 
course of macro-economic and political changes in Tanzania. 
 
Phase 1: 24th June 2005 – 19th January 2006 
 
28/7/2005: William (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam 
10/8/2005: Hilda (Rombo), Dar es Salaam 
12/8/2005: Aloyce (Rombo), Dar es Salaam 
16/8/2005: Simbo (Machame), Dar es Salaam  
27/9/2005: Aloyce (Rombo), Dar es Salaam 
13/9/2005: Bright (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam 
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21/10/2005: Melissa (Rombo), Moshi 
22/10/2005: Tom (Masama), Moshi 
22/10/2005: Ezikiel (Kibosho), Moshi 
24/10/2005: David (Uru), Moshi 
24/10/2005: Ezikiel (Kibosho), Moshi 
27/10/2005: Anael (Masama), Moshi 
27/10/2005: John (Kibosho), Moshi 
2 and 3/11/2005: Simbo and David (Machame), Dar es Salaam 
11/11/2005: Linda and Diana (Machame), Dar es Salaam 
22/11/2005:William (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam 
5/12/2005: William (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam 
14/12/2005: Tom (Masama), Moshi 
27/12/2005: Robert (Marangu), Marangu 
28/12/2005: John (Kibosho), Moshi 
28/12/2005: Thomas (Mamba), Moshi 
30/12/2005: David (Uru), Moshi 
2/1/2006: Anael (Masama), Moshi 
3/1/2006: Aika (Machame), Dar es Salaam 
15/1/2006: Emanuelle (Marangu), Dar es Salaam 
 
Phase 2: 16th February 2006 – 28th November 2006 
 
7/3/2006: Emanuelle, (Marangu) Dar es Salaam 
8/3/2006: Tom (Masama), Dar es Salaam 
16/3/2006: Flora (Machame), Moshi 
16/3/2006: John (Kibosho), Moshi 
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22/3/2006: Samuel (Kibosho), Moshi 
22/3/2006: David (Uru), Uru 
13/6/2006: Vicky (Marangu), Moshi 
15/7/2006: Frank (Rombo), Moshi 
28/7/2006 – 28/11/2006: Machame-based research 
30/8/2006: Joseph (Machame), Machame 
 
Phase 3: 13th April 2007 – 18th August 2007 
 
16/3/2007: Simbo (Machame), Dar es Salaam 
16/3/2007: Joseph (Marangu), Dar es Salaam 
16/3/2007: Anna (Machame), Dar es Salaam 
25/3/2007: Marangu fieldwork 
29/3/2007: Tom (Masama), Moshi 
4/4/2007: Sam (Mamba), Moshi 
R7/6/2005 – Masama fieldwork 
14/6/2007 – 15/6/2007 Marangu fieldwork 
30/6/2007 – Safari (Kibosho), Moshi 
 
Additional research was conducted in Dar es Salaam, Machame and Moshi during July 
2008; in Dar es Salaam and Moshi between September–December 2008; and in Dar es 
Salaam, Moshi, and Uru during January 2011. 
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